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ABSTRACT
Anti Virus (AV) software generally employs signature matching and
heuristics to detect the presence of malicious software (malware). The
generation of signatures and determination of heuristics is dependent upon
an AV analyst having successfully determined the nature of the malware,
not only for recognition purposes, but also for the determination of infected
files and startup mechanisms that need to be removed as part of the
disinfection process. If a specimen of malware has not been previously
extensively analyzed, it is unlikely to be detected by AV software. In
addition, malware is becoming increasingly profit driven and more likely to
incorporate stealth and deception techniques to avoid detection and analysis
to remain on infected systems for a myriad of nefarious purposes.
Malware extends beyond the commonly thought of virus or worm, to
customized malware that has been developed for specific and targeted
miscreant purposes. Such customized malware is highly unlikely to be
detected by AV software because it will not have been previously analyzed
and a signature will not exist. Analysis in such a case will have to be
conducted by a digital forensics analyst to determine the functionality of the
malware.
Malware can employ a plethora of techniques to hinder the analysis process
conducted by AV and digital forensics analysts.

The purpose of this

research has been to answer three research questions directly related to the
employment of these techniques as:
1. What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed?
2. How can the use of these techniques be detected?
3. How can the use of these techniques be mitigated?
These questions were effectively answered by validating anti-analysis
techniques, showing how the techniques can be effectively detected and
mitigated as well as by analyzing malware collected from the internet. This
research contributes to the knowledge of malware analysis and digital
forensics by:
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•

Demonstrating that anti-analysis techniques can be very effective at
hindering analysis by the tools typically used by analysts.

•

Showing that the use of anti-analysis techniques can be effectively
detected and mitigated by the use of appropriate analysis techniques,
scripts and plugins.

•

Support of claims virus signature based detection by anti-virus
software can be far less than ideal.

•

Showing that extensive use of packers and protectors are employed
by network based malware collected from the internet to obstruct
signature based detection and to hinder analysis.

•

Support of an alternate paradigm of malware detection that could use
detection

of

deception

and

anti-analysis

techniques

to

detect

malicious software instead of using virus signatures and heuristics.
•

Identification of a Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK) that
incorporates anti-analysis techniques as a core component.

•

Identification of deficiencies in analysis tools given the extent of
available anti-analysis techniques.

•

Determination of an appropriate analysis methodology tailored for
dealing with anti-analysis techniques.

•

Development of a taxonomy of analysis avoidance techniques.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1.

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

This thesis analyses techniques malicious software (malware) incorporates
into its code to prevent and/or hinder the malware forensic analyst from
conducting an analysis of the malware. The effectiveness of these
techniques was validated in this research. A variety of procedures were
developed and examined to determine if these anti-analysis techniques
could be detected and mitigated. Malware collected from the internet was
also analyzed to partially corroborate these techniques. This research found
that a plethora of techniques are available to hinder the malware analyst
and all of the techniques that were implemented in the course of this
research were found to be effective at hindering analysis. Equally, detection
and mitigation techniques were uncovered and also found to be effective at
detecting and mitigating the anti-analysis techniques. Malware and forensic
analysts and researchers will be the primary users of this research.
Aycock (2006, pp. 1-12) defines malware as “software whose intent is
malicious, or whose effect is malicious”. Analysis of malicious software is
essential for computer security management and is emerging as an
important field of research. This is because malware is often targeted at
organizations and is increasingly using anti-analysis techniques to prevent
detection and analysis (Masood, 2004).
Anti-Forensics is described by Rogers (2006) as “attempts to negatively
affect the existence, amount, and/or quality of evidence from a crime scene,
or make the examination of evidence difficult or impossible to extract”.
Kessler (2007) extends this definition in a practical sense by saying “antiforensics, then, is that set of tools, methods, and processes that hinder
such analysis”. The movement towards the employment of anti-forensic
techniques in malware could be attributed to the substantial illicit financial
gain that can now be achieved from employing malware nefariously
(Larsson, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sukhai, 2004; Team Cymru, 2006).
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Commercial Anti-Virus (AV) software is often limited in its ability to detect
and remove malware (Chouchane, Walenstein, & Lakhotia, 2007; Mila Dalla,
Mihai, Somesh, & Saumya, 2008; Xuxian, Xinyuan, & Dongyan, 2007; Yin,
Song,

Egele,

Kruegel,

&

Kirda,

2007;

Zhang,

Reeves,

Ning,

&

Purushothaman Iyer, 2007; Zhou & Meador Inge, 2008). This is essentially
because AV software relies on an analyst having already analyzed collected
malware, extracted a signature and made computer virus signature files
available to the users of the AV software through very regular updates.
Hence, AV software is highly unlikely to detect new malware that is
unleashed on the internet, corporate intranet or that has been customized
to target specific networks because it has not been previously analyzed and
had a signature extracted (Masood, 2004).

1.2.

A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There is a positive feedback loop between malware developers and malware
researchers. As soon as a strategy is developed by one side, the other side
implements a counter measure. Security professionals in the field need to
know how to determine if they are the target of an attack, what the
functionality of malware infections is and how to eradicate infections from
their systems. This is especially true if a signature does not exist and the
forensic analyst is required to analyse the instance of malware. The analysis
process can be assisted if the analyst has up to date methodologies and skill
sets at their disposal.
Virus Total provides a web-based, free and independent service that uses
multiple anti-virus engines to analyze suspicious files that have been
uploaded to their site. Virus Total (2007), on their website, state that
“Currently, there is not any solution that offers a 100% effectiveness rate
for detecting viruses and malware”. In support of this statement, Figure 1-1
shows the results that were captured from submitting a potentially harmful
web robot (bot) that was collected from the ECU Nepenthes sensor
network, to the Virus Total service.
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Figure 1-1 Screen shot from Virus Total showing low detection rate
of submitted bot after examination by thirty one different AV
engines.
Out of the thirty-one antivirus programs that had the bot submitted to them,
only six detected the bot, whilst one detected that there was a low threat
present. This is not a particularly unusual result, evidenced from this
research and supported by other researchers (Bilar, 2005; Masood, 2004;
Mohandas, n.d.; Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Szewczyk & Brand, 2008;
Wysopal, 2009). An analysis of the Win32.Qucan.a worm, by Mohandas
(n.d., p. 20), found that only 50% of the antivirus detection engines were
able to detect the worm that he submitted. This finding is well supported by
the researchers with indication that the situation is deteriorating. Masood
(2004) claims that the percentage of malware that avoids automated
detection is growing every day and “manages to wreak havoc on networks”.
Skoudis and Zeltser (2004, p. 108) emphasize that with new and fast
spreading malware, most computer users would not be able to download a
virus definition fast enough to stop them. Rubenking (2007) says that a
solution needs to be found where malware can be recognized and cleaned
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up whilst not interfering with legitimate programs or interfere with the
normal operation of the computer.
Part of the problem is that AV software relies on detecting signatures of
malware that has already been analyzed by AV researchers and that the
user has already downloaded the latest AV signatures to protect their
computers. If newly released and unanalyzed malware is loaded onto a
computer, it is highly unlikely that the malware will be detected because a
signature will not exist. This undoubtedly can be classified as an incident.
“An incident can be thought of as a violation or imminent threat of violation
of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security
practices” (NIST, 2004, pp. 2-1). An appropriate strategy and priority must
be assigned for the incident. NIST (2004, pp. 3-17) lists a number of
criteria for the determination of a suitable strategy, which include
consideration of:
•

Potential damage to, and theft of resources.

•

Need for evidence preservation.

This information is important if the incident is reportable to the appropriate
authorities and to assist in risk mitigation. However, the difficulty of
obtaining this information must be taken into account. Malware uses a
variety of techniques to avoid analysis. This is because there is an
increasing profit motive for malware authors whose intention is to keep
their malware undetected on computers (Dunham, 2006; Holt, 2007;
Schiller et al., 2007; Sukhai, 2004; Team Cymru, 2006).
A significant body of knowledge is required to obtain this information from
manual analysis, to either develop an AV signature or to determine the
functionality of the malware (Valli & Brand, 2008). A short, non-exhaustive,
requisite skills list for Windows-based malware analysis indicated by Valli &
Brand could include:

4

•

Assembly language programming.

•

Program debugging skills.

•

Static analysis techniques.

•

Dynamic analysis techniques.
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•

Windows Applications Programming Interface (API) programming.

•

Windows Operating System.

•

Computer networking skills.

•

Malware techniques.

•

Reverse engineering skills.

Automated and semi-automated tools exist to assist in this analysis, but
malware can detect these tools and alter its behaviour to hide its presence
and/or modify its behaviour to not show its true intentions. This is
exemplified by the research of Lau and Svajcer (2008). These researchers
found that families of malware will adapt its behaviour if it detects it is
running in a virtual machine by stopping execution or will run an alternate
payload to deceive the forensic analyst. This is because forensic analysis of
malware is often performed from within virtual machines. The advantage of
using virtual machines for analysis is that they can be reverted to a known
state very quickly. This is especially useful for analyzing malware that
employs deception. If a deceptive path is executed that adds no value to
the analysis but corrupts the host that is running the malware, the host can
be reverted back to a known state and analysis continued down an alternate
path of execution.
There is evidence that malware writers are targeting specific organizations
such as banks. Larsson (2007) claims to have interviewed the creator of the
Haxdoor Trojan, which was purportedly used to steal eight million Swedish
Kronor from the Nordea bank. The significant issue raised in the article is
that the creator of the virus is offering to create and sell customized
versions of his malware so that users can steal money from accounts from
the bank of their choice. He also offers support to achieve this, such as
provision of servers for saving the stolen account information, in a nontraceable way. This sort of supported, targeted attack is not unprecedented.
Dunham (2006, p. 11) reports that, in May 2005, an Israeli programmer
was arrested for customizing and selling a Trojan horse, called Hotworld,
to steal proprietary data from specified targets. At least eighty companies
were implicated, including private investigation firms. This is significant
because it is highly unlikely that such customized malware will be detected
5
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by AV software and in addition, that companies are prepared to pay for
stolen information.

1.3.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The objective of this research has been to find answers to the following
research questions:
1. What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed?
2. How can the use of these techniques be detected?
3. How can the use of these techniques be mitigated?
Research question one seeks to find out what techniques malware can use
to hinder the forensic analyst from fully analyzing it. The objective of the
malware is to prevent full discovery of its malicious intent by using
deception and obfuscation.
Research question two seeks to determine how the use of these techniques
by malware can be detected by an analyst. This information is of value to
the forensic analyst so that an appropriate strategy or methodology can be
employed to counter the use of the technique. This information could also
be of value to the forensic analyst to find evidence of intent to deceive or
hide malicious intent.
Research question three seeks to ascertain how the use of these techniques
can be mitigated so that analysis can proceed beyond the engagement of
the analysis avoidance technique in the code so that discovery of the true
intent of the malicious program can be determined.

1.4.

SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This research contributes to the body of knowledge for malware forensic
analysis with particular emphasis given to the advancement of the analysis
of the anti-analysis capability of malware.
The conduct of this research shows that there is a very large variety of antianalysis techniques malware can incorporate to hinder analysis and avoid
6
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detection. This was determined primarily from a search of the literature and
from validating the techniques in small, standalone programs and observing
the effect on common analysis tools such as debuggers using quasiexperimentation. A taxonomy of anti-analysis techniques was developed
during the course of this research that amalgamates the classification of
techniques from key papers.
The detection of anti-analysis techniques feature far less in the literature
than does the discussion of the incorporation of anti-analysis techniques.
Detection of anti-analysis techniques in code would not only assist the
analyst in investigation of malicious intent and the attempt at deception, it
also appears that detection of anti-analysis techniques may be a very good
indicator that the code has a malicious intent. This research supports other
researcher’s claims that existing AV software, that uses signatures and
heuristics, is less than ideal at detecting malware, especially malware that
has not been analyzed before. Analysis of network based malware collected
from the internet for the purposes of this research is shown to nearly all
contain a measure of anti-analysis techniques.

Hence this research

supports a new paradigm for AV software to rely less on signature detection
and to be focused more on the detection of anti-analysis techniques as a
good indicator that program under investigation is malicious.
Plugins exist for popular debuggers to hide its presence from discovery by
malware that can incorporate anti-analysis techniques. These plugins focus
primarily on hiding the presence of the debugger and ordinarily do not log
or notify the analyst of the presence of anti-analysis techniques in the code
that is being analyzed. This is a significant omission if malicious intent is
being investigated, because it will simply not be logged. This research
shows that the coverage of mitigation techniques of plugins is much less
than the number of anti-analysis techniques that are available. This is
significant because a false sense of security from using the plugins may lead
to the analyst not conducting a thorough analysis of the malware and being
the subject of deception. This suggests a deficiency in existing tools.
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A variety of scripting languages and Application Programming Interfaces
(API) exist to extend popular debuggers. This research shows how they can
be incorporated to successfully detect and mitigate the use of anti-analysis
techniques. Given the claim by this research that existing plugins have
severe limitations due to their lack of coverage of anti-analysis techniques
and lack of logging functionality, scripting of debuggers is an essential skill
required for analyzing malicious software. In addition, this research shows
that the extent of knowledge required to analyze malware is extensive. A
proposed Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge was initiated by the conduct
of this research where the treatment of anti-analysis techniques is a key
and vital component.
This research examines some of the more well known methodologies for
analyzing malware. A suitable methodology that detects the presence of
anti-forensic techniques during the analysis process and then mitigates the
technique has been identified through the conduct of this research.
This research could also prove to be of benefit to software engineering
where requirements dictate that the Intellectual Property (IP) of the
software has to be protected from reverse engineering. An understanding of
the anti-analysis techniques discussed in this thesis that can be used to
hinder the reverse engineering of code could assist in validating such a
requirement through Test and Evaluation (T&E).

1.5.

STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS

Chapter 1 of this thesis presents an overview of this thesis, a statement of
the problem, the research questions this thesis addresses and highlights the
significance of this research for the digital forensic investigator. Malware
invariably incorporates anti-forensic techniques and AV software cannot be
relied upon to detect the presence of malicious code. This necessitates the
development of an appropriate methodology to reveal the true intent of
malware.
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature. It establishes the foundation
for this research by defining key terminology, models, classifications, anti8
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forensic techniques, previous studies and models to reveal and support lines
of enquiry not discussed in the literature.
Chapter 3 justifies the selection of the most appropriate research method,
the conceptual framework and research design to address the research
questions. The selected research method to address the research questions
is positivist, empirical and quasi-experimental. Two lines of experimentation
were identified. The first was to implement a number of anti-forensic
techniques in small, standalone programs to determine their effectiveness
against the software tools likely to be employed by a digital forensic analyst.
The second line was to analyze network based malware using anti-virus
software.
Chapter 4 presents the results from conducting experiments with antiforensic techniques. All of the techniques were found to be effective, and
that the use of these techniques can be detected and mitigated.
Chapter 5 presents the results of having analyzed network based malware.
The results support claims that anti-virus software is much less than ideal at
detecting malicious software.
Chapter 6 provides discussion of the results and why the results are
significant to the digital forensic analyst. Claims of contribution to
knowledge are discussed together with an appropriate methodology that
can be employed by analysts when anti-forensic techniques are encountered
during their investigations and highlights the limitations of existing tools
and anti-virus software. Further lines onf investigation are also identified.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by linking the claims of contribution to
knowledge to the implications of this research.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Code that protects itself from being analyzed is a significant hindrance, not
only to automated malware detection tools such as AV software, but also to
the manual analysis performed by malware analysts. The purpose of this
literature review is to examine the literature related to:
•

Characterization of network based malware

•

Existing malware analysis methodologies.

•

Anti forensic techniques used by malware to avoid analysis.

•

Malware detection techniques.

•

Packers and protectors.

•

New paradigms for malware detection.

These lines of enquiry trace directly to the research questions.

2.1.

CHARACTERISATION OF NETWORK BASED MALWARE

Malware presents itself as a significant threat to computer users. Various
attack vectors exist as well as the number of malicious payloads that they
can

contain.

Network

based

malware,

such

as

worms,

propogate

autonomously via networks and do not propogate in the same fashion as
viruses do. Network based malware was collected for the basis of this
research, as discussed in the Conceptual Framework section of this thesis,
subsection 3.6.2. For this reason, viruses are not included directly in the
following discussion.

Hence, this subsection introduces worms and how

they propogate. It also discusses the various payloads of worms that can
include, but not limited to, Trojans, Rootkits, Backdoors and Bots. It is
important to note that the payload of worms, such as Bots, have evolved to
incorporate anti-forensic techniques. The anatomy of a worm is presented
to provide a greater insight into how they function, and how their payloads
have evolved to include multiple threats and have become more stealthy to
avoid detection. Current detection methods are also discussed.

10
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2.1.1.

Worms

Network worms can propagate to victim computers using a variety of
methods. A summarized description of the propagation categories listed by
Kaspersky Labs (2007b) is presented in Table 2-1.

11
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Table 2-1 Summary of the propagation methods of worms.
Worm

Propagation Method

Email Worms

The worm could be an attachment to an email, and the
worm is activated when the attachment is opened, or the
email contains a link to an infected site. These worms
spread though:
•

Windows Mail API (MAPI) functions

•

Microsoft Outlook Services

•

Directly to SMTP servers using code in the worm.

Instant

Propagate using instant messaging applications to send

Messaging

links to entries in the contact list to infected sites.

(ICQ and
MSN) Worms
Internet

Spread by:

Worms

•

Copying to network resources

•

Exploitation of Operating System vulnerabilities

•

Penetration of services such as FTP and Web
servers.

•

Take advantage of malware already installed to
install the worm

IRC Worms

Utilizes contacts from the infected user to use Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) channels to send links to infected
websites or send infected files.

File-sharing

Uses the P2P network to download and execute infected

Networks or

files.

P2P Worms

2.1.2.

Trojans

A summarized description of the categories listed by Kaspersky Labs
(2007a) is listed in Table 2-2.
12
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Table 2-2 Summary of the malicious functionality of trojans.
Trojan
PSW Trojan

Functionality
Steal passwords and confidential information and send this
information to a remote computer.

Trojan
Clickers

Redirect infected machines to web sites to :
•

Increment the hit count of a site for the purposes
advertising.

•

For organizing a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.

•

To redirect the victim to an infected site where the
victims machine will be attacked by other malware.

Trojan

Downloads and installs malware on the victim machine and

Downloaders

most likely registers it to auto run without the consent or
knowledge of the user.

Trojan

Consist of multiple payload components to install other

Droppers

malware onto the victim machine so that the installation of
the additional components is hidden from the user, and
perhaps to trick anti virus software which may not analyse
the other components.

Trojan

Uses the infected machine to give the attacker anonymous

Proxies

access to the intenet. These machines can also be used by
an attacker for mass mailing of spam.

Trojan Spies

Spy on user activity through the use of spy programs such
as key loggers and forward the collected information to the
attacker. Can be used to steal banking details and financial
information for the purposes of fraud.

Trojan

Notify the attacker that the machine has been infected via

Notifiers

email, ICQ, or IRC.
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2.1.3.

Rootkits

Rootkits are used by an attacker to evade detection by replacing system
files. Hoglund and Butler (2005, p. 4) say “a rootkit is a set of programs
and code that allow permanent or consistent, undetectable presence on a
computer”.

2.1.4.

Backdoors

Contain a remote administration capability so that infected machines can be
controlled remotely via a network connection, and may not be visible in the
list of currently active programs (VirusList.com, 2009). Activities may
include all the functionality listed above and may also
•

Send and/or receive files

•

Launch and/or delete files

2.1.5.

Bots

The original intention of a robot (bot) was to perform some useful action on
an IRC channel whilst the operator or user were engaged in some other task
(Schiller et al., 2007, p.7). Bots are capable of taking action on a client
machine without a hacker having to have logged onto the infected machine.
A collection of Bots is known as a botnet. The botnet is typically under the
command of a botherder who can dictate the actions of the botnet through
a bot server. The botnet can be divided into divisions which can each be
performing different actions, or if the communication channel to one
division is lost, the other divisions can continue the mission. Bot clients are
modular and adaptive and can be updated with new software, or
commanded to perform a malicious action such as a DDoS against a target.
The attacker may be distanced from the infected machine by many layers
within the hierarchy. The attacker can send commands to an IRC channel
through an obfuscating proxy and through multiple hops (Schiller et al.,
2007, p.30).
A bot typically consists of a module to exploit a vulnerability to gain access
to a target, another module to stop AV software and firewalls, a module to
14
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scan for other vulnerable systems, a module to exploit the system it is
installed on, such as collecting passwords or keylogging and a module that
communicates with a Command and Control Center (C&C). Not only is it
important to remove the bot from an infected system, it is important to
work out how the bot got onto the system in the first place so the
vulnerability can be rectified.
Schiller et al. (2007, p. 24) describes botnet technology as the “next killer
Web application” because organized crime have used it as a force multiplier
to attack the non-computer literate, including the young and the elderly to
derive money. Their discussion continues to say that these criminal
organizations have grown large enough to become a “threat to major
corporations and even nations”.
The evolution of botnets is important to understand. It shows how they
have become more modularized and stealthy as time has progressed.
Stealth is a critical component of anti-analysis techniques. The following sub
sections discuss this evolution.

2.1.5.1.

Evolution of Bots

PrettyPark (Anonymous, 1999) was the first bot client that made use of
the IRC bot for the purpose of remote control over the internet, and
emerged in June 1999 (Canavan, 2005, p. 6). It allowed the attacker to
retrieve information from the compromised system and had a basic
mechanism for updating itself by downloading and executing new files from
IRC. Features of PrettyPark are still evident in IRC bots seen today.
Features discussed by Canavan (2005, p. 6) include:
•

The capability to determine system information such as the version of
the operating system as well as the user and computer name.

•

The

ability

to

retrieve

email

addresses

and

login

names

to

applications such as ICQ.
•

The ability to retrieve network settings, user names and passwords.

•

The capability of being able to download updates to increase its
functionality.
15
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Global Threat (GT) bots began to appear in late 2000 and made use of a
Windows shareware IRC client called mIRC (Mardam-Bey, 1995) that include
scripting capabilities that allowed hackers to put together their own scripts
to connect to remote servers and await commands. GT bots also made use
of tools such as HideWindow (Anonymous, n.d.-f) to conceal its presence on
infected machines and used PsExec (Microsoft, 2008c) to spread itself over
the local network. They also used FireDaemon (FireDaemon Technologies
Ltd, 2009) to install and run as a service and IrOffer (iroffer.org, n.d.) to
perform as a fileserver. These bots were launched as a service by altering
the system startup files (Canavan, 2005, p.7). GT bot also had the
capability to conduct a DDoS attack by flooding. It could spread itself also
by using social engineering ploys including sending an email that claimed to
be from a security vendor and if the user clicked on an embedded link they
downloaded the bot client from a malicious website. GT bots were not
modular, they were all contained within a single package (Schiller et al.,
2007, p. 9).
SDBot (sd, 2002) appeared in 2002 and added the feature of a remote
control backdoor (Schiller et al., 2007). The source code was made
available by the author, as well as a Web page and contact information
through email and ICQ. This made it easy for hackers to modify and
maintain. Variants of SDBot can exploit the backdoors of other malware
such as SubSeven (Sub7Crew, n.d.), Mydoom (Anonymous, n.d.-k),
Bagle (Anonymous, n.d.-b), Kuang (Anonymous, n.d.-h) and many others.
When these backdoors are found SDBot downloads itself onto the client and
infects it.
Agobot (Gembe, 2002) made use of modular design and appeared in 2002.
It uses IRC for C&C, but is spread using P2P file sharing applications
(Schiller et al., 2007, p. 11). It has three modules which retrieves the next
module once the primary task of the module has completed. The sequence
of events is as follows:
1. Delivers the IRC bot client and installs a remote access back door.
2. Attacks and shuts down AV processes.
16
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3. Prevents the user from accessing Web sites including AV vendor sites.
Capabilities of Agobot discussed by (Schiller et al., 2007) include:
•

Able to scan other computers for vulnerabilities.

•

Capable of being able to launch DDoS attacks.

•

Ability to scan for CD keys for games and software.

•

Can terminate AV software and security monitoring processes.

•

Can modify the host file so that updates will not be downloaded from
AV software sites.

•

Can install a rootkit to hide itself.

•

Incorporates anti reverse engineering techniques to make analysis
difficult.

Related bots include Phatbot (Gembe, 2002) which uses public key
cryptography
(Anonymous,

for

communication

2004),

XtremBot

with

the

C&C

(Anonymous,

over
n.d.-d)

P2P,
and

Polybot
Forbot

(Anonymous, n.d.-e). It is also worth noting that this is when the family
lines of bots began to blur and variants appeared which took the best
components of other bots and incorporated those features. It became
harder to determine from which family a particular bot had evolved from
(Canavan, 2005, p. 14). There are reports that AV vendors are becoming
less concerned about identifying the particular bot because of the number of
variants which have different capabilities (Schiller et al., 2007, p. 12).
Instead they are looking at the malicious components of the bot as the
source of identification.
Spybot (Anonymous, 2003) is a derivative of SDBot and appeared in 2003
as open source. It adds Spyware capabilities and collects email addresses,
lists of visited web sites and logs of activities. Variants can also capture
screen shots of the screen, send spam, install a rootkit, control webcams,
kill security processes and other malicious acts. It spreads via file sharing
applications, exploitation of known vulnerabilities and backdoors left by
other malware.
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RBot (Anonymous, n.d.-l) appeared in 2003 and is a backdoor Trojan which
uses IRC to communicate with the C&C. It introduced the use of packers
and protectors to compress and/or protect the malware. It can scan for
shares on networks with Windows machines and attempts enumerate users
and attempts to guess weak passwords.
Polybot is derived from the source code of Agobot and appeared in March
2004. It uses polymorphism to change its appearance of the packed and or
protected binary for each infection by using a different key each time.
The MyTob (Diabl0, 2005) bot appeared in February 2005 and is a hybrid
that uses its own SMTP engine for sending mass e-email to addresses in the
Address Book of the infected computer and has capabilities similar to
Spybot.

(Schiller et al., 2007, p. 15) lists a number of new features appearing as
components for bots. These are summarised as follows:

GpCoder (Anonymous, 2005) – Encrypts a user’s files and then offers to
sell the user a decoder.
Serv-U – An FTP server that enables botherders to store stolen software,
games, movies and illegal material on the botnets under their control. The
data is stored in hidden directories, and the FTP server appears as Windows
Explorer in Task Manager.
SPIM – Spam for Instant Messaging. Can be used for phishing attacks
which provide links to Web sites that download malicious code to victim
machines. An example SPIM message presented by Schiller et.al. (2007, p.
16) is reproduced in Figure 2-1.
ATTENTION...Windows.has.found.55.Critical.System.Errors...
To fix the errors please do the following:..
1 Download Registry Update from: www.regfixit.com.
2 Install Registry Update
3 Run Registry Update.
4 Reboot your computer
FAILURE TO ACT NOW MAY LEAD TO SYSTEM FAILURE!
Figure 2-1 Example Spam for Instant Messaging (SPIM) message to
trick the user into downloading malware.
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2.1.6.

Blended Threats

It is very important to realize that modern malware combines numerous
attack vectors and malicious payloads, such that simple classification of
malware to an individual type or family is becoming more difficult. Such a
combination of threats in an individual instantiation of a malware specimen
is known as a blended threat. Virus Bulletin (2008) describes a blended
threat as “a sophisticated attack using multiple malware types and vectors
to carry out penetration and control of a system”. An example of a blended
threat discussed by Virus Bulletin could be initiated be the receipt of a
spammed email that contains a link to a hijacked web site that uses

iframes running malicious javascript. The malicious javascript exploits
vulnerabilities in the browser of the user which can then execute code on
the users computer to disable security software and download additional
malware. Functionality of the downloaded malware could be to run a spam
e-mail server or to launch attacks against new victims.

2.1.7.

Anatomy of a Worm

Skoudis and Zeltser (2004) describe the anatomy of a worm with an
analogy to a rocket with the following components:
Warhead – Contains exploit(s) to take advantage of vulnerabilities in
software to penetrate a target.
Propagation

Engine

–

Mechanism(s)

to

propagate

itself

to

other

vulnerable machines.
Target Selection Algorithm – An algorithm to select or search for
vulnerable machines.
Scanning Engine – An algorithm and code that searches for machines that
run software that is known to be exploitable, using the code available in the
warhead.
Payload – Contains the individual malicious packages that are installed on
the target machine such as a keylogger, web server, backdoor, firewall and
AV disabler and so on.
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Figure 2-2 is adapted from Skoudis et al. (2004). and depicts the
components of the BugBear.B worm.
Combined Warhead and
Propagation Engines

Payload: Virus and Backdoor
Email

Target Selection
Algorithm:
Harvested E-mail
addresses
and
File
Addresses
and
Shares
File
Shares

File Sharing

Scanning Engine:
No scanning as Email and Share info
available

Firewall/AV
Disabler

Polymorphic
File Infector

Key Logger

GUI Based
Backdoor

Web
Server

Bank Detector

Figure 2-2 Anatomy of BugBear.B showing modular nature of the
worm.
The representation of the BugBear.B worm emphasizes the modular nature
of modern malware. Different components and sub components can be
plugged in or out depending upon the requirements and intention of the
attacker.

Trend Micro Incorporated, a major AV software vendor,

recognizes that blended threats are increasingly being seen on the internet
and predicts that malware will increasingly use tricks to avoid detection
(Trend Micro Incorporated, 2007).

2.1.8.

Defence Methods

Defence methods against malware are typically based on some combination
of the following methods (Farwell, 2004):
Signatures - recognition of signatures of known and previously analyzed
malware.
Heuristics – flagging of anything outside the normal operating parameters
of the system.
Integrity – detection of changes to the integrity of known files.
The typical computer user runs a signature based virus checker that should
download new signature files every day to help protect them from
compromise. However, this is far from a complete solution as it relies on the
signature of the malware being present in the updated signature file. If the
malware that is attacking a computer system is new to the internet, or
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custom written to attack identified targets, it is highly likely that the
updated signature file will not protect the target (Masood, 2004).
Before a signature is extracted and uploaded to the client machines and
added to the virus signature database, the malware must be analyzed by a
malware analyst to determine what the functionality of the malware is, what
changes it will make to system files and how it will change the normal
behaviour of the machine. The extent of infection must be determined to
ensure that infected files are removed or repaired. If the malware has
detected it is being analyzed and has not shown its true intent by not
unpacking and installing all of the files it was going to install, then the full
extent of the infection will not be determined to the detriment of the end
user who requires protection. The first step in this analysis process is
referred to as profiling.

2.2.

PROFILING

Initial examination of collected malware is called profiling (Aquilina, Casey,
& Malin, 2008, p. 286). Profiling of malware is conducted from a high level
of perspective to determine the purpose and functionality of the malware.
This assists in making an informed decision on how to proceed with a more
detailed analysis. There are two general types of file profiling that can be
conducted, namely static analysis and dynamic analysis.

2.2.1.

Static Analysis

Static analysis extracts information about the binary code without actually
running the code. It can include examination of disassembly listings,
extraction of strings, obtaining a virus signature, determination of the
target architecture and compiler used, as well as many other characteristics
Static analysis of disassembly listings of binary code can be technically
difficult. A disassembly of binary code is a textual file that represents the
assembly language code of a program. A program is a series of instructions
and data that a computer executes to perform some series of functions. The
series of instructions and structures of data can be analysed without
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executing the program. This gives the analyst the ability to explore various
possible paths of execution that can take place when a program runs. These
different paths of execution are referred to as control flow graphs and
consist of nodes and edges, where nodes consist of basic blocks of code and
edges interconnect the nodes as potential control flow paths. Control flow
can be dictated by constructs including conditional blocks, switch blocks and
loops. Dataflow analysis examines the way data is moved and changed
throughout the execution of a program (Chess & West, 2007).

2.2.2.

Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic analysis extracts information about the code by observing what it
does whilst it is running. This can include network communications, file and
registry access and modification, interaction with services and other
behavioral activities. Dynamic analysis gives consideration to the services to
provide or emulate for the network based malware to interact with so that
its dynamic behaviour can be observed. The malware that arrives on the
system may simply be the first stage in a process that attempts to
download the real payload in a second stage. This is known as a dropper.
Arnold, Chess, Morar, Segal, & Swimmer (2000) recommend that the
following services may need to be provided through emulation, or via a real
service, to give the network based malware the opportunity to behave in
the environment it would expect on a real network.
HTTP – Malware may try to transfer files from HTTP, through javascript, or
some other scripting language. Typically this is port 80.
FTP – Malware may try to transfer files. Typically this is port 21.
IRC – Bots, in the past, typically used IRC for communications. P2P is
becoming more popular for communications. Typically, IRC uses ports in the
ranges of 6660-6669, but malware can use any unused port.
DNS – Malware may seek to look up an address in DNS. Typically this is
port 53.
Drive sharing – Malware may look for shared drives. Typically this could
include ports 135, 137 and 445.
Email – Malware may look for mail services, typically on port 25.
Packet routing – Malware may try to route packets through various
network devices.
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Skoudis (2004, p. 595) outlines a model where analysis tools are distributed
on a local victim machine and on an external machine, to capture behavioral
aspects of the malware on the local machine and its interaction with
external services over a network. External services as outlined by Arnold et
al. (2000) can be setup on the external monitoring segment. A possible
model for malware monitoring is shown in Figure 2-3. It shows that the
malware is installed on a local machine together with local file, registry and
process monitoring tools, debugger and local network monitoring. Externally
provided tools include a port scanner and vulnerability scanner to see if the
malware has opened up ports, or exposes a particular vulnerability that may
only be visible from an external computer. This is because malware can hide
the presence of open ports on the victim machine and they can only be
seen externally. A sniffer is a useful addition to the external network to
detect the types of network communications that are initiated by the
malware, including attempts to resolve names from a DNS server, attempts
to establish connections to an IRC server, scans for computers that are
sharing drives, or mail servers.

Figure 2-3 Possible model for deployment of analysis tools for
monitoring malware on victim machine and via external monitoring.
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A summarized list of the analysis tools recommended by Skoudis (2004,
p.568) as well as their purpose and analysis type, is shown in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3 Summary of malware analysis tools showing analysis type,
purpose and name of commonly used tool name.
Analysis Type
Static analysis

Purpose

Tools

Use as many antivirus detection

VirusTotal (Virus Total,

engines as possible to assist

2008)

classification.
Static analysis

Search the body of the malware

Strings (Microsoft, 2008c)

for strings.
Dynamic analysis

Dynamic analysis

File integrity check to record

Winalysis (Winalysis.com,

baseline configuration.

2008)

File monitoring. Find which tools

Filemon (Microsoft, 2008c)

are opening, reading and writing
files.
Dynamic analysis

Process monitoring. Determine

Process explorer

resources that are being used

(Microsoft, 2008c)

such as DLL’s and registry keys.
Dynamic analysis

Network monitoring. Uncover

Fport (Foundstone, 2008),

which ports are open, collect

tcpview (Microsoft, 2008c),

network traffic and find

nessus (Tenable Network

vulnerabilities.

Security, 2008), nmap
(Insecure.org, 2008),
wireshark (Combs, 2008),
and snort (Sourcefire,
2008).

Dynamic analysis

Registry monitoring. Monitor

Regmon (Microsoft, 2008c)

registry activities as they occur.
Code analysis

Disassembly, debugging

IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2008) ,
OllyDbg (Yuschuk, 2008) .
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2.3.

OVERVIEW OF COMMON MANUAL ANALYSIS
METHODOLOGIES

A manual, step by step, analysis process suggested by Skoudis (2004,
p.573) for analysis of malware that incorporates static and dynamic analysis
techniques has been reproduced in the following list:
•

Load specimen onto victim machine.

•

Run antivirus program.

•

Research antivirus results and filenames.

•

Conduct strings analysis.

•

Look for scripts.

•

Conduct binary analysis.

•

Disassemble code.

•

Reverse compile code.

•

Monitor files changes.

•

Monitor files integrity.

•

Monitor process integrity.

•

Monitor local network activity.

•

Scan for open ports remotely.

•

Scan for vulnerabilities remotely.

•

Sniff network activity.

•

Check promiscuous mode remotely.

•

Monitor registry activity.

•

Run code with debugger.

The methodology of Skoudis (2004) is fairly linear in nature, after one step
is completed, the next step is entered. It does not explicitly seek to mitigate
the use of anti forensic techniques the malware may be using to hide its
presence, alter the program flow, or detect the presence of analysis tools.
A generalized approach to profiling listed by Aquilina, Casey and Malin
(2008, p.286) is listed and summarized as follows as a series of steps that
may be conducted in a particular order:
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Detail – Document the system details from which the suspect file was
obtained.
Hash – Determine the cryptographic hash of the suspect file.
Compare – Conduct a similarity test against known samples.
Classify – Identify the target platform, high level language of the specimen
and the compiler used.
Scan – Identify the language used to author the code as well as the
compiler used, the type of file and target architecture.
Examine – Use executable file analysis tools to try to determine if the
suspect file has malicious intent.
Extract and Analyze – Extract strings, file metadata and symbolic
information.
Reveal – Identify armoring techniques that will protect the suspect file from
examination.
Correlate – Determine if the file is statically or dynamically linked.
Research – Determine if the file has already been analyzed by conducting
online research.

This list explicitly has a step to reveal armoring techniques that malware
can use to hinder analysis which is not listed by Skoudis. The work by
Skoudis (2004) precedes the list by Aquilina et al. (2008) by approximately
four years and may indicate that the use of anti-analysis techniques
employed by malware has become more prevalent during this time and that
these techniques have to be mitigated before analysis can proceed.
A significant work by Zeltser (2007) is very much, a comprehensive, manual
analysis treatise. It is in the form of a training course conducted by the
SANS

organization

and

is

appropriately

titled

“Reverse-Engineering

Malware: Tools and Techniques – Hands On”. Zeltser begins by setting up a
safe, laboratory environment, using freely available software tools. The
general methodology presented by Zeltser (2007, pp. 1-12) is listed as
follows:
1. Run the malware in an isolated laboratory
2. Monitor the interactions between the system and the network from a
behavioral sense.
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3. Understand the program’s code
4. Repeat the process until enough information is gathered.

What becomes evident throughout Letzer’s (2007) notes and the practical
exercises, is the iterative and recursive nature of this methodology. This is
in contrast to the linear methodology of Skoudis (2004). Starting points, or
clues, are extracted from the malware from static and dynamic analysis and
these are used to focus on the aspects of the code that have malicious
functionality. This approach is often referred to as “hit listing” in reversing
and analysis literature because it is often infeasible to fully analyze a
malware specimen from the perspective of time that can be expended to
this endeavor. In fact, it is to the malware writers’ advantage to make the
code as difficult and time consuming to analyse as possible. The analyst
may not be able to spend as much time analyzing the code as they would
like. This could lead to missing the opportunity to analyse important and
relevant sections of code.
As this information is extracted, the investigative environment is adapted,
such as adding entries to the hosts file, addition of an IRC client or server,
mail server or whatever else the malware expects to connect to. Then the
behavioral analysis can begin again, with the new information, to delve
deeper into the malware to reveal its intentions and how it works. The
iterative and recursive nature also lends itself to dealing with anti-analysis
techniques as they arise and could be a superior methodology to adopt to
detect and mitigate anti-analysis techniques, especially in the case where
detection of the use of anti forensic techniques is an objective.

2.4.

OVERVIEW OF ANTI FORENSIC TECHNIQUES

“Digital forensics includes preserving, collecting, confirming, identifying,
analyzing, recording and presenting crime scene information” (Kleiman,
2007, p. 9). Malware is increasingly being used to commit cyber crime
(Trend Micro Incorporated, 2007) and digital forensics are applied by
investigators to achieve this objective. However, techniques to thwart the
digital forensic analyst are employed by maware developers.
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Today as computer intruders become more cognizant of digital
forensic techniques, malicious code is increasingly designed to
obstruct meaningful analysis. By employing techniques that
thwart reverse engineering, encode and conceal network traffic,
and minimize the traces left on file system, malicious code
developers are making both discovery and forensic analysis more
difficult. This trend started with kernel loadable rootkits on UNIX
and has evolved into similar concealment methods on Windows
systems. Today, various forms of malware are proliferating,
automatically spreading (worm behaviour), providing remote
control access (Trojan horse/backdoor behaviour), and sometimes
concealing their activities on the compromised host (rootkit
behaviour). Furthermore, malware has evolved to undermine
security measures, disabling AntiVirus tools and bypassing
firewalls by connecting within the network to external command
and control servers. (Aquilina et al., 2008, p. xxxv)
An important consideration in the analysis of malware is that anti forensic
techniques are increasingly being employed by developers of malware to
avoid detection and analysis of their code (Brand, 2007; Falliere, 2006,
2007; Ferrie, 2008; Grugq, n.d.; Harbour, 2007; Smith & Quist, 2006). It
was reported in an online article that a speaker at the Australian IT Security
in Government Conference claimed that 65% of new malware “uses some
type of stealth or anti-forensic technology in an attempt to remain
undetected before, during and after an attack” (Kotadia, 2006).

Malware employs anti forensic techniques to prevent the forensic analysis of
its behaviour and its underlying code. This is achieved by detecting the use
of popular analysis tools and debuggers. Once detected, the malware can
modify its behaviour so that it does not perform its malicious action from a
dynamic analysis point of view. From a static analysis point of view, it can
use numerous techniques to make the static analysis difficult and hide its
true nature.
An example presented by Yason (2007, p. 12) has been adapted and
modified by the researcher in Figure 2-4 with comments. It uses the
FindWindow() function from the user32 Dynamic Link Library (DLL) to
identify if the popular debuggers, WinDbg (Microsoft, 2008b) or OllyDbg are
running. If malware detects the presence of a debugger, it can amend its
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behaviour so that it does not perform malicious activities, remove itself
from the system, or, with appropriate privileges, damage the system.
; set up the call to FindWindow to find OllyDbg
push NULL
push .szWindowClassOllyDbg
call [FindWindowA]
; check the result of the call
test eax,eax
; if the result is non zero, the debugger was found,
; so jump to the section of code to display a message box
; note that this is not in this snippet of code
jnz .debugger_found
; set up the call to FindWindow to find WinDbg
push NULL
push .szWindowClassWinDbg
call [FindWindowA]
; check the result of the call
test eax,eax
; if the result is non zero, the debugger was found,
; so jump to the section of code to display a message box
; note that this is not in this snippet of code
jnz .debugger_found
; data
.szWindowClassOllyDbg db
“OLLYDBG”, 0
.szWindowClassWinDbg db
“WinDbgFrameClass”, 0
Figure 2-4 Partial implementation of FindWindowA function to find
popular debuggers (Yason, 2007, p. 12)
Another example by Yason (2007, p. 14), reproduced in Figure 2-5 checks
for the presence of breakpoints by scanning for the byte 0xCC (which
represents a breakpoint) in a region of protected code as defined by the
region:
Protected_Code_End – Protected_Code_Start
The protected code could be within a region of packed code that is
unpacked by a runtime packer. A packer compresses and/or encrypts an
executable program (which may or may not be malware) and creates a new
executable binary file. The packed program includes a runtime unpacking
stub which unpacks the original program into its original state and transfers
control to the original program. Packers may use software protection
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mechanisms such as anti debugging, anti virtual machine, exception
handling and control flow handling to hinder analysis (Sun, Ebringer, &
Boztas, 2008).

cld
mov
mov
mov
repne
jz
Figure 2-5

edi,Protected_Code_Start
ecx,Protected_Code_End – Protected_Code_Start
al,0xCC
scasb
.breakpoint_found
Partial implementation of code to detect breakpoints

(Yason, 2007, p.14)
Most of the literature that discusses anti-analysis techniques only provides
code snippets to accompany explanatory text. These snippets can be
incorporated into working code for validation purposes to assess the
effectiveness of the technique. Work on validation of a subset of these
techniques has been conducted by the researcher and the results are
documented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. A very general, overarching
taxonomy of anti-analysis techniques, revealed through a search of the
literature (Aquilina et al., 2008; Brand, 2007; Grugq, n.d.; Skoudis &
Zeltser, 2004; Zeltser, 2007), includes the following:
•

Anti virtual machine

•

Anti online analysis engines

•

Anti unpacking

•

Process injection techniques

•

Code execution from memory

•

Checksum checks

•

Process camouflage

•

Structured exception handling

•

Import Address Table

•

Rootkits

•

Packers and Protectors

These techniques are discussed in the following sections.
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2.5.

ANTI VIRTUAL MACHINE

Analysis of malware is recommended by Zeltser (2007, pp. 1-20) to be
performed on Virtual Machines such as VMWare (VMware, 2008) or Virtual
PC (Microsoft, 2007). This allows multiple virtual machines to be run on the
one physical machine, all of which can be networked and can each be
running a different operating system. These virtual machines can also be
backed up and restored very quickly and easily. This makes an ideal
environment for the analysis of malware where a known state or checkpoint
can be returned to, and the analysis restarted if required.
However, malware can use techniques to determine if it is running in a
virtual machine as demonstrated by the logic of the following pseudo code
reproduced from a presentation by Smith and Quist (2006) as Figure 2-6.
IF detect_vmware
THEN do nothing, destroy self, destroy system
ELSE
Continue with malware payload
Figure 2-6 VMWare detection pseudo code showing that if VMWare
is detected, the machine could be damaged (Smith & Quist, 2006).
Eagle (n.d.) reports that VMware uses a registry key for the installation
location of Vmware as:
HKLM\Software\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools\InstallPath
Malware can look for the presence of this key to indicate that it could be
running in a virtual machine. Another technique Eagle points out, is to use
the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to iterate though the
network interfaces to see if any of the MAC addresses used belongs to
VMware. Eagle suggests the following to mitigate this technique:
•

Uninstall VMware tools.

•

Change the MAC address of the virtual adapter in the guest OS.
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Innes and Valli (2006) point out that VMWare, in its default configuration, is
very easy to detect through a listing of the hardware and its reported type.
The types listed by Innes et al. are reproduced in Table 2-4.
Table 2-4 Default Hardware Configurations used to find presence of
VMWare (Innes & Valli, 2006)
Hardware

Reported Type

Video Card

VMWare Inc [VMWare SVGA II

Network Interface Card

Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] 79c970 [PCnet 32
LANCE] (rev 10)

Hard Disk

VMWare Virtual IDE Hard Drive

CD Drive

NECVMWar VMWare IDE CDR10

SCSI Controller

VMWare SCSI Controller

Innes et al. (2006) also lists the three MAC addresses assigned to the
virtual network cards as one of the following three values and this can be
detected by running either ipconfig /all or by running the command arp
–a and scanning the result.

00-05-69-xx-xx-xx
00-0C-29-xx-xx-xx
00-50-56-xx-xx-xx
Innes et al. (2006) also point out that VMWare developers left a backdoor
open for the configuration of the virtual machine during runtime with the
following lines of assembly code that have been reproduced from their
paper as follows in Figure 2-7.

mov eax, VMWARE_MAGIC ; 0x564D5868
mov ebx, b ; <parameter of command>
mov ecx, c ; <number of command>
mov edx, VMWARE_PORT ; 0x5658
in eax, dx
Figure 2-7 Code snippet used to detect the presence of VMWare
(Innes & Valli, 2006)

32

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

A sample of the commands listed by Innes et al. are reproduced in Figure
2-8.

04h Get current mouse cursor position.
05h Set current mouse cursor position
06h Get data length in host's clipboard.
07h Read data from host’s clipboard
08h Set data length to send to host's clipboard.
09h Send data to host’s clipboard
0Ah Get VMware version
0Bh Get device information
Figure 2-8 Commands that can be used to detect the presence of
VMWare (Innes & Valli, 2006)
Innes et al. (2006) point out that a VMWare machine could be detected if
running this code was successful and a result was returned from the
function call. Smith et.al. (2006) provide additional techniques to detect
Vmware and Virtual PC.
Porras, Saidi & Yegneswaran (2007, p.7) note that recent versions of Storm
appear to have stopped checking to see if it is running inside a virtual
machine and is instead focusing on hiding themselves from monitoring
software. The significance of this comment is that the developers of Storm
have evolved their malware beyond detecting the presence of a virtual
environment. Possibly, this could be because of the trend for organizations
to use virtualization to host their servers. If the simple approach of the
malware is to not install itself on a virtual machine, an opportunity may be
lost to it if it tries to install itself on a virtual machine that is not an analysis
environment, but a real, business orientated, virtual machine. By loading
their own drivers (sys files), they can be notified when a program or driver
in an undesired list is launched. This takes the malware to a lower layer,
underneath the radar, beneath where the virtual machine runs. This is done
via a call to the Windows API function PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine().
The list of executables disabled by Storm is quite extensive and listed in the
Appendix of the paper by Porras et. al. (2007). The list includes spyware
detection programs, virus scanners and anti spyware programs. This is a
problem because it provides a vector to detect and mitigate the tools of a
forensic analyst as well.
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2.6.

ANTI ONLINE ANALYSIS ENGINES

Anubis (International Secure Systems Lab, Vienna University of Technology,
Eurecom France, & UC Santa Barbara, 2008) is an online malware
behavioral analysis service. Online analysis engines automate the dynamic
analysis process as discussed above. Malware can be uploaded to the site,
and a report is generated that includes extensive information on:
General information such as the MD5 hash and file size
•

Load time DLLs

•

Run time DLLs

•

Packer signature

•

Virus signature

•

Registry activities

•

File activities

•

Process activities

This information provides a high level over view of the actions malware can
conduct on a system and assists in determination of any possible threats. A
post by Xc (2007) to a forum, reported that all of the analyzed files on
Anubis were being executed from the directory C:\InsideTM. This makes it
easy for the malware to check if it is being run from this directory. An
Anubis detection routine was written by OG (2007).
Sandboxie (Sandboxie, 2008) is an application where suspicious programs
can be run in an environment that uses a transient storage area, known as
a sand box, so that data is not written to the hard drive. This allows the
analyst to observe what an unknown program is going to do. However,
Sandboxie can be defeated by “a DLL (SbieDLL.dll) being injected into the
process run under SandBoxie” (Thrasher, 2007). Anti sandbox code was
written by OG (2007).
Norman Sandbox (Norman, 2008) also provides an online service to analyze
malware, but this also can be detected. Krack (2006) notes that the
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presence of the sandbox can be detected by “reading it’s memory, and
comparing it to that of a standard computer”. Then, upon detection of the
sandbox, the malware can halt its execution, resulting in nothing being
logged and detected.
A sample program was written by Stargazer (2006) that can detect the
Norman Sandbox. This is a problem because analysts can submit suspicious
files to online analysis engines such as Norman Sandbox. If the suspicious
file detects that it is running on such an engine, it can alter its behaviour so
that it appears to be benign and the report generated from the online
engine does not reflect its real potential. The analyst could then allow the
suspicious file to run on real systems, unaware of its real, malicious purpose.
Analysts need to be aware of the limitations of their tools and the
limitations of virtual environments, online analysis engines and sandboxes
as outlined in the discussion above in this section. This, in general,
highlights a weakness in dynamic analysis techniques where the analyst
may not be aware that malware has detected the environment it is in, and
is using deception to mask its true capability. In contrast to detailed static
analysis of code, dynamic analysis is faster and much easier to perform, but
is arguably, easier to deceive. The following section addresses the
techniques malware can use to hinder static analysis techniques.

2.7.

ANTI REVERSING TECHNIQUES

Eilam (2005, pp. 327-356) devotes a chapter in his book, on anti-reversing
techniques. Eilam’s discussion of techniques is ordered into the following
headings, and discussed in the following sections:
•

Eliminating symbolic information

•

Code encryption

•

Active anti-debugger techniques

•

Confusing disassemblers

•

Code obfuscation

•

Control flow transformations

•

Data flow transformations
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2.7.1.

Eliminating symbolic information

Release builds that use C or C++ typically remove all symbolic information,
but byte code languages such as Java and C# contain information that is
useful to the analyst. This is because byte code languages utilize names
instead of addresses for cross referencing. These meaningful names can be
replaced by meaningless strings by byte code obfuscators. DLL imports can
also use ordinals instead of names (Eilam, 2005, pp. 328-330). Ordinals are
simply numbers and may appear far less meaningful than a function that is
appropriately named according to its purpose. This can make it harder for
the analyst because a list of the names of function calls can make it easier
to assess the overall functionality of the malware. This could include
identifying calls to modify the registry, startup programs or communicate
over the internet to other computers.

2.7.2.

Code encryption

Eilam (2005, p. 330) explains that this technique is commonly used to
prevent static analysis and is performed after the program is compiled. It
contains a decryption section in the code and the program is decrypted at
run time. This means that the analyst will most likely have to run the
program to let it decrypt itself. This gives the malware control and the
opportunity to use deception to hide its true intent from the analyst.

2.7.3.

Active anti-debugger techniques

Eilam (2005, pp. 331-336, p.331-336) discusses a few active techniques
that are better described in other papers (Ferrie, 2008; Falliere, 2007;
Yason, 2007). However, one technique worth discussion is the use of code
checksums. This technique calculates a checksum for particular functions
and then checks at runtime if the function has been modified by code
patching, or by the setting of software breakpoints. This helps the malware
determine if it is being analyzed if the code has been patched or a software
breakpoint set in the region of code of interest.

2.7.4.

Confusing disassemblers

Two methods used by disassemblers are linear sweep and recursive
traversal. Linear sweep is used by the disassemblers/debuggers SoftIce
(Compuware, 2008) and WinDbg (Microsoft, 2008b), which conducts a
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disassembly in a sequential manner. Recursive traversal (used by OllyDbg
and IDA Pro) follows the flow of each branch and is the more reliable
technique and tolerant to anti-disassembly tricks. Linear sweeps can be
easily confused with junk bytes, but the recursive sweep technique can also
be fooled with opaque predicates (Eilam, 2005, pp. 336-344). Opaque
predicates are simply code that appears to make a decision that could alter
program flow, but in reality, only one branch of execution is possible to
follow.

2.7.5.

Code obfuscation

Eilam (2005, p. 344) says “code obfuscation involves transforming the code
in such a way that makes it significantly less human-readable, while still
retaining its functionality”. Transformation characteristics include potency,
which is the level of complexity added to the code and can be measured by
complexity metrics including the depth of nesting in a particular sequence
and the number of predicates the code contains. Another characteristic is
that the transformation must be resilient. A highly resilient transformation is
hard to undo. Deobfuscators can conduct data-flow analysis to reverse the
transformation. There is also a cost characteristic of the obfuscation
transformation in terms of increased size of the resultant code and slower
execution time (Eilam, 2005, pp. 344-345, p.344-345).

2.7.6.

Control flow transformations

Control flow transformations are another way of reducing human readability
of code by altering the order and flow of a program (Eilam, 2005, p. 346).
Control

flow

transformations

are

categorized

as

computation

transformations, aggregation transformations and ordering transformations
(Collberg, Thomborson, & Low, 1998)

2.7.7.

Data transformations

Eilam (2005, pp. 355-356) explains that data transformations obfuscate the
data of a program rather than the structure of the code by encoding some,
or all, of a program’s variables and/or by restructuring the arrays of the
program.
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2.8.

ANTI UNPACKING

The 2nd International Caro Workshop was held in the Netherlands in May
2008 that focused on the problems and technical aspects of packers,
decryptors and obfuscators as the major theme of the conference. Ferrie,
(2008) a Senior AV Researcher at Microsoft, presented a paper at the
conference that (at the time of writing this thesis) extensively lists what he
refers to as the most common anti-unpacking tricks, together with some
countermeasures. Ferrie’s taxonomy for these techniques is as follows:
•

Anti unpacking by anti dumping

•

Anti unpacking by anti debugging

•

Anti unpacking by anti emulating

•

Anti unpacking by anti intercepting

•

Miscellaneous

The techniques Ferrie discusses in his paper are summarized in the
following sections under the same headings as the taxonomy listed above.
It should be noted that these techniques need not only be used during the
unpacking process. They can be used within the body of the malware itself.

2.8.1.

Anti Unpacking by Anti Dumping

Packed malware can be run until the OEP is reached, which generally means
that the original code is now unpacked in memory. The analyst can then
dump the code from memory and then analyze it. These tricks are used to
prevent an accurate facsimile of the code being dumped (Ferrie, 2008, p. 1).

2.8.1.1.

Size of Image

The SizeOfImage value in the Process Environment Block (PEB) can be
changed so that process access is impeded, as well as stopping a debugger
from attaching to the process. Ferrie (2008, p. 1) says that it breaks
popular dumping tools such as LordPE (yoda, 2005a) in default mode, and
continues by saying that this technique can be defeated by ignoring the
SizeOfImage value in the PEB and call the VirtualQuery() function instead.
This returns the number of sequential pages whose attributes are the same,
and these pages can be enumerated. The first page begins with the
38

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

ImageBase page and sequential pages should return the MEM_IMAGE type. A
page that did not come from the file is indicated by a page that is not of the
MEM_IMAGE type.

2.8.1.2.

Erasing the Header

Ferrie (2008, p. 1) reports that some dumpers such as ProcDump (G-RoM,
Lorian, & Stone, 1999) rely on the section table in the PE header, and that
altering or erasing the table can defeat such dumping tools. Ferrie (2008, p.
2) advises using the VirtualQuery() function to recover the image size
and to determine the permissions of the pages, but that it is not possible to
recover the section table once it has been erased.

2.8.1.3.

Nanomites

As a more advanced form of anti-dumping, this technique replaces branch
instructions with software breakpoints (INT 3), called nanomites. This
technique was introduced by the packing tool Armadillo (Silicon Realms,
2008), now mostly known as SoftwarePassport. Tables in the unpacking
code record details of the nanomite. Ferrie (2008, p. 2) relates that a
process that is protected by nanomites uses self-debugging. This technique
uses a copy of the process as a debugger which can then intercept the
exceptions generated by the debuggee when the nanomite is reached.
When this occurs and if the exception address is in an address table, the
type information is retrieved from a type table. The branch is taken if the
type matches the CPU flags and the destination address is retrieved from a
destination table. Execution resumes from that address. If a match is not
made, a size table is used to retrieve the size of the branch so that the
instruction can be skipped.

2.8.1.4.

Stolen Bytes

ASProtect (ASPack Software, 2008) introduced this technique. These are
instructions taken from the original program and relocated into dynamically
allocated memory. The original programs instructions are replaced with junk
code except for a jump to the start of the relocated code (Ferrie, 2008, p.
2).
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2.8.1.5.

Guard Pages

The purpose of Guard Pages is to act as an alarm if they are accessed, by
raising an EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE (0x80000001) exception. Then the
exception can be intercepted and then checked to see if the page is within a
particular range such as the process image space. Ferrie (2008, p. 2)
reports that the packing tool called Shrinker (Blinkinc, 2003) uses this
technique to perform on-demand compression. It uses this technique to
reduce the committed memory requirements because pages that are not
required do not need to be loaded into physical memory. It does this by
hooking the ntdll KiUserExceptionDispatcher() function and looking for
the EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE exception.
Armadillo uses a variation of this technique to perform on-demand
decryption but requires the use of self-debugging. It loads the entire
program into memory at once, in contrast to the way Shrinker loads pages
only as required. The debugger intercepts the exceptions raised by the
debuggee and if the exception is within the process image space, the
individual page that is being accessed is decrypted and execution resumes.
Ferrie

(2008,

p.

3)

suggests

a

way

of

mitigating

Armadillo’s

implementation by touching all the pages in the image which should make
Armadillo decrypt all pages which can then be dumped from memory.

2.8.1.6.

Imports

Because the list of imported functions of a binary give a good idea of the
overall functionality of a program, most packers alter the Import Table after
the imports have been resolved by erasing it and replacing it with a
different access mechanism. This could be a private buffer that holds real
function addresses that is not dumped by default (Ferrie, 2008, p. 3).

2.8.1.7.

Virtual Machines

The executable code is never visible if a virtual machine is used to unpack
the code. This technique is used by packers such as themida (Oreans
Technologies, 2008), neoGuard (Seculab, 2008) and VMProtect (VMProtect,
2008).

Seculab’s Russian web page extols the virtues of neoGuard to

include a very high level of protection against disassembling and debugging
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and that a custom disassembler and compiler would have to be written by
the analyst to analyse the code that has been protected using neoGuard
(Seculab, 2008).
A simple technique to analyse packed malware is to let it unpack itself into
memory, halt execution and then dump the code from memory and analyse
it. Rolles (2007) reports that new protectors are applying transformations to
the original code so that dumping and analyzing code is much more difficult.
Rolles says this is done by “converting portions of the code into proprietary
byte-code formats which are executed by an embedded interpreter (socalled virtualization, virtual machines) and copying portions of the code
elsewhere in the process' address space (so-called stolen bytes, stolen
functions)”. This means that packers that use virtual machines run their
unpacking routines from within a VM. The advantage to malware authors is
that it negates the usefulness of existing, static analysis tools. Static
analysis is broken because each different VM has a different instruction
encoding format (and this can be polymorphic). Patching the VM program
requires a familiarity with the instruction set that must be gained through
analysis of the VM parser (Rolles, 2007).

2.8.1.8.

Anti Unpacking by Anti Debugging

These techniques focus on preventing or hindering analysis when the
malware is being run inside a debugger, or if a debugger tries to attach to a
running process.

2.8.1.9.

NtGlobalFlag

The NtGlobalFlag is a field in the PEB at offset 0x68 that is zero by default,
but has a value stored in it when the process is running in a debugger. The
value is comprised of a set of flags as follows:
FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_TAIL_CHECK(0x10)
FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_FREE_CHECK(0x10)
FLG_HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS(0x40)
Ferrie (2008, p. 3) emphasizes that other flags can be set in this value and
it is a mistake to simply compare the value of this field with 0x70 to check
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for the presence of a debugger. Although these three flags are usually set
for a debugger, they are not set for a debugger that attaches to a running
process. Ferrie also points out three more exceptions. Additional flags can
be set for all processes with the value of GlobalFlag by the registry key:
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager

The next exception is that all flags can be controlled on a per-process basis
by the value of GlobalFlag by the registry key:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Image File
Execution Options\<filename>
Where <filename> is replaced by the name of the file being executed.

The third exception is all of the flags can be controlled by the Load
Configuration Structure on a per-process basis and was introduced to
support Safe Exception Handling in Windows XP. It also contains two fields
called GlobalFlagsClear and GlobalFlagsSet and can be used to set or
clear any flags in the NtGlobalFlag field in the PEB.

2.8.1.10.

Heap Flags

The default heap of the process can give away the presence of a debugger.
The pointer to the base of the heap can be determined by using the
kernel32 DLL GetProcessHeap() function, or alternatively by directly
accessing the PEB. The handle to the process heap is at offset 0x18 in the
PEB from which there are two fields of interest, Flags at offset 0x0c which
shows the settings for the current heap block and ForceFlags at offset
0x10c which shows the settings for how the heap will be manipulated. Ferrie
(2008) says the presence of a debugger could be indicated by these values
set in the Flag field as shown in Figure 2-9.
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HEAP_GROWABLE(0x02)
HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x20)
HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x40)
HEAP_SKIP_VALIDATION_CHECKS(0x10000000)
HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS_ENABLED(0x40000000)
Figure 2-9 Heap Flags that can be read and used to detect the
presence of a debugger.

Ferrie (2008, p. 4) says that the presence of a debugger could be indicated
by the setting of these flags in the ForceFlags field.

HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x20)
HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x40)
HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS_ENABLED(0x40000000)
Figure 2-10 Force Flag fields that can be read and used to detect the
presence of a debugger.

2.8.1.11.

The Heap

Ferrie (2008, p. 5) reports that some artifacts can still be detected after the
heap flags have been cleared, and that packers such as Themida® (Oreans
Technologies, 2008) look for these. The following flag can cause the
sequence 0xABABABAB to appear twice at the end of the allocated block.
HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED
Whilst the flag HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED can cause the whole, or part
sequence of 0xFEEEFEEE to appear if bytes are required to fill the slack
space between blocks.

2.8.1.12.

Special API’s

Various API’s can be used to detect the presence of a debugger. These are
presented in the following subsections.

2.8.1.12.1.

IsDebugger Present

A call to the kernel32 DLL IsDebuggerPresent() function returns TRUE if a
debugger

is

found.

Because

it

simply

returns

the

value

of

the
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BeingDebugged field of the PEB, the kernel32 call can be bypassed by
directly looking at the PEB. This method can be defeated by setting the flag
to FALSE (Yason, 2007).

2.8.1.12.2.

Check Remote Debugger Present

This call has two parameters, a process handle, and a pointer to a BOOLEAN
variable that will be set to TRUE if it is found that a debugger is attached to
the process (Yason, 2007). The signature of this call is as follows:

BOOL CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent (
HANDLE
hProcess,
PBOOL
pbDebuggerPresent
)
Figure 2-11 Signature of the

CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent

function that can be used to detect the presence of a debugger.

2.8.1.12.3.
The

call

NtQueryInformationProcess
chain

for

CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent

is

via

ntdll

NtQueryInformationProcess() which queries the DebugPort field of the
EPROCESS kernel structure (Yason, 2007).

2.8.1.12.4.

Debug Objects

Ferrie (2008, p. 6) explains that Windows XP introduced the idea of a
“debug object” that is created when a debugging session commences. A
handle is associated with this object and the ProcessDebugObjectHandle
class can be used to query the value of the handle.

2.8.1.12.5.
The

number

NtQuery Object
of

NtQueryObject()

debug
function

OBJECT_ALL_INFORMATION

objects
call.

can
This

which

be
call

obtained
returns

contains

by
a

a

using

ntdll

structure

called

field

called

NumberOfObjectsTypes which is a count of total object types. A mitigation
strategy is to set a breakpoint when NtQueryObject returns and then patch
the NumberOfObjectsTypes field to 0 (Ferrie, 2008, p. 7).
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2.8.1.12.6.

Thread Hiding

The SetInformationThread() call can be used to hide a thread using an
information class called HideThreadFromDebugger. The thread will continue
to run when the function is called, but a debugger will no longer receive any
events related to that thread (Ferrie, 2008, p. 7).

2.8.1.12.7.

Open Process

When a process is loaded into a debugger, the SePrivilege privilege in the
access token is enabled. It is not enabled when not loaded into a debugger.
“Some packers indirectly use SeDebugPrivilege to identify if the process is
being debugged by attempting to open the CSRSS.EXE process” (Yason,
2007, p. 9). CSRSS.EXE (Client Server Runtime Server Subsystem) manages
most of the graphical commands of Windows. The idea behind this is that
the security descriptor of the CSRSS.EXE process only allows SYSTEM to
access this process. A process that has the SeDebugPrivilege can access
any process regardless of the security descriptor. Yason (2007, p. 10) says
that this privilege is only granted to members of the Administrators group
by default.
Packers may try to obtain the PID of CSRSS.EXE via process enumeration. A
possible solution to this technique is to set a breakpoint where ntdll
NtOpenProcess() returns and to set the value of EAX to 0xC0000022
(STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) when the breakpoint is reached if the PID that is
passed is that of CSRSS.EXE (Yason, 2007, p. 10)

2.8.1.12.8.

Close Handle

The presence of a debugger can be detected by making use of the ZwClose
system call. CloseHandle indirectly makes use of this call. Calling ZwClose
with an invalid handle will generate a STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exception.
Falliere (2007, p. 6) says that “the only proper way to bypass the
CloseHandle anti-debug is to either modify the syscall data from ring 0,
before it is called, or set up a kernel hook.”

2.8.1.12.9.

Output Debug String
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Falliere (2007, p. 7) says that if OutputDebugStringA is called with a valid
ASCII string under the control of a debugger, the return value will the
address of the string passed as a parameter. When not run in a debugger,
the return value should be 1.

2.8.1.12.10.

Read File

By reading file content into the code stream, the kernel32 ReadFile()
function can be used as technique for self modification. It can also be used
to remove the software breakpoints that a debugger may have placed. This
technique can be defeated by using hardware breakpoints instead of
software breakpoints (Ferrie, 2008, pp. 8-9).

2.8.1.12.11.

Write Process Memory

The WriteProcessMemory() function of the kernel32 DLL can be used in a
similar way to the ReadFile() function but requires that the data that is to
be written is already in process memory space. Ferrie (2008, p. 9) says that
the use of this technique can be defeated using hardware breakpoints.

2.8.1.12.12.

Unhandled Exception Filter

Windows has a chained Structured Exception Handler (SEH) mechanism to
pass exceptions to handlers instead of crashing the program if possible.
Malware can take advantage of SEH to gain control of the malware to detect
it is being debugged. The malware throws an exception deliberately, and if
its own SEH does not handle the exception, it can deduce that it is being
debugged (Yason, 2007, p. 25).

2.8.1.12.13.

Block Input

Packers can use the user32 DLL BlockInput() function to prevent the
analyst from using input devices such as the keyboard and mouse whilst the
unpacking routine is being executed, and makes the system appear
unresponsive during this time (Yason, 2007, p. 23).

2.8.1.12.14.

Suspend Thread

User mode debuggers can be disabled by the use of the kernel32
SuspendThread() function. Ferrie (2008, p. 9) reports that Yoda’s
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Protector (yoda, 2005b) uses this technique which enumerates the
process and then suspends the main thread of the parent process if it does
not match Explorer.exe (Microsoft, 2008a) which is the parent process.

2.8.1.12.15.

Guard Pages

This technique registers an exception handler, a page is dynamically
allocated to it that is executable and writeable and the opcode RET is written
to it. The page protection is changed to PAGE_GUARD and then an attempt is
made

to

execute

the

RET

instruction

which

will

result

in

an

EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE exception being raised. A debugger may intercept
the exception and hence give away its presence. PC Guard (Sofpro, 2008)
uses this technique (Ferrie, 2008, p. 10).

2.8.1.12.16.

Alternative Desktop

An alternative desktop can be hidden by a technique described by Ferrie
(2008,

p.

10)

and

is

used

by

the

protector

with

its

own

VM,

HyperUnpackMe2 (Anonymous, n.d.-g).

2.8.2.

Hardware Tricks

Various hardware related tricks can be utilized to determine if the process is
being

debugged.

These

techniques

are

presented

in

the

following

subsections.

2.8.2.1.

Prefetch Queue

Prior to the Pentium and later CPU’s, a variety of tricks were possible by
exploiting some ways the prefetch queue for the CPU was mishandled by
allowing the overwriting of the next instruction to execute after an
exception occurred. Ferrie (2008, p. 10) says that the REP MOVS and REP
STOS instructions can still be used to exploit this mishandling. These two
instructions are cached by the CPU and will execute them even if the same
instructions in memory have been overwritten.

2.8.2.2.

Hardware Breakpoints

There are 8 debug registers (DR0 – DR7) that are used to set hardware
breakpoints. Malware can detect that it is being debugged by setting them
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to particular values and checking them later, or by simply resetting them.
Ferrie (2008, p. 11) says that the packer called Telock (TGM, 2004)
employs this technique to detect the use of a debugger as does ASProtect.
Debug registers cannot be set directly in user mode, but other ways Falliere
(2007, p. 11) lists include:
•

Throwing an exception and then modifying the thread context
because it contains the contents of the CPU registers, and then
resuming normal execution with the modified context.

•

Using the NtGetContextThread and NtSetContextThread system
calls through the kernel32 DLL functions GetThreadContext and
SetThreadContext.

2.8.2.3.

Instruction Counting

This technique registers an exception handler and then sets some hardware
breakpoints.

When

the

addresses

of

the

breakpoints

are

hit,

an

EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP exception is raised and passed to the exception
handler which is then able to adjust the instruction pointer to point to a new
instruction

from

which

execution

can

resume.

The

kernel32

GetThreadContext() function can be used to access the context structure
of the

thread. Some

debuggers

do not correctly handle

hardware

breakpoints not set by the debugger itself and this may result to
instructions not being counted properly (Ferrie, 2008, p. 11).

2.8.2.4.

Execution Timing

Packers and debug detection routines take advantage of the fact that code
running in a debugger is going to take longer to execute than when not
running in a debugger. The routines measure the time elapsed and
compares the time differential with a normal run time value. If it took
longer to run than expected, then it is probably running in a debugger. The
RDTSC (Read Time Stamp Counter) instruction can be used before and after
a routine to determine how much time elapsed.
The kernel32 DLL has a function called GetTickCount that returns with the
number
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since
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system
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started.
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SharedUserData data structure is always located at address 0x7FFE0000
and contains the fields TickCountLow and TickCountMultiplier.
A simple solution would be to identify where the timing checks are being
performed in the code, and then set a breakpoint before the first time delta
measurement and then perform a run instead of a step until the breakpoint
is hit (Yason, 2007, p. 8). Alternatively the return result from a call to
GetTickCount and modify the return value. Yason says that Olly Advanced
(MaRKuS, 2006) installs a kernel mode driver that performs the following:
Sets the Time Stamp Disable bit (TSD) in the CR4 control register which will
trigger a General Protection (GP) exception if the RDTSC instruction is
executed in a privilege level other than 0.
The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is setup so that the GP exception is
hooked and the execution of the RDTSC is filtered.

2.8.2.5.

EIP via Exceptions

Ferrie (2008, p. 12) says that it is a very common trick of unpackers such
as PECompact (Bitsum Technologies, 2008) to use exceptions to alter the
EIP and also to gain a measure of obfuscation if the trigger of the exception
is not obvious.

2.8.3.

Process Tricks

A number of process related techniques are available to determine if the
process is being debugged and to hinder the analysis process. These
techniques are discussed in the following subsections.

2.8.3.1.

Header Entry Point

Since the PE header is read only by default, some unpackers, including MEW
(Northfox, 2004), set the entry point of the program in it. This effectively
blocks the debugger from setting a break point at the entry point, unless
the kernel32 VIrtualProtectEx() function is called first (Ferrie, 2008, p.
13).
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2.8.3.2.

Parent Process

A process often has explorer.exe as its parent process, and a parent other
than explorer.exe may have been spawned by a debugger. Yason (2007, p.
10) says that this can be determined by the following process.
1. Get the current process PID via the TEB (TEB.ClientID) or by calling
GetCurrentProcessId().
2.

Use Process32First/Next() and get explorer.exe’s PID from

PROCESSENTRY32.szExeFile and get the PID of the parent process of the
current process from PROCESSENTRY32.th32ParentProcessID.
3. The target may be being debugged if the PID of the parent process is not
the same as the PID of explorer.exe.
A false positive may result if the process was launched using the command
prompt or if the default shell is different. Yason says that this can be
mitigated by setting Process32Next() to always fail when using Olly
Advanced. Ferrie (2008, p. 13) reports that Yoda’s Protector is among
the packers that use this technique.

2.8.3.3.

Self Execution

A process can escape the control of a debugger by executing a copy of itself
by utilizing a mutex. The initiating process creates the mutex and then
executes a copy of the process which will not be debugged, even if the first
process was being debugged and will know that it is a copy since the mutex
will be found to already exist (Ferrie, 2008, p. 15).

2.8.3.4.

Process Name

Some packers look for process names that match the names of debugging
or

malware

analysis

tools

using

the

kernel32

CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() function (Ferrie, 2008, p. 16).

2.8.3.5.

Threads

Some packers such as PE-Crypt32 (random, killa, & acpizer, 1999) use
threads to check for the presence of a debugger, or to check the integrity of
the main code (Ferrie, 2008, p. 16).
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2.8.3.6.

Self Debugging

Ferrie (2008, pp. 16-17) says that this technique used by Armadillo and
other packers, runs a copy of a process and attaches to the copy as a
debugger. This makes the process un-debuggable because only one
debugger can attach to a process at any one point in time. This technique
can be defeated by using kernel mode code to zero the EPROCESS>DebugPort field to allow another debugger to attach to the process. A DLL
can also be injected into the process space by using the kernel32
OpenProcess()

function.

On

Windows

XP

and

later,

the

kernel32

DebugActiveProcessStop() function can be utilized to detach the debugger.

2.8.3.7.

Disassembly

Breakpoints set within the first few instructions of an API can be bypassed if
the packer uses API interception and copies the first few instructions of the
function into a private buffer, and executes the instructions from there. The
packer places a jump at the end of the last copied instruction so that
execution of the original code resumes just after the point the last copied
instruction was made. This also gives the packer the opportunity to search
for breakpoints that have been set in the code which is an indication that
the program is being debugged (Ferrie, 2008, p. 17).

2.8.3.8.

TLS Callback

This technique is used to change the original entry point of a program to a
different entry point so that an initial check can made to see if a debugger
or other analysis tools are being run. It changes the PE loader so that the
entry point of the program is referenced in Thread Local Storage (TLS),
which is the 10th directory entry in the optional PE header (Falliere, 2007).
TLS callbacks can be identified by examining the Data Directory of the PE
header using a tool such as pedump (Pietrek, n.d.) because it will show if a
TLS directory is in the executable (Yason, 2007, p. 28).

2.8.3.9.

Device Names

Packers can use a device driver technique to detect debuggers such as
OllyDbg and IDA Pro as well as monitors running at the system level such
as the SysInternals tools Regmon and Filemon. This technique uses
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kernel32 CreateFile against well known names. Yason (2007, p. 13) says
that some versions of SoftICE append numbers to the device name which
will cause this check to fail. However, a brute force approach can be used to
find the name by appending numbers to the search routine in a loop.
Ferrie (2008) provides examples of some device names used by popular
analysis tools that are reproduced in Figure 2-12.

SoftIce
\\.\SICE
\\.\SIWVID
\\.\NTICE
Regmon
\\.\REGVXG
\\.\REGSYS
FileMon
\\.\FILEVXG
\\.\FILEM
Figure 2-12 Device names used by popular debugging tools that can
be used by malware to detect their presence.

2.8.3.10.

SoftIce Specific

SoftIce was a popular ring 3 and ring 0 debugger for the Windows platform.

2.8.3.10.1.
SoftIce

Driver Information
device

drivers

can

be

enumerated

using

the

ntdll

NtQuerySystemInformation() function. The version information of each file
can then be determined using the VerQueryValue() function as well as
strings that can be matched including SoftIce (Ferrie, 2008, p. 18).

2.8.3.10.2.

Interrupt 1

Ferrie (2008, p. 18) explains that the int 1 instruction cannot be set from
ring 3 and will raise an EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION exception (General
Protection Fault) if this interrupt is called directly. However, SoftIce hooks
this interrupt and adjusts the Descriptor Privilege Level (DPL) to 3 from its
normal DPL of 0 to enable SoftIce to single step user mode code. When
the int 1 occurs, SoftIce does not check the cause was a software
interrupt or the trap flag and it always calls the handler for interrupt 1
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and

an

EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP

exception

is

raised

when

an

EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION exception should have been raised resulting
in the detection of the presence of SoftIce.

2.8.3.11.

OllyDbg Specific

OllyDbg is a very popular ring 3 debugger. The techniques in the following
subsections examine ways of detecting its presence.

2.8.3.11.1.

Malformed Files

Ferrie (2008, p. 19) says that OllyDbg “will refuse to open a file whose data
directories do not end exactly at the end of the Optional Header”. OllyDbg
tries to allocate the amount of memory that the Export Directory Size,
Base Relocation Directory Size, Export Address Table Entries and
PE->SizeOfCode fields say, no matter how large the values are which can
cause the system swap file to grow so large that it affects the performance
of the system.

2.8.3.11.2.

Initial ESI Value

Some packers try to detect OllyDbg by examining the initial value of the
ESI register. Ferrie (2008, p. 19) reports that this value is 0xFFFFFFFF on
Windows XP, but 0 in Windows 2000, and is just a coincidence.

2.8.3.11.3.

Output Debug String

Falliere (2007, p. 7) reports if OutputDebugStringA is called with a valid
ASCII string under the control of a debugger, the return value will the
address of the string passed as a parameter. When not run in a debugger,
the return value should be 1. Yason (2007, p. 26) says that this technique is
specific to OllyDbg because it is vulnerable to a format string bug.

2.8.3.11.4.

Find Window

The user32 function FindWindow() and FindWindowEx() can be used to
find out if known applications are being run including OllyDbg (Yason, 2007,
p. 22).

2.8.3.11.5.

Guard Pages
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An attempt to execute instructions in a guarded page should result in an
exception, but OllyDbg executes them (Ferrie, 2008, p. 19).

2.8.3.12.

Hide Debugger Specific

OllyDbg has an enormous variety of plugins including ones to counter
detection techniques. One of these is HideDebugger (Shub-Nigurrath, 2006)
which hooked the kernel32 OpenProcess() function by setting a far jump
to a new handler. The detection of this jump provides a good indication of
the presence of the plugin (Ferrie, 2008, p. 19).

2.8.3.13.

Immunity Debugger Specific

Ferrie (2008, p. 20) points out that the Immunity Debugger (Immunity,
2008) is a customization of OllyDbg with a Python command-line interface
and is vulnerable to all the same detection and vulnerabilities as OllyDbg.

2.8.3.14.

WinDbg Specific

WinDbg is a Microsoft distributed, ring 3 and ring 0 debugger. The following
techniques are WinDbg specific.

2.8.3.14.1.

Find Window

Ferrie (2008, p. 20) says that the user32 FindWindow() function can be
used to detect WinDbg by using the class name WinDbgFrameClass.

2.8.3.15.

Miscellaneous Tools

The following sub section discusses various miscellaneous tools.

2.8.3.15.1.

Find Window

Less common tools that malware searches for includes the window name
string of Import REConstructor v1.6 FINAL © 2001-2003 MackT/uCF or
class name of TESTDBG, kk1, Eew57 or Shadow (Ferrie, 2008, p. 20).

2.8.4.

Anti Unpacking by Anti Emulating

This section discusses some of the techniques used to detect emulators and
virtual machines.
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2.8.4.1.

Software Interrupts

2.8.4.1.1.

Interrupt 3

An emulator can be detected if it does not behave the same way as
Windows. The EIP has already been advanced to the next instruction when
an EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT occurs and Windows tries to set the EIP back to
where it should be, but Windows assumes that the exception is caused by
the short form of int 3 (CC). However, the EIP will point to the wrong
place if the long form of int 3 (CD 03) caused the exception (Ferrie, 2008,
p. 20).

2.8.4.2.

Time Locks

Anti-emulation code can exploit the characteristic of emulators to limit the
amount of time and/or the number of instructions that will be executed
before exiting with no detection. The anti-emulation code can use a dummy
loop to force the emulator to give up (Ferrie, 2008, p. 20).

2.8.4.3.

Invalid API Parameters

For the purpose of simplicity, some emulators do not provide error checking
for the return results of API calls. Some anti-emulator code can exploit this
vulnerability to detect the presence of an emulator including that of the
Tibs packer (Ferrie, 2008, p. 20). The Tibs (Anonymous, n.d.-m) packer
is often used to pack the storm worm and has anti-emulation capability
(Websense, 2008).

2.8.4.4.

Get Proc Address

The address of a function exported by a DLL is obtained by using the
kernel32 function GetProcAddress(), however, not all functions are
provided by the virtual environment such as the kernel32 function
GetTapeParameters(). Because some packers try to exploit this, some
anti-malware emulators return a value for GetProcAddress() without due
consideration to the parameters that were passed to it. The anti-emulator
code can call a function with invalid parameters fully expecting not to
receive a return value, and an emulator can be detected if a valid result is
returned (Ferrie, 2008, p. 21).
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2.8.4.5.

Get Proc Address (Internal)

Ferrie (2008, p. 21) says that “some anti-malware emulators export special
APIs, which can be used to communicate with the host environment”.

2.8.4.6.

“Modern” CPU Instructions

Ferrie (2008, p. 21) advises that for the purposes of simplicity, some antimalware emulators do not implement the entire CPU instruction set and
leave out less common instructions such as CMPXCH8B and entire instruction
classes such as Floating Point Unit (FPU), Multimedia Extensions (MMX) and
Streaming Single Instruction Multiple Data Extensions (SSE). This can be
used by the packer to detect the presence of the emulator, or the emulator
may fail to determine what the malware is doing.

2.8.4.7.

Undocumented Instructions

Am emulator may fail to detect the intention of the malware if a packer can
use undocumented instructions that are not supported by the emulator
(Ferrie, 2008, p. 22).

2.8.4.8.

Selector Verification

Ferrie (2008, p. 22) says that packers such as MSLRH (Anonymous, n.d.-i)
can use the kernel32 GetVersion() function to get the operating system
version which can then be compared with the descriptor table layout. On a
Windows NT-based system the CS selector should be 0x1B for ring 3 code,
whilst on Windows 9x-based platforms the CS selector can exceed 0xFF
(Ferrie, 2008, p. 22).

2.8.4.9.

Memory Layout

Anti-malware emulators may not include the in-memory structures that a
real system will have such as the RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS which
should appear at memory location 0x20000 (Ferrie, 2008, p. 22).

2.8.4.10.

File Format Tricks

This section discusses a number of PE Header file format tricks used by
malware that do not conform to the way the emulator expects to file to
appear.
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2.8.4.10.1.

Non Aligned Size of Image

The PE->SizeOfImage field is stated in the file format documentation to be
a multiple of the value in the PE->SectionAlignment field but is not a
requirement and Windows can round up the value if required. Malware can
take advantage of this to ensure that it will not run within a VM and hence
hinder analysis (Ferrie, 2008, p. 22)
.

2.8.4.10.2.

Overlapping Instructions

Structures in the PE Header file can be made to overlap such as the MZ>lfanew field so that the PE header appears inside the MZ header. The PE>SizeOfOptionalHeader field can be set so that it appears as if a section
table is in the DataDirectory array. The Import Address Table and the
Import Lookup Table virtual address values can “produce an import table
which has fields inside the PE header” (Ferrie, 2008, p. 22).

2.8.4.10.3.

Non Standard Number of RVA and Sizes

The location of the section table should be determined by using the PE>SizeOfOptionalHeader field. Ferrie (2008, p. 22) says a common mistake
made by both SoftIce and OllyDbg is to “assume that the value in the PE>NumberOfRvaAndSizes field is set to the value that exactly fills the
Optional Header, and that the section table follows immediately”.

2.8.4.10.4.

Non Aligned SizeOfRawData

By recognizing that Windows automatically rounds up the SizeOfRawData
field in the section table, a section table can be created whose entry point
appears in pure virtual memory but there will not have physical data to
execute because of the rounding (Ferrie, 2008, p. 23).

2.8.4.10.5.

Non Aligned PointerToRawData

A section can be created where the entry point appears to point to data
anywhere

other

than

what

should

be

executed

because

the
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PointerToRawData field in the section table is subject to rounding down by
Windows (Ferrie, 2008, p. 23).

2.8.4.10.6.

No Section Table

If the value of the PE->SectionAlignment field is reduced to less than 4kb,
the PE header is marked as both executable and writeable and the contents
of the section table become optional. This means the entire section table
can be zeroed out. The file is then mapped as if it were only one section
where the size is that of the value set in the PE->SizeOfImage field (Ferrie,
2008, p. 23).

2.8.5.

Anti Unpacking by Anti Intercepting

2.8.5.1.

Write->Exec

Some unpacking tools try to determine when the unpacker has completed
the unpacking process and transferred control to the host. It can do this by
intercepting the execution of newly written pages by first writing and then
executing a dummy instruction. This can cause the interceptor to exit early
(Ferrie, 2008, p. 23).

2.8.5.2.

Write^Exec

Ferrie (2008, p. 23) says that some unpacking tools can change the page
attributes of memory from writeable-executable to writeable or executable
but not both.

2.8.6.

Miscellaneous

2.8.6.1.

Fake Signatures

Packers such as RLPack Professional (Reversing Labs, 2008) provide a
false signature so that packer signature matching tools such as PEiD (Jibz,
Qwerton, Snaker, & XineohP, 2006) incorrectly identify the packer (Ferrie,
2008, p. 24).

2.9.

PROCESS INJECTION TECHNIQUES

Harbour (2007, p. 21) explains that process injection is used to inject code
into another running process. The target process executes the malicious
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code. In so doing, it acts to conceal the source of the malicious behaviour.
It can be used to bypass process specific security mechanisms and host
base firewalls. The Windows Hooks mechanism can be used to achieve this
by letting the process run specific code when a particular message is
received. The Win32 API call SetWindowsHookEx() allows the target process
to load a specified DLL into the memory space of the executable and select
a function as a hook to handle a particular event. When the event is
received, the target process executes the malicious code. An example
provided in the paper by Harbour (2007, p. 25) is reproduced as follows in
Figure 2-13

HANDLE hLib, hProc, hHook;
hLib = LoadLibrary(“evil.dll”);
hProc = GetProcAddress(hLib, “EvilFunction”);
hHook = SetWindowsHookEx(WH_CALLWNDPROC, hProc, hLib, 0);
Figure 2-13 Code snippet showing SetWindowsHook function to load
a malicious DLL.
Another method is to use library injection. A new thread is created in the
process which is used to load the malicious library. “When the library is
loaded by the new thread, the DllMain() function is called, executing your
malicious code in the target process” (Harbour, 2007, p. 29). An example
provided by Harbour (2007, p. 30) is reproduced as follows in Figure 2-14.

char libPath[] = “evil.dll”;
char * remoteLib;
HMODULE hKern32 = GetModuleHandle(“Kernel32”);
void *loadLib = GetProcAddress(hKern32, “LoadLibraryA”);
remoteLib = VirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, sizeof (liPath),
MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
CreateRemoteThread(hProc, NULL, 0, loadLib, remoteLib, 0,
NULL));
Figure 2-14 Code snippet showing library injection to load a
malicious DLL.
Yet another method pointed out by Harbour (2007) is to use Direct Injection.
This is where the memory space of the process is populated with the
malicious code, which could be a function or an entire DLL, which he says is
much

harder

to

do.

API's

required

include

VirtualAllocEx(),
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WriteProcessMemory() and CreateRemoteThread() which is used to create
a new thread in the process.

2.10. CODE EXECUTION FROM MEMORY
If the code is executed directly from memory and never resides on the hard
drive, it may not be detected during a forensic acquisition. The “memory
buffer to be executed will most likely be populated directly by a network
transfer” (Harbour, 2007, p. 35). Source code contained in a variable can
be executed by something similar to exec() or eval().
Harbour (2007, p. 42) discusses a technique known as the Nebbett Shuttle
to launch Win32 executables from a memory buffer and provides an
example that is reproduced of what an implementation could look like.
Essentially the technique launches a process in a suspended state and then
overwrites the allocated memory space with a new executable.

CreateProcess(..., “cmd”, ..., CREATE_SUSPEND, ...);
ZwUnmapViewOfSection(...);
VirtualAllocEx(..., ImageBase, SizeOfImage, ...)
WriteProcessMemory(..., headers, ...);
for (i=0; i< NumberOfSections; i++) {
WriteProcessMemory(..., section, ...);
}
Resumethread();
Figure 2-15 Code snippet using Nebbet shuttle to launch Win32
executable code.
A specified process cmd is loaded into memory, but is suspended at the
entry point. All memory that is allocated to the process is released. Area is
allocated to put the new executable image in the memory space of the
original process. The PE headers are written to the start of the memory
region. Each section of the new executable is written to its new virtual
address. The new, malicious process is still named as cmd in the task list,
and since the process inherits privileges from the original code, if the
original code was allowed to communicate through a host based firewall, the
replacement code will be allowed to as well.
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2.11. CHECKSUM CHECKS
Malware can use checksums to try to determine if the code has been
changed. This could have been done by the malware analyst to change the
flow of the malware, or to have patched out anti forensic implementations
in the code (W. Yan, Zhang, & Ansari, 2008).

2.12. PROCESS CAMOUFLAGE
“A cleverly named process is often enough to fly beneath the radar and
avoid immediate detection” (Harbour, 2007, p. 32). There can often be
several copies of svchost.exe and spoolsv.exe running in memory, and
additional processes with the same name may go unnoticed. Other name
variations could include svcshost.exe, spoolsvc.exe, spoolsvr.exe,
scardsv.exe and lsasss.exe.

2.13. STRUCTURED EXCEPTION HANDLING
Structured Exception Handlers (SEH) can be used to detect the presence of
a debugger. All Win32 applications have an Operating System (OS) supplied
SEH, and the exception handling mechanism is thread based. The exception
handling mechanism in Linux is process based, and the exception handler is
set up with a signal() system call. The global handler in ntdll.dll
catches the exception and determines where control is given to. The SEH is
a function pointer, and it is possible to overwrite the pointer to a SEH chain
(exception-handler list), where if one handler chooses not to handle the
exception, then the next handler can do it. The final handler is a default
handler for the process which must handle it (Koziol et al., 2004, p. 116).
The exception handler list is stored in the Thread Information Block (TIB)
data structure, which can be found at FS:[0]. A single process can have
multiple threads, and each thread has a TIB, but all threads see the same
memory, and all share the same address space (Eilam, 2005, p. 106).
Packers such as AsProtect use this mechanism to gain control, and to see
if it is running inside a debugger. AsProtect creates multiple exceptions
and a trick to unpacking AsProtect is to count the number of exceptions.
OllyDbg can be configured to either pass exceptions to the process to
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handle, or to handle within the debugger. If the debugger is set to handle
the exceptions, it will give the user the choice to handle the exception, or to
pass back to the process. Using this iterative process, the number of
exceptions can be counted until the process freely runs. This gives the
analyst the opportunity to break on the OEP. If the count of exceptions is n,
then the next time it is run, only pass n-1 exceptions to the process. At this
point, the memory map can be viewed, and the code section can be seen
where the OEP is in. A break point can be set on the code section (set
memory break point on access). Then, when the jump to the OEP is
conducted, the breakpoint on the entire section will be triggered on the OEP
and the process can dumped (Anthracene, 2006).

2.14. IMPORT ADDRESS TABLE
Much of the functionality in a program is derived from calls to functions
arranged in libraries called Dynamic

Link Libraries (DLL), and the

information necessary to call DLL functions is stored in the Import Address
Table (IAT) of a binary. Programs typically use the DLL’s supplied by
Microsoft to interact with the OS to perform common tasks. Because these
tasks are so common, multiple programs can share the same DLL’s that are
loaded, and reduce unnecessary duplication. The PE header of a program is
read when it is loaded by the dynamic linker, and the addresses of the DLL
functions (function pointers) the program requires are filled in, in the IAT
(Eilam, 2005, p. 487).
Typically however, the Import Address Table (IAT) will be obfuscated by the
packer or protector. Craig (2006) explains that at compile time, the IAT
contains NULL memory pointers for each function, but when the executable
is loaded at run time, Windows overwrites the NULLs with the correct
memory location for each function. This is because the address of the DLL in
memory will be different on any particular machine.
“The IAT is resolved with a LoadLibrary loop, just before a jump to the
original entry point” (Falliere, 2006, p. 1). The import name table is
typically messed up, but can be rebuilt using tools such as ImpRec (MackT,
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2008). Most packers used by malware do their best to mess up the IAT so
that the analyst cannot easily determine the DLL functions called. Typically,
only three DLL functions will be visible for programs that have been packed
at load time. The malware packer may have generally messed up the IAT by
encrypting it, altered its size, or mangled it some other way. It is important
to understand how the IAT should look, because the analyst may have to
repair it.

2.15. ROOTKITS
Windows uses four privilege levels, known as rings, to determine the access
level for access control. Access control determines how hardware can be
accessed, what instructions a process may use, what files may be modified
and which areas of memory can be accessed or changed. Ring 0 is the most
privileged level and Ring 3 has the least amount of privilege. Most
applications users run, are run in Ring 3 and these applications cannot
access hardware directly and have limited access to memory. Ring 3 is
often referred to as “user land”. Ring 0 applications run with full system
privileges and can perform IO and memory management, run device drivers,
execute privileged instructions, access all memory space, access all
hardware and access all components of the kernel. This is often referred to
as “kernel land”.
A special mechanism exists so that a user land program can access kernel
land in a controlled fashion so that device drivers (*.sys file) can be
installed. Root kits exploit this mechanism so that they can install their own
device driver into kernel land, giving their program full privileges at Ring 0
and hence control the environment in which other software runs. In this
way, it can avoid detection (Hoglund & Butler, 2005).

2.15.1.

System Service Dispatch Table

System calls are used by user land programs to initiate a function in kernel
land which works by interrupting the execution of the user land program
and transfers control of execution to the kernel which is then responsible for
processed the request. System calls are identified by a system call number,
which is placed into the EAX register and are processed by a kernel routine
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called KiSystemService. After processing the request, the user land
program resumes execution. KiSystemService looks up the system call
number that is in EAX in a table known as the System Service Dispatch
Table (SSDT). The SSDT contains the memory addresses of all of the
system calls and is an ideal target for malicious code to get control of to
control the execution of the kernel by rerouting calls to legitimate functions
to functions the rootkit wants to call instead. This technique is referred to as
Hooking and is used by legitimate software as well.

2.15.2.

IAT Hooking

The Import Address Table (IAT) is a structure that contains library function
(DLL) names and addresses in memory that a loaded program requires to
execute. Rootkits can alter the IAT of a program so that its own function will
be called instead of the legitimate function by overwriting the address of the
IAT function with the address of its own function loaded into memory space,
as illustrated in Figure 2-16. The sold line shows the normal sequence of
calls. The dashed line from the IAT to the Rootkit code shows the hooking
from the IAT to the Rootkit code.

Figure 2-16 Altering the IAT of a program so that rootkit code is
called instead (hooking).

2.15.3.

Inline Function Hooking

Instead of over writing the address of the DLL in the IAT, the function code
can be directly modified in memory and this is known as an inline function
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hook. This is achieved by over writing the first few instructions of the
hooked function with instructions that will jump to the rootkit code. After
the rootkit code has completed, it may return the flow of execution to the
code that was originally intended to be called.

2.15.4.

SSDT Hooking

Hooking the flow of execution can also occur in the kernel by using the
SSDT in a fashion similar to IAT hooking. The original functions address can
be replaced by the rootkit function. Functions that return results of open
ports or list running processes, can be subverted and allow the presence of
the rootkit to remain undetected.

2.15.5.

Direct Kernel Object Manipulation

Tools exist for detecting the hooks installed by rootkits, such as Root Kit

Revealer

(Microsoft, 2008c) and a more advanced method to hide

processes is to alter the kernel memory data structures that are used for
keeping track of the state of the operating system itself. This is known as
Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) and is hard to detect because
“directly modifying the raw main memory contents with a Ring 0 rootkit
cannot be controlled by any built-in security mechanism in Windows”
(Schwittay, 2006, p. 80). These undocumented data structures contain lists
of running processes, threads scheduled for execution and other data. A
disadvantage of using DKOM is that it may make the system unstable or
even crash. It is especially easy to crash because the actual structure is
undocumented and minor operating system changes could change the way
the operating system defines and uses the structures. Processes can be
hidden by manipulating the in memory data structures that use forward and
backward pointers to keep track of processes by reorganizing the pointers
of these doubly linked lists. “Because the scheduling of processes does not
depend on a process being present in that list, this technique hides the
process successfully (e.g. From the Task Manager), but the process is still
executed unnoticed” (Schwittay, 2006, p. 80). Figure 2-17, adapted from
Schwittay, shows the normal linking between data structures in the top half
of the diagram. The lower half of the diagram shows how the middle
process is hidden by manipulating the pointers.
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Figure 2-17 Using DKOM pointer manipulation to hide a process
(Schwittay, 2006, p. 80)

2.16. PACKERS AND PROTECTORS
Packers make static analysis of the binary difficult because the actual code
instructions and data is not able to be read until the code has been
unpacked. It is very similar to compression. Unpackers exist for many
packers in the form of scripts, plugins, programs and in the form of advice
on how to unpack manually with the use of a debugger. The unpacked code
can then be analyzed with a debugger such as IDA Pro, or Ollydbg. If
malware to be analyzed has been packed by an unknown packer, it can
often be loaded into memory, and then process dumped and examined
using tools such as the Ollydbg plugin, LordPE (yoda, 2005a), or any
other memory dumping tool. It should be noted that the code may use
techniques to determine if a debugger is being used and respond by
protecting itself using some combination of the anti forensic techniques that
have been discussed earlier in this literature review. The analyst needs to
be in a position to statically analyse the executable as soon as it has
66

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

unpacked itself, by starting analysis at the Original Entry Point (OEP),
otherwise code can be written over and evidence overlooked. A multitude of
packers are available and there are methods for unpacking them. The
general steps outlined by Craig (2006) for unpacking are:
1. Locate the OEP.
2. Dump the executable image.
3. Change the Entry Point of the dumped image.
4. Calculate the Entry Point Relative Virtual Address (RVA).
Where RVA EP = OEP – Base Image
5. Fix the Import Address Table (IAT).
6. Reinsert the fixed IAT into the dumped executable.
7. Execute the binary (break at EP), and the binary will populate the IAT
with the correct values.
Packer signatures can be detected by tools such as Stud_PE (CG SoftLabs,
2008). Figure 2-18 displays the signature view of a malware specimen, and
shows that the packer used is PE Pack 1.0 (ANAKiN, 2005). Note that
Stud_PE in this case is using the PEiD packer signature database. The PEiD
database contains over four hundred signatures, but is starting to become
dated.
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Figure 2-18 Screen shot of Stud_PE showing detection of PE Pack
signature
Figure 2-19 displays a view of the sections contained in a malware sample
using Stud_PE.

“Sections contain executable code, data, debugging

information, resources and additional metadata used by the program”
(Harbour, 2007, p. 13).
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Figure 2-19 Screen shot of Stud_PE showing useful information on
sections
Another way of recognizing a packed file is that the first section could have
a physical size of 0 bytes. This section will be filled with data that will be
unpacked from another section (Falliere, 2006, p. 1). Once unpacked, the
classic entry point can be recognized as follows in Figure 2-20.

PUSH EBP
MOV EBP, ESP
Figure 2-20 Classic entry point signature for recognition purposes.
Harbour (2007, p. 72) points out that a custom packer will likely defeat low
level reversers, and that a binary packed by a custom packer is unlikely to
be identified at all. The Executable Toolkit, exetk (Anonymous, n.d.-c) is a
custom packer that is available with source code. Harbour (2007, p. 72)
says that tools such as PeiD are easily fooled and recommends using
Mandiant Red Curtain (MRC) (Mandiant, 2007) for detecting packed
binaries. MRC examines and scores executable files based on a set of
criteria including entropy (randomness), detection of packers, compiler and
packer signatures to develop a threat score on how suspicious the file is.
This score can then be used to determine if a file should be further
examined. A screen shot of MRC is shown in Figure 2-21. Useful columns
69

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

include the threat score, the Entry Point Signature (Packer Signature), the
entropy of the entire program, the entropy of the code and a count of the
anomalies found.

Figure 2-21 Mandiant Red Curtain screen shot showing useful
information including entropy and anomaly count
Lyda and Hamrock (2007) explain that entropy is a method for measuring
uncertainty in a series of bytes, and although a file compressed with a
software compressor may have a high entropy level, the data is structured
and is not random. In contrast, measuring the entropy of packed malware
measures the lack of structure in the packed malware. The packer typically
modifies the original programs standard sections (.text, .data, .rsrc) and
compresses these sections into one or two new sections.

Lyda et al.

performed a series of controlled experiments to compute the entropy of
21,567 Windows based malware samples collected between January 2000
and December 2005 and found that entropy measurement was very
effective at identifying packed malware. This approach is supported as
effective at detecting packed malware by other researchers such as
Ebringer and Sun (2008).
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2.16.1.

ASProtect

ASProtect is a popular, commercial packer and protector that is used to
obfuscate demo programs and shareware. Protectors differ from packers by
incorporating encryption features. It is also used by malware authors to
deter and hinder AV software and malware analysts from analyzing their
code. It inserts anti debugging code into the binaries it is packing/protecting
and can insert registration schemes and time limits. Run time tracing can be
made complicated by exploiting Microsoft Windows Structured Exception
Handling (SEH) scheme. It can also use techniques to hinder the dumping
of memory. Dumping of memory can be useful for the malware analyst by
letting obfuscated programs unpack themselves as they run, catching and
halting the program at the moment the unpacking stops, and then dumping
the unpacked program in memory. This allows the code to then be analyzed.
ASProtect can make this dumping process less useful by deleting a section
of code as soon as it has finished executing. This technique is known as
“stolen bytes”. These bytes must be restored if the dumped program is to
be run again. The extensive range of features that ASProtect can
incorporate is listed in the screen shot of Figure 2-22. Figure 2-23 displays
the dialog that allows the selection of features that can be incorporated into
the code and shows this this is as simple as selecting check boxes. Figure
2-24 shows a screen shot of the dialog box displayed at the end of the
packing and protection implementation routine. It shows that the original,
6k byte file has grown to 305k bytes with the addition of CRC check
protection, anti debugging and IAT protection.
The view of the OEP in OllyDbg is shown in the screen shot of Figure 2-25
before ASProtect is applied to the program. The code and function calls can
be easily read and followed. The original IAT is shown in the screen shot of
Figure 2-26 and the imports can be easily read as well, before the
application of ASProtect. In contrast, Figure 2-27 shows the screen shot of
OllyDbg after the application of ASProtect and that the file has grown from
6 KB to 305 KB with the addition of protection such as CRC code checking
and anti debugging. The obfuscation introduced by the protector is clearly
evident and demonstrates that the code has to be unpacked and
unprotected before analysis can begin.
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Figure 2-22 List of ASProtect Features
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Figure 2-23 Dialog showing range of available options in ASProtect
to protect code and hinder analysis.
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Figure 2-24 ASProtect completion showing the file size has grown
markedly with added protection.

Figure 2-25 Original Entry Point clearly evident in OllyDbg before
protection.
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Figure 2-26 Imports before protection clearly showing imported
functions.

Figure 2-27 Packed View of Entry Point in OllyDbg showing
obfuscation.

2.16.1.1.

Unpacking ASProtect

Anthracene (2006) provides an overview on how to deal with some of the
features of ASProtect and is only a single demonstration of a plethora of
informal

papers

and

demonstrations

that

are

available

on

reverse

engineering sites that cater mostly for software crackers. Software crackers
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use reverse engineering techniques to defeat protection mechanisms of
legitimate software to avoid licensing, or to extract information on how
software works beneath the hood. Anthracene’s treatise is quite extensive
and very typical of the step by step advice that is often required to unpack
packed software to arrive at the OEP and to repair the IAT so that detailed
analysis can be conducted. Essentially, the technique discussed by
Anthracene is summarized in the following sequence:
1. Confirm the signature of the packer used, using PEiD.
2. Open the file in OllyDbg.
3. Set the options in OllyDbg to pass all exceptions to the program
being debugged. This is because it uses exception handling tricks to
try to determine if it is being debugged.
4. Set OllyDbg to remove analysis from module. This is because code
and data are intertwined.
5. The entry point is characterized by a PUSH and a RETN. This is
equivalent to a JMP. Jump to the address.
6. Set a hardware breakpoint on access to the DWORD pointed to by the
ESP register. Then hit run.
7. The break could be on a JMP EAX instruction. This could be the jump
to the OEP. Step over this instruction, and this could be the OEP. This
will be characterized by a typical stack frame setup.
8. Dump the file using the OllyDump plugin.
9. Start ImpRec, attach to the process being debugged and fill in the
OEP.
10.Click on IAT autosearch, click Ok and then click on Get Imports.
11.Repair the Imports (which is a detailed activity in itself).
Although presented above as a simple list of summarized instructions, the
details in Anthracene’s discussion covers more than 23 pages. This
exemplifies the work required to manually unpack, but only hints at what
could be considered a much more difficult exercise if more anti-analysis
features are added to the protector.
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2.16.2.

The Problem with Packers

Packing is becoming a dominant problem for AV software because of the
number and sophistication of the packers that are now available (Sun et al.,
2008, p. 2). Even though scripts and plugins are available for unpacking,
they only work when simple packers are used, and fail when sophisticated
packers have been used. Such tools often use heuristics to search for the
OEP whilst the unpacker is allowed to run. Sun et al. propose a method of
unpacking by creating an execution trace of the instruction pointer EIP, and
creating a histogram of the addresses of the executed instructions and
ordering them by the last time an address is executed. This is based on
their observation that:
a. OEP bytes are invariably only executed once, even in a packed
program.
b. Generally, the packer will unpack the original program to a region of
memory which has not been executed previously.
The results documented in the paper by Sun et al. appear to be very good
but only fairly simple packers were examined, including UPX (Oberhumer,
Molnár, & Reiser, 2008), Morphine (Anonymous, n.d.-j), MEW and FSG
(Bart & Xtreeme, 2005) as well as a multi packer example which packed
the file with UPX 2.03 and then Morphine 2.7. Future work identified in
the paper includes optimizing the tracer to resist anti-analysis techniques.
Figure 2-28 is a screenshot of the protection options dialog that users of

Themida® can use to protect their code. An extensive list of options are
available that provide coverage of some of the most significant anti-analysis
techniques discussed in this literature review.

77

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

Figure 2-28 Themida® dialog showing extensive range of protection
options.

2.17. PLUGINS
Plugins exist for most of the popular tools used for reverse engineering and
are typically DLL’s that are simply installed to a known directory pre
determined by the debugger, which then makes the plugin available via a
menu. A variety of plugins are available from the internet, particularly
reverse engineering and cracking sites. It is highly conceivable that these
plugins contain malicious software themselves and it is advisable to treat
them with caution and to analyse the source code for the plugin if it is
possible, especially if forensic evidence has been collected using the plugin.
The functionality of plugins can be replicated using scripting languages that
accompany the most popular disassemblers and debuggers such as IDA Pro.
IDA Stealth (Newger, 2008) is a free plugin for IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2008),
a commercial disassembler and debugger. The dialog box for IDA Stealth
is displayed in Figure 2-29. It lists a limited subset of the techniques
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discussed by (Ferrie, 2008), who in turn says the 52 techniques discussed
in his paper are only the most widely used techniques. The plugin functions
are divided into the following sections:
•

Stealth Techniques

•

Disable Flags

•

Protect Debugger

•

Global Enable

The particular technique to be used is simply enabled by selecting the
appropriate checkbox.

Figure 2-29 IDA Stealth Plugin showing available options to hide the
debugger from only a selection of techniques discussed in the
literature review.
OllyAdvanced (TH-DJM, 2006) is a plugin for OllyDbg (Yuschuk, 2008) a
free disassembler and debugger. Olly Advanced is similar to the IDA
Stealth plugin as depicted in Figure 2-30.

79

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

Figure 2-30 Olly Advanced Plugin showing available options to hide
the debugger from only a selection of techniques discussed in the
literature review.
Plugins are useful for manual analysis but typically do not tell the operator
that the technique that has been selected has been located or mitigated,
their main function is to hide the debugger. It is also evident too, that the
extensive list of anti-forensic techniques discussed in the sections above,
are not fully reflected in the number of options in the plugins. This leaves a
gap between what is available and what could be required by the analyst.
This gap can be addressed by the use of scripting languages.

2.18. SCRIPTING LANGUAGES
Disassemblers and Debuggers such as IDA Pro and OllyDbg are supported
by scripting languages as well as Application Programming Interfaces (API)
for the development of plugins. “Potential uses for scripts are infinite and
80

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

can range from simple one-liners to full-blown programs that automate
common tasks or perform complex analysis functions” (Eagle, 2008a, p.
249). IDA Pro’s native scripting language is called IDC and appears very C
like in appearance and is used to query the database that IDA Pro stores
the file being analyzed in. IDA Python (Erdélyi, 2008) is a Python plugin for
IDA Pro that allows the analyst to access the functions of IDC and the full
power of Python. Similar plugins for other popular scripting languages such
as Perl and Ruby are also available for IDA Pro.
Scripting languages for OllyDbg (also in the form of plugins) include
OllyScript (SHaG, 2006) which is very similar in appearance to assembly
language. Other plugins include OllyPerl (Stewart, 2006) and OllyPython
(Vilhonen, 2007) that leverage from Perl and Python respectively. The
Immunity Debugger (Immunity, 2008) is an extension of OllyDbg that is
integrated with Python.
Existing scripts for OllyDbg are plentiful on the web for performing a myriad
of analysis and reverse engineering tasks and far exceed those available
freely for IDA Pro. It is this researcher’s conjecture that this is because
OllyDbg and more recently, the Immunity Debugger, have been the
favorite tool of software crackers who have a spirit of sharing more
prevalent than the commercial users of IDA Pro. IDA Pro was initially only
a disassembler used for performing static analysis and a debugging
capability was added in the past few years. The existing scripts for OllyDbg
include a very wide variety of unpackers which are not only useful in their
own right, but also serve as a source of information on how to unpack
particular packers. These can also be used as an algorithmic template to
implement the routine in other scripting languages such as IDA Python.
Scripts written in IDC or IDAPython can then be run against the IDA Pro
database, which is stored in an IDB (IDA Pro Database) file, or against the
original executable itself on the command line, or through the Graphical
User Interface (GUI). The IDB file saves previous analysis work that has
been conducted on the file which can include identification of functions,
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structures, enumerations and unions as well as any mitigation work against
anti forensic techniques and obfuscation. This assists in automating analysis
on malicious files. For example, to run an IDAPython script with IDA Pro on
the command line named walkTheSegments.py against an IDB file named
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent.idb, the following would be entered on the
command line or in a script as shown in Figure 2-31. This feature greatly
assists automation.

idag -A -OIDAPython:walkTheSegments.py
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent.idb
Figure 2-31 Calling IDA Pro on the command line to run a
IDAPython script assists automation of code analysis.

2.19. TRACING
Scripts and plugins that are used to unpack malware typically allow the
malware to unpack itself at run time, and halt execution when the OEP is
recognized. Ideally, the analyst can then use a memory dumping tool to
capture the unpacked malware in memory and analyse it (Aquilina et al.,
2008; Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Zeltser, 2007). However, this approach can
miss anti-analysis techniques incorporated into the unpacking code. Lau and
Svajcer (2008) point out that executable packers such as Themida®
(Oreans Technologies, 2008) will not unpack underlying code if it detects
that it is running inside VMWare and that tracing is very useful to uncover
the use of anti-analysis techniques. “Tracing offers a means of logging
specific events that occur while a process is executing” (Eagle, 2008a, p.
508). Events can include every instruction that is executed, function calls,
register activities or any other parameter of interest that changes as the
malware is executed.
Sun et al. (2008) also employ tracing to locate the OEP of packed software
by creating a histogram of the addresses of executed instructions and
ordering the histogram by the last time an instruction is executed.
“Decryption, decompression and copying appear as large spikes at the start
of the histogram, followed by a flat section, of height one, which is usually
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the OEP” (Sun et al., 2008). The researchers show good results for
analyzing non malicious software packed by various packers.

2.20. NEW PARADIGMS FOR MALWARE DETECTION
AV software, that relies on signature matching and heuristics is recognized
by AV researchers to be far less than optimal (Mila Dalla et al., 2008;
Szewczyk & Brand, 2008; W. Yan et al., 2008; Z. Yan & Inge, 2008; Zhou &
Meador Inge, 2008). This has led to a variety of research to be conducted
on alternate techniques for malware detection as discussed in the following
subsections.

2.20.1.

Statistical Structures

Bilar (2005) shows how malware can be classified by analyzing statistical
structures. Three perspectives examined by Bilar, includes assembly
instructions, Win 32 API Calls and system dependence graphs. Examination
of assembly instructions is primarily a static analysis technique where the
frequency distribution of operation codes (opcodes) is developed from the
disassembly of the binary. Bilar shows that this technique can be useful to
provide a quick identification. Just looking at the most frequent opcodes is a
weak predictor. Looking at fourteen of the most infrequently used opcodes
such as an interrupt (int) and no operation (nop), it may be possible to
classify malware. Bilar suggests that root kits make heavy use of software
interrupts whilst viruses make use of the nop instruction for padding sleds.
Additional work being carried out in this area includes investigating
equivalent opcode substitution effects between compilers and types of
opcodes.
2.20.2.

Win 32 API Calls

Looking at Win 32 API Calls is an active analysis technique that observes
the API calls that a program under investigation makes. These calls are
recorded and a count vector is saved into a database. These vectors are
then compared to known malware vectors in the database if it is determined
that the vectors are related. Bilar (2005, p. 25) claims that this vector
classification is successful in classification of malware into a family. The Win
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32 API call fingerprint is shown by Bilar (2005, p. 27) to be robust, even
though various packers were used.
2.20.3.

System Dependence Graphs

System Dependence Graphs is a newly developing static analysis technique
described by Bilar (2005, p. 31) that represents control, call and data
dependencies of a program through graph modeling. Then graph structures
can be used as fingerprints, which assist in the process of identification,
classification and prediction of behaviour.
2.20.4.

Run Time Behaviour Monitoring

Malware detection and analysis by an investigator can be a labor intensive
process using static and active techniques. Due to time constraints and the
abilities of the investigator, there is a possibility that critical forensic
evidence could be overlooked. To this end, automated malware detection
and classification tools are being developed. Lee and Mody (2006, p. 3)
“propose an automated classification method based on runtime behavioral
data and machine learning”. Essentially the run time behaviour of a file is
represented by a sequence of events, which is stored in a canonical format
in a database. Machine learning is used to recognize patterns and
similarities, which are then used to classify new objects. Such an automated
system is important because human analysis can be inefficient and time
consuming (Lee & Mody, 2006). However, development of algorithms,
validation training data for the classification system requires the input from
manual analysis.

2.20.5.

Obfuscation Detection

Obfuscation is used by legitimate software to protect the Intellectual
Property (IP) as well as by authors of malware whose intention is to hide
the malware from AV software. Wysopal (2009) suggests that the very
presence of obfuscated code could indicate the presence of malware.
Wysopal says that if the behaviour of software cannot be verified, then the
software could have a malicious nature and could violate the privacy of the
user.
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2.21. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
The search of the literature, directly related to the implementation,
detection and mitigation of anti-analysis techniques malware employs,
reveals a number of lines of enquiry not fully covered in the literature.
Various methodologies exist for analyzing malware. The more effective
methodologies take the presence of analysis avoidance techniques into
account and encourage the use of mitigation strategies for them. Zeltser
(2007) uses a sequential static and dynamic, phased approach, where he
discovers something from each phase that assists with progressing to the
next phase to discover more about how the malware works. An effective
technique to support the detection and mitigation of analysis avoidance
techniques could be to use such an incremental static and dynamic spiral
approach, where anti forensic techniques are discovered and mitigated as
the analyses of the malware progresses from a high level of perspective
down to the most detailed perspective.
An extensive range of anti forensic techniques can be implemented in
malware. A non-exhaustive list of techniques can include anti-dumping,
anti-debugging,

anti-disassembling,

anti-virtual

machine,

anti-online

analysis, use of root kits, IAT destruction, anti-tool specific and process
injection. Techniques are dispersed amongst the literature and generally
only exist as code snippets. This leaves the prospect to fully implement the
techniques and validate their use against analysis tools. This also includes
an opportunity to determine how effective the tools are against such a large
number of techniques. It also provides a chance to determine how the use
of the techniques can be detected and mitigated. A variance of anti-analysis
taxonomies was revealed in the literature and this provides an opportunity
to combine the taxonomies into an overall one.
Before detailed analysis of the code of malware can be examined, the
malware has to be unpacked and the OEP reached. Packers are used to
compress multiple malware files into one file and are unpacked when
installed or at run time by run time unpacking routines. Various tools and
methods are available to unpack packed malware but are very dependent
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on knowing which packer was used. This information may come from a
packer signature detector, but tools such as PEiD are becoming dated,
unless the signature database they rely on are updated with signatures of
the latest packers. The use of a packer can be determined by measuring the
entropy of the malware, which tends to have very high levels of entropy
when packed. Malware collected from the internet could be used to
determine the prevalence of the use of packers and protectors.
Plugins exist for popular debuggers that assist in hiding the debugger from
some of the anti-forensic techniques discussed above, but their coverage of
the number of techniques is limited. A variety of scripting languages that
are available for use with the debuggers are available and these can be
used to detect, log and mitigate the use of these techniques. This opens the
door to examine the existing plugins and to discover how effective scripting
languages are at extending the tools to detect and mitigate anti-analysis
techniques.
The literature search revealed that researchers claim that traditional AV
software is far less than ideal at detecting malware and that alternate
methods exist. This provides an opportunity to examine their claims.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODS

The research questions examined in this thesis were stated in the
Introduction chapter of this thesis as:
1. What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed?
2. How can the use of these techniques be detected?
3. How can the use of these techniques be mitigated?
These questions, refined whilst searching the literature, clearly initiated this
line of research. Hernon (1991, p. 4) describes research as an inquiry
process and lists the aims of research to include the “Discovery or creation
of knowledge, or theory building”.

In addition, Hernon says that another

aim of research could be the “Testing, confirmation, revision, refutation of
knowledge and theory”.

Alternatively, Hernon says that the aim of the

research could be the “Investigation of a problem for local decision making”.
Without a doubt, all three research questions for this thesis could have any,
some or all of these aims. However, for research to be considered to have
been conducted with appropriate rigor, and to be accepted as truth, the
process and methods used to arrive at the result must be shown to be
justifiable, the line of enquiry to be clearly defined, with traceability all the
way from the research questions to the resultant conclusions and claims of
contribution to knowledge. The research process itself could be considered
as the linking activities that the researcher conducts to connect the research
questions to the aims and results of the research via a number of
intermediatory phases (Bouma & Ling, 2004, p. 5).

3.1.

A MODEL OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS

A possible model of the research process that is discussed and represented
in diagrammatic form by Oates (2007, p. 23) is reproduced as Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1 Model of the research process showing the variety of
paths that can be undertaken (Oates, 2007, p. 23).
The process diagram assists in charting a course to navigate from
formulating research questions to discovering answers for the research
questions. The particular model presented by Oates shows that experiences,
motivation and a literature review are inputs into developing appropriate
and meaningful research questions. An objective of this initiating phase of
the process is to show why this line of research is important, why it has not
been fully addressed in published literature and how the research will be
used. The research question is the underlying thread throughout the entire
process. After it has been formulated, it is then used to select an
appropriate research strategy, data generation method and data analysis
method. Research questions clearly have traceability throughout the
research process and arriving at answers to an enquiry is dependent upon
the selection of an appropriate research strategy, data generation method
and data analysis method most appropriate for the questions being asked.
Significant consideration is required to be allocated to the choice of research
paradigm before the selection process of research method commences.
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Various research paradigms exist to guide the enquiry (Guba & Lincoln,
1994, p. 105; Marshall, 1997, p. 16; Oates, 2007, p. 283). Lincoln and
Guba (1994, p. 105) say that “Questions of method are secondary to
questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or
worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in
ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways .” This is a significant
statement, because it emphasizes that in order to conduct research, the
researcher must adopt an appropriate and over arching, philosophical
viewpoint, referred to as a research paradigm.

3.2.

RESEARCH PARADIGMS

Oates (2007, p. 282) describes a paradigm as “a set of shared assumptions
or ways of thinking about some aspect of the world”. Various philosophical
paradigms exist and have different views about the nature of the world,
referred to as ontology, and the way that the knowledge is acquired,
referred to as epistemology.
Paradigms can be subdivided further by asking ontological, epistemological
and methodological questions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). Epistemology
essentially focuses on the theory of knowledge and its acquisition (Carroll &
Swatman, 2000). Ontology is concerned with examining the nature of
reality from an existence point of view. This philosophical viewpoint asks
questions such as “what is?” Epistemology on the other hand, focuses on
asking how this knowledge is acquired in the format of questions such as
“how do we know what we know?” The methodological question is “how can
we come to know it?” (Pickard, 2007, p. 6).
Some common research paradigms include positivism, interpretivism and
critical research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 105; Oates, 2007, p. 283).

3.2.1.

Positivism

Oates (2007, p. 283) says positivism is the foundation of the experimental
method, which in turn, has two fundamental assumptions:
•

The world has order, is regular and is non-random.

•

The world can be investigated objectively.
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These assumptions are significant because it facilitates the discovery of
regularities, patterns and laws through the conduct of experimentation to
discover evidence of cause and effect. The discovery process is initiated by
the formulation of a hypothesis which is followed by experiments designed
to refute or confirm the hypothesis. Confidence in a theory may be gained
each time it fails to be refuted. Positivist researchers typically use controlled
experiments but they are not limited to the use of controlled experiments as
their research strategy. Other strategies such as surveys are also frequently
used by this paradigm. Positivists are considered to be reductionist. That is,
they study phenomena by breaking them down into simpler components
(Easterbrook, Singer, Storey, & Damian, 2008, p. 291).
Guba et al. (1994, p. 109) describe the ontology of positivism as a realism
and that “an apprehend able reality is assumed to exist, driven by
immutable laws and mechanisms”. Guba et al. describe the epistemology of
positivism as dualist and objectivist. This is because the investigator and
the phenomena under investigation are assumed to be independent entities
and the investigator studies the object without influencing it, or is
influenced by it. Validity is threatened if an influence exists. Guba et al. (p.
110) describe the methodology of positivism to be experimental and
manipulative. “Questions and/or hypotheses are stated in propositional form
and subjected to empirical test to verify them; possible confounding
conditions must be carefully controlled (manipulated) to prevent outcomes
from being properly influenced” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110).

3.2.2.

Interpretivism

In contrast to positivism, interpretivism does not seek to prove or disprove
a hypothesis. The interpretivist approach tries to understand phenomena
through the meanings and values people assign to them. In this way,
multiple, subject realities are detailed. Hence, there is no single truth.
Different researchers can view the world differently and their values and
actions mold the research process. This results in multiple interpretations.
Data collected via this paradigm is generally qualitative (Easterbrook et al.,
2008, p. 291; Oates, 2007, pp. 292-293).
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Guba et al. (1994, p. 110) describe the ontology of interpretivism as
relativist. This is because realities are interpreted from social experience
and intangible mental constructions from individuals or groups that hold the
constructions. Constructions from such individuals or groups may be more
or less informed than those formed by other individuals or groups. Guba et
al. (p. 111) describe the epistemology of interpretivism as transactional and
subjectivist. That is, the investigator and the object of investigation are
assumed to be interactively linked. Guba et al. (p. 111) describe the
methodology of interpretivism as hermeneutical and dialectical and say that
“… constructions can be elicited and refined only through interaction
between and among investigator and respondents” .
Williamson (2002) explains that what differentiates interpretivism from
positivism is that knowledge can be acquired differently because the natural
world is viewed as separate to the social world. The researcher becomes
part of the study and loss of the benefit of objectivity obtained from
empirical observation may result.

3.2.3.

Critical Research

Critical research is similar to interpretivism from the perspective that there
are multiple views of reality, but differs by saying that social reality
possesses objective properties that interpretivists discount.

“Critical

researchers seek to identify and challenge the conditions of domination, and
the restrictions and unfairness of the status quo and taken-for-granted
assumptions” (Oates, 2007, p. 297).
Guba et al. (1994) describe the ontology of critical research as historical
realism and describe the epistemology of critical research as transactional
and subjectivist.
Similar to the description of the epistemology of interpretivism by Guba et
al., the investigator and the object under investigation are assumed to be
interactively linked and the values of the investigator influence the inquiry.
The same researchers describe the methodology of critical research as
dialogic and dialectical. A dialog is required between the investigator and
the subjects of the inquiry and Guba et al. (p. 110) say “… dialogue must be
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dialectical

in

nature

to

transform

ignorance

and

misapprehensions

(accepting historically mediated structures as immutable) into more
informed consciousness …” .

3.2.4.

Research Paradigm Selected for this Research

This research does not consider the social meaning of the phenomena under
investigation. This discounts the use of the other identified research
paradigms other than the positivist paradigm. The approach selected to
address the research questions of this thesis is therefore positivist.
An empirical approach is appropriate because the result should be the same,
no matter how it is measured. The use of various tools to perform
measurements

should

produce

the

same

results.

This

research

is

reductionist. It is studying the plethora of anti-forensic techniques malware
can incorporate by measuring the effectiveness of these techniques on an
individual basis together with the effectiveness of being able to detect the
use of the techniques and how effectively the use of the techniques can be
mitigated.

The number and type of techniques employed within any

particular collected malware specimen under investigation must be finite.

3.3.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

“Empirical research seeks to explore, describe, predict, and explain natural,
social, or cognitive phenomena by using evidence based on observation or
experience” (Sjoberg, Dyba, & Jorgensen, 2007, p. 361). Empirical research
involves the collection and interpretation of evidence through methods such
as surveys, interviews, experimentation and observation.
Easterbrook et al. (2008, p. 290) say that once the research questions have
been developed, thought has to be given to the determination of what will
be accepted as the empirical truth. If ontology is considered as the nature
of the world with respect to knowledge, epistemology is understood as the
process in which that knowledge is obtained. This thesis undertakes an
empirical approach to obtain knowledge relevant to answering the research
questions.
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The steps listed by Perry et al. (2000, p. 348) to conduct an empirical study
are :
•

Formulation of an hypothesis or question to test

•

observing a situation,

•

abstracting observations into data,

•

analyzing the data, and

•

drawing of conclusions with respect to the tested hypothesis.

There are various types of empirical research in which data can be produced.
Easterbrook, Singer, Storey, & Damian (2008, p. 286) explicitly list the five
classes of empirical research methods that they believe are most relevant to
software engineering as:
•

Controlled Experiments (including Quasi-Experiments)

•

Case Studies (both exploratory and confirmatory)

•

Survey Research

•

Ethnographies

•

Action Research

A controlled experiment manipulates one or more independent variables to
measure the effect on one or more dependent variables to assist the
researcher to determine how the variables are related and to identify
causality. A hypothesis is used to guide the steps of the experimental
design including which variables to include in the study and how they will be
measured.

This

is

essentially

reductionist

and

positivist

in

nature.

Complexity is reduced by allowing only a few variables of interest to vary in
a controlled manner, whilst holding all other variables constant (Easterbrook
et al., 2008, pp. 294-296).
A case study investigates a phenomenon within a context and can reveal
causality. Case studies are used where the reductionism of a controlled
experiment is inappropriate. This could include when effects may take a
long time to appear or where the context plays a role in the phenomena
under investigation (Easterbrook et al., 2008, pp. 296-298). To address the
research questions of this thesis, a case study could include observing

93

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

malware analysts in the field and noting how the analysts detect and
mitigate anti-forensic techniques over a period of time.
Survey research can be conducted via questionnaires, structured interviews
or data logging to identify characteristics of a representative sample from a
well defined population. A clear research question is a precondition, the
sampling technique must be sound and the survey questions must be
designed to yield useful and valid data (Easterbrook et al., 2008, pp. 298299). To address the research questions of this thesis, a survey could create
a questionnaire tailored for malware analysts to determine if they believe
the use of anti-forensic techniques are being increasingly used by the
malware they are analyzing.
“Ethnography is a form of research focusing on the sociology of meaning
through field observation” (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p. 300). To address
the research questions of this thesis, ethnography could be used to observe
malware analysts create practices and use strategies to detect and mitigate
the use of anti-forensic techniques over a period of time.
Action research focuses on solving real world problems. “While most
empirical research methods attempt to observe the world as it currently
exists, action researchers aim to intervene in the studied situations for the
explicit purpose of improving the situation” (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p.
301). The research questions of this research could be addressed by
working in a malware research laboratory and interacting with malware
analysts.
Selection of the most appropriate research method requires consideration of
ontology, epistemology, methodology, resources and the abilities of the
researcher with respect to the phenomena under investigation. Empirically
based questions can be asked to facilitate comprehension of the ontology of
the phenomenon. One of the first steps Easterbrook et al. (p. 287)
recommends in selecting the research strategy is to clarify the research
question.

This

begins

by

asking

exploratory

questions

to

aid

in

understanding the phenomena. Such questions assist in the determination
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of measurable and valid evidence. Table 3-1 re-represents the exploratory
questions and the form of the question discussed by Easterbrook et al.
(p.288) in the form of a table.
Table 3-1 Examples of exploratory research questions
Question

Form of Question

Existence questions

“Does X exist?”

Description and

“What is X like?”

classification

“What are its properties?”

questions

“How can it be categorized?”
“How can we measure it?”
“What is its purpose?”
“What are its components?”
“How do the components relate to each other?”
“What are all the types of X?”

Descriptive-

“How does X differ from Y?”

Comparative
questions
The research questions in this thesis are fundamentally exploratory in
nature and can be answered in a literature review and through empirical
methods. Answering these questions assists in progressing to the next
stage of questioning where Easterbrook et al. (p. 288) says “ … base-rate
questions about the normal patterns of occurrence of the phenomena” need
to be asked. Base-rate questions help to determine if a particular situation
is normal or abnormal. Table 3-2 re-represents the base-rate questions and
the form of the question discussed by Easterbrook et al. (p. 288) in the
form of a table. These questions are appropriate for formulating the
research questions, particularly from the perspective of gaining knowledge
about how the anti-analysis techniques work and how effective they are.
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Table 3-2 Examples of base-rate research questions
Question
Frequency and

Form of Question
“How often does X occur?”

distribution questions “What is the average amount of X?”
Descriptive-Process

“How does X normally work?”

questions

“What is the process by which X happens?”
“In what sequence do the events of X occur?”
“What are the steps X goes through as it evolves?”
“How does X achieve its purpose?”

Relationship questions seek to find out how phenomena are related to each
other. Table 3-3 re-represents relationship questions in the form of table
discussed by Easterbrook et al. (p. 288). Although relevant to future
research, relationship questions are considered to be out of the scope for
the line of investigation nominated in this thesis.
Table 3-3 Examples of relationship research questions
Question

Form of Question

Relationship

“Are X and Y related?”

questions

“Do occurrences of X correlate with occurrences of
Y?”

Causality questions attempt to identify the relationship between cause and
effect. Answering such questions is assisted by having answered the
relationship questions presented in Table 3-3. Easterbrook et al. (2008, p.
289) points out that it is very important to be able to differentiate
correlation and causality. This is because it is harder to demonstrate
causality than it is to show correlation. If high values of variable X correlate
with high values of variable Y, it could be because X causes Y, or because Y
causes X. However, it could also be that some other, common variable is
the cause and that neither is the cause of the other. It could also be the
case that they co-evolve in complex ways and that no clear cause and effect
can be identified (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p. 289).

96

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

Table 3-4 re-represents the causality questions discussed by Easterbrook et
al. (p. 289). Causality questions are considered to be out of scope for this
thesis, but remain relevant for future research that extends the line of
enquiry developed in this thesis.
Table 3-4 Examples of causality research questions
Question
Causality questions

Form of Question
“Does X cause Y?”
“Does X prevent Y?”
“What causes Y?”
“What are all the factors that cause Y?”
“What effect does X have on Y?”

Causality-

“Does X cause more Y than does Z?”

Comparative

“Is X better at preventing Y than is Z?”

questions
Causality-

“Does X or Z cause more Y under one condition but

Comparative

not others?”

interaction questions

3.3.1.

Selected Empirical Research Method

All of the empirical research methods listed in the discussion above would
be suitable for addressing the research questions of this thesis. However,
action research, ethnography, survey and case study would require access
to malware researchers desirably working in AV software laboratories for an
extended period of time, and preferably, in situ. Such access is not possible
for the author at this time. The research questions of this thesis are
essentially exploratory in nature. The empirical research method selected
for this research is via controlled experiment.

3.4.

EXPERIMENTAL STRATEGIES

Various experimental strategies are available.

“In academic research, an

experiment is a strategy that investigates cause and effect relationships,
seeking to prove or disprove a causal link between a factor and an observed
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outcome” (Oates, 2007, p. 127). The strategy starts with a hypothesis
which can then be tested empirically with an experiment designed to prove
or disprove the hypothesis. The design of the experiment takes care to
remove all factors from the study that could affect the result, apart from the
one factor that is considered to cause the outcome of interest. Easterbrook
et al. (p. 133) says true experiment concentrates on the “… manipulation of
the independent variable, pre- and post-test measurement of the dependent
variable(s), and control or removal of all other variables”.

3.4.1.

True Experiment

The experiment needs to consider the variables that can be controlled and
those that can be measured.

The variables can be classified as either

dependent or independent. The dependent variable (effect) changes as a
result of a change in the independent variable (cause). Experiments
typically manipulate the independent variable and observe the effect on the
dependent variable. The idea is to determine the independent variable that
causes the change in the dependent variable. The experimental method is
essentially positivist and reductionist. “They reduce complexity by allowing
only a few variables of interest to vary in a controlled manner, while
controlling all other variables” (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p. 295). The aim is
to show that only one factor causes the observable change. Ways of
controlling variables to assist the determination of the factor are listed by
Oates (2007, p. 130) to include:
•

Eliminate the factor from the experiment.

•

Hold the factor constant if it is not possible to eliminate the factor.

•

Use random selection of subjects

•

Use control groups

•

Make the researchers and subjects blind

Oates (p. 131) says an experiment has good internal validity if the
measurements obtained are the result of the experimenter’s handling of the
independent variable and not due to other factors. Threats listed by Oates
(pp. 131-132) to internal validity include:
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Differences between the experimental and control group

•
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•

Maturation

•

Instrumentation

•

Experimental mortality

•

Reactivity and experimenter effects

Oates (p. 132) says an experiment has good external validity if the “results
are not unique to a particular set of circumstances but are generalizable.
That is, the same results can be predicted for subsequent occasions and in
other situations”. Threats listed by Oates (p. 133) to external validity
include:
•

Over reliance on special types of participants

•

Too few participants

•

Non-representative participants

•

Non-representative test cases

3.4.2.

Quasi Experiment

Quasi-experiments try to remain within the spirit of the true experiment,
“but concentrate on observing events in real-life settings where there is a
‘naturally occurring’ experiment” (Oates, 2007, p. 134). This is because the
true experiment endeavors to have nearly complete control over the
independent and dependent variable and can exhibit good internal and
external validity. Pickard (2007, p. 108) points out that “internal validity is
always seen as the greatest threat to quasi-experimental research design;
lack of control over intervening variables means it is almost impossible to
eliminate rival explanations of any relationship between variables”.
In the field, control over variables is harder, and the manipulation of an
independent variable is more difficult as well. Therefore, determining cause
and effect is not as conclusive as that obtainable from conducting a true
experiment (Oates, 2007, p. 134). The quasi-experiment “has some of the
components of experimental research, but not all” (Pickard, 2007, p. 107).
Oates (p. 108) explains that there are two types of quasi-experimental
research design. The non-equivalent group design and the time series
design. The non-equivalent group design is similar to the true experiment,
except that the selection of participants is non-random and the study is
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conducted in the field and not in the laboratory. The time series design is
similar to the design of the non-equivalent group, except the observations
are made in time intervals. This gives more observational data that can
provide detail on progressive change.

3.5.

CHOICE OF RESEARCH METHOD

The selected research method to address the research questions is positivist,
empirical and quasi-experimental. The independent variable is the individual
anti forensic technique under investigation and the dependent variable is
the binary result of either detection or non-detection.

3.6.
3.6.1.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Validation of Techniques

This section discusses the general processes used to address the three
research questions of this thesis. The first part of the research design is
designed to validate the techniques as described and uncovered in the
Literature Review chapter of this thesis. This includes determination of the
ability to detect and mitigate these techniques via small quasi experiments.
The results from this process are presented in the Validation of Techniques
chapter of this thesis.

3.6.2.

Collection of Network Based Malware

The Nepenthes (Nepenthes, 2006) project is a malware collection tool that
works by emulating known vulnerabilities and which then downloads the
payload of the malware that attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Dr
Craig Valli of Edith Cowan University (ECU) has been participating in the
Nepenthes project and has been collecting malware using a network of
distributed sensors deployed within the geographical locale of Perth,
Western Australia. Figure 3-2 is a process diagram depicting how malware
is collected and processed by Nepenthes and has been adapted from the
paper by Valli and Wooten (2007) which outlines how the honeynet was
deployed and used to collect malware for analysis purposes.
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The process diagram shows that multiple avenues of processing are
conducted on the collected malware before results are stored in a SQL
database and made available via a web interface. The highlighted process
box designates the source of data for the research that was conducted for
this thesis using malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes malware
collection system. By the very nature of the way this malware has been
collected via a network interface, the malware is classified as network based.
This networked based malware was used a source of data to examine
particular types of techniques malware uses to hinder analysis, namely,
packers and protectors which is one of the first techniques malware analysts
encounter.
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Figure 3-2 Model of the nepenthes malware collection system
depicting the source (highlighted) of malware collected for this
research.

3.6.3.

Analysis of Collected Malware Packers

The second part of the research design is designed to analyze the use of
Packers and Protectors in Microsoft Windows platform, network based
malware, collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors. This is also used to
support the examination of the research questions, primarily with respect to
the ability to detect the use of packers and protectors which is used by
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malware to hinder analysis. The results of this process are presented in the
Analysis of Collected Malware chapter of this thesis.

3.6.4.

Risk Mitigation

All steps of the process were conducted on a Linux machine which will not
natively run the malware. Downloading the malware from Nepenthes and
uploading the malware to the online analysis engines necessitated a
connection to the internet. All other analysis work was conducted on a
standalone Linux machine without an internet connection to ensure that the
malware did not inadvertently interact with the internet. VMWare Virtual
Machines were used to run the malware for analysis purposes under
Microsoft Windows XP. The advantage of using Virtual Machines was that
the state of the Virtual Machine could be restored quickly and easily at any
point. Data was transferred between the Virtual Machines and the Linux
host using a USB memory device.

3.7.
3.7.1.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Validate Individual Techniques

This process addresses the exploratory questions outlined in Table 3-1
above. The objective of this process is to validate the requirement that each
individual technique prevents code from being analyzed. It also investigates
the effectiveness of detection and mitigation methods that can be used
against the techniques under investigation.
Inputs – Literature review, research questions, individual techniques.
Outputs – Success or failure result for Technique, Detection and Mitigation.
The steps used were:
1. Write standalone executable programs which employ the individual
analysis avoidance technique as identified in the Literature Review
section of this thesis.
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2. Validate that the technique works by testing the general requirement
for each technique, that is, “The use of the technique detects that the
program is running in a debugger”.
3.

Write a script that will detect the use of each technique.

4. Validate that the detection script correctly identifies each technique.
5. Write a script that will mitigate each technique.
6. Validate that the mitigation script defeats the technique.
7. Analyse results.

3.7.2.

Analysis of Collected Malware

The objective of this process is to collect empirical data from the malware
collected from the ECU Nepenthes honeypot from a variety of analysis tools.
This process seeks to assess the effectiveness of Packer Detection tools and
methods.
Inputs – Malware specimens from ECU Nepenthes sensors.
Outputs – Results from various Packer detection tools and methods.
The steps used to analyze the malware from an empirical perspective were:
1. Download the malware from the ECU Nepenthes sensor.
2. Create a directory with the same name as the hash of the collected
malware specimen on the analysis machine.
3. Enter the hash into the “MD5 Sum” column of the “Malware Analysis”
spreadsheet for each sheet that was used to record the result of each
specific type of analysis method that was used.
4. Record the date the malware was collected by Nepenthes into the
“Nepenthes” sheet.
5. Submit the specimen to Virus Total for analysis. Store the html
page result in the directory. Virus Total is a site where malware can
be submitted and the malware is tested by in excess of 30 AV
Engines. Extract information from result and store in “Malware
Analysis” spreadsheet in the “Virus Total” sheet. Extract data and
store in the appropriate column in the sheet. Count the number of
successful detections and store in “Detections” column. Count the
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number of engines and store in the “Number of Engines” column.
Calculate the detection result and store in column “Detection Result”.
6. Submit the specimen to Anubis which is an online dynamic analysis
engine. Store the resultant web page into a text file (Anubis) in the
directory. Record results into the sheet named “Anubis” in the
appropriate columns.
7. Validate the collected malware as malicious or not.
8. Load the unpacked version of the malware into Mandiant’s Red
Curtain analysis tool. Record entropy and PEiD results directly into
the “Red Curtain” sheet in “Entropy” and “PEiD” column of the sheet
respectively.
9. Determine effectiveness of Packer detection on validated malware.
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CHAPTER 4

VALIDATION OF ANTI-ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES RESULTS

4.1.

OVERVIEW

The literature review discussed two fundamental types

of analyses

appropriate to analyse malware as static and dynamic analysis. Malware
tends to be heavily obfuscated to avoid signature based AV software also to
defeat

static

analysis.

Analysts

generally

run

the

malware

under

investigation inside a debugger so that instructions are potentially deobfuscated and revealed at run time. After this, further analysis can
commence, however, malware may contain hundreds of thousands of
instructions

and

stepping

through

every

instruction

manually

can

understandably become untenable. This is because the time the analyst can
allocated to the analysis is a limited resource. Debuggers have associated
scripting languages to perform fundamental analysis tasks in an automated
manner to avoid stepping manually through the code.
The literature review revealed that malware can use run time packers that
are a stub program embedded in the malware that unpack the original code
at run time into memory. Once the malware has been unpacked, the
original instructions are executed. The point at which the original code is
reached, after the unpacking process is completed, is referred to as the
Original Entry Point (OEP). Generally, it is at this point where the program
can be dumped from memory and analyzed to determine its functionality,
including access to the registry, files, network communications, vectors of
attack to other systems and other very useful information to the analyst.
In order to hinder dynamic analysis at such a level, the search of the
literature exposed a plethora of techniques malware incorporates into its
code to hide functionality. Malware can determine if it is running inside a
debugger and then take control of the flow of execution so that it can use
deception to hide its true intent and not reveal which files it was going to
modify, how it was going to communicate over the network and other
malicious activities that could identify it as malicious. This information is
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also required for disinfection purposes. If a known specimen of malware is
detected, the intent of the quarantine process is to remove the files that are
known to be associated with the specimen.
The literature associated with anti-analysis techniques very sparsely covers
routines to detect the use of these techniques. Detection of the use of antianalysis techniques was identified in the literature as potentially a very
good indicator that the software under investigation is possibly of a
malicious nature. Equally, the literature review revealed that mitigation
techniques available in popular plugins for dealing with anti forensic
techniques such as OllyAdvanced and IDA Stealth for OllyDbg and

IDA Pro respectively, do not come close to providing coverage for the
number of anti-analysis techniques. This provides an opportunity to
investigate the methods that can be employed to detect and mitigate the
use of anti-analysis techniques.
The purpose of this chapter is three fold. The first part validates a selection
of the anti-analysis techniques presented in the literature review. Once the
technique has been validated as successful, the implementation of the
technique can be used for the next two parts. The second part is used to
determine if the use of the same technique can be detected. The third part
determines if the use of the same technique can be mitigated. The intention
is to produce Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) to directly support answers
to the three research questions of this thesis. The OQE is produced by a
series of small quasi experiments where strict control over the flow of
execution of the programs is maintained and external influences are
minimized.

4.2.

METHODOLOGY

The fundamental methodology for performing the quasi experiments is as
follows:
For each anti-analysis technique under investigation:
1. Implement the technique in as simple a program as possible.
2. Observe if the anti-analysis technique is successful or not.
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3. Implement a detection script or employ a detection technique
to try to detect the presence of the technique.
4. Observe if the detection technique is successful or not.
5. Implement a mitigation script or technique to try and mitigate
the use of the anti-analysis technique.
6. Observe if the mitigation technique is successful or not.
Steps one and two are used to produce OQE to address research question
one. That is, “What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed?”.
Steps three and four are used to produce OQE to address research question
two. That is, “How can the use of these techniques be detected?”. Steps five
and six are used to produce OQE to address research question three. That is,
“How can the use of these techniques be mitigated?” The function of each of
these steps is outlined in the following sub sections.

4.2.1.

Implement the technique in as simple a program as possible

The literature review presented a wide variety of techniques malware can
incorporate to hinder analysis. Code to implement the anti-analysis
techniques discussed in the referenced papers exists only as code snippets.
That is, as non-functioning and non-complete programs. To progress the
examination

of

the

anti-analysis

technique

and

to

determine

its

effectiveness, the code had to be implemented in small standalone
programs. The selection of the language to develop the programs in was
assembly language. This is because this is the lowest level a programmer
can write code in and this is the same language that an analyst would work
with when analyzing a malicious program. It has the added benefit of
ensuring that the most strict control was obtained over the functioning of
the code. That is, it allows control of external variables that could influence
the behaviour of the program.

4.2.2.

Observe if the anti-analysis technique is successful or not

Once the anti-analysis technique has been implemented, the program is run
to determine if it effectively detects the presence of a debugger and alters
its path of execution. This can be observed at the debugger level, by
stepping through the program and observing each and every instruction as
it is executed at the assembly language level. It is intended that the result
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of each of these tests will either show cause and effect, or not. Figure 4-1
depicts the execution logic of the program and shows the only two possible
observable results in a simple flow chart. Either the technique detects the
presence of a debugger or it does not.

Start

Yes

Detect
Tool?

No

Record Result
as Tool not
Detected

Record Result
as Tool
Detected

Finish
Figure 4-1 Simple flowchart to record if technique was successful or
not in detecting the presence of a tool.

4.2.3.

Implement a detection script or employ a detection technique

to try to detect the presence of the technique.
The purpose of this step is to implement a debugging script or to use an
analysis technique to detect the use of the anti-analysis technique in the
developed program. A small variety of scripting languages was used to
achieve this, using the two most popular debuggers used in Malware Digital
Forensics, IDA

Pro (Commercial) and OllyDbg (Non Commercial)

(Zeltser, 2007). Scripts are written such that they will either detect the
technique or not and no unnecessary programming overhead is included.
Where scripting languages were not used, features of the debuggers were
used instead to detect the use of the technique. Selection of techniques to
implement was essentially determined by the techniques implemented in
popular anti forensic plugins such as the IDA Stealth plugin for validation
purposes. This gave an addition validating mechanism to determine if the
technique was successful or not.
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4.2.4.

Observe if the detection technique is successful or not.

Figure 4-2 depicts the logic of the observable result from conducting the
test. It is intended that the result of each of these tests will show cause and
effect. The results of each test are recorded as observations, the detection
technique either worked or it did not.

Start

Yes

Technique
Detected
?

No

Record
Technique as
Not Detected

Record
Technique as
Detected

Finish
Figure 4-2 Simple flow chart depicting logic of recording the result
of script or technique to detect implementation of anti-analysis
technique.

4.2.5.

Implement a mitigation script or technique to try and mitigate

the use of the anti-analysis technique.
Scripts were written or techniques were employed to mitigate the use of the
anti-analysis technique. Scripts are written such that they will either
mitigate the technique or not and no unnecessary programming overhead is
included. Where scripting languages were not used, features of the
debuggers were used instead to mitigate the use of the technique.

4.2.6.

Observe if the mitigation technique is successful or not.

Figure 4-3 depicts the logic of the test of the mitigation script or technique.
Either the mitigation technique was successful or not.
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Start

Yes

Technique
Mitigated
?

No

Record
Technique as
Not Mitigated

Record
Technique as
Mitigated

Finish
Figure 4-3 Simple flow chart depicting the logic of recording the
result of the mitigation script or technique.

4.3.
4.3.1.
Figure

KERNEL32 ISDEBUGGERPRESENT() QUASI EXPERIMENT
Implementation of anti-analysis technique
4-4

demonstrates

a

call

to

the

kernel32

DLL

function

IsDebuggerPresent(). IsDebugger present will return 1 if the process is
being debugged, 0 if not being debugged, and an appropriate message will
be displayed. The ADDR keyword specifies that pointers to the strings are
being passed to the MessageBox function.
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.686
.MODEL flat, stdcall
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE

;Case sensitive

include windows.inc
include kernel32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
include user32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.DATA
text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0
caption db 'IsDebuggerPresent',0
text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0
.CODE
Start:
INVOKE IsDebuggerPresent
TEST EAX,EAX
JNZ DebuggerDetected
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, ADDR text1, ADDR caption, MB_OK
JMP Finish
DebuggerDetected:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, ADDR text2, ADDR caption, MB_OK
Finish:
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
End Start
Figure 4-4 Listing of implementation of kernel32 IsDebuggerPresent
technique.

4.3.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The debugger was detected when the program was run in OllyDbg and IDA

Pro.

4.3.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The use of functions can be easily detected from a static analysis point of
view in IDA Pro. The IDA Python script in Figure 4-5 shows how the
name of a function can be detected. It should be noted that this is a very
simple example and that malware can obfuscate function names so that
detection is not so easy. The function prints to the screen, but could just as
easily write to a file or a port. It should be noted that this script works with
the static disassembly. A script can also be written that will work inside the
debugger as it runs. This approach facilitates dynamic analysis and even
allows decisions to be made about the control flow of the program as it runs.
The reality is that a function found from a disassembly may never be
actually called. This can be determined by checking to see what other
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functions (cross references) call the function of interest. The compromise is
that with a static analysis, the analyst is not actually running malicious code.
However, with a dynamic analysis (running in the debugger), the malicious
code is actually interacting with the system.

# detectFunction(functionToFind)
# detect the presence of a particular function
# input : functionToFind = function to find as string
# output : True if function found, False otherwise
def detectFunction(functionToFind):
found = False
# get the segments starting address
ea = ScreenEA()
# loop through all the functions in the segment
for function_ea in Functions(SegStart(ea), SegEnd(ea)):
if GetFunctionName(function_ea) == functionToFind:
found = True
print hex(function_ea), GetFunctionName(function_ea)
return found
def main():
detectFunction("IsDebuggerPresent")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Figure 4-5 IDA Python function detection script used for static
analysis.

4.3.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The detection script effectively detected the use of the technique.

4.3.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

The mitigation technique employed was the use of the selection of the

OllyAdvanced option to detect IsDebuggerPresent in OllyDbg and to use
the IsDebuggerPresent flag in IDA Stealth.

4.3.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The OllyAdvanced option and the IDA Stealth option were effective in
mitigating the technique in the implemented program in Figure 4-4.
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4.4.
4.4.1.

PEB ISDEBUGGED() QUASI EXPERIMENT
Implementation of anti-analysis technique

In such a simple example as shown in the listing in Figure 4-4, the
IsDebuggerPresent() function call shows up in the import table and can be
detected. Since the API function call itself is simply reading the second byte
of the Process Environment Block (PEB) at offset 2, a stealthy version can
attempt to do this itself directly instead of calling the IsDebuggerPresent
API function as shown in the listing of Figure 4-6. Offset +30 from the
Thread Environment Block (TEB) data structure points to the PEB of the
current process. Because a BYTE is being transferred to EAX, it must be
extended with zeros (MOVZX) to fill the register.

.686
.MODEL flat, stdcall
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE

;Case sensitive

include windows.inc
include kernel32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
include user32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.DATA
text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0
caption db 'IsDebugged',0
text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0
.CODE
Start:
ASSUME FS:NOTHING
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[30h]
MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR [EAX+2] ;mov with zero extend
TEST EAX,EAX
JNZ DebuggerDetected
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK
JMP Finish
DebuggerDetected:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK
Finish:
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
End Start
Figure 4-6 Listing of implementation of PEB!IsDebugged technique
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4.4.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and

IDA Pro.

4.4.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The IsDebuggerPresent flag is an option in IDA Stealth that can be
used to detect the use of this technique. An alternative to using IDA

Stealth is to patch the IsDebugged field of the Process Environment Block
(PEB) using the IDC script in Figure 4-7, partially extracted from an
example from Eagle (2008b). Although Eagle’s technique is effective at
mitigation, some additional modification is required to check if the malware
is using this detection method.

#include <idc.idc>
static main() {
auto globalFlags, func, end;
// run to the entry point
RunTo(BeginEA());
// launch the debugger, but suspend
GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1);
//ebx points to peb on entry. This is only true at BeginEA,
not main
PatchByte(EBX + 2, 0);
//PEB!IsDebugged = 0;
// resume the debugger
GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_CONT , -1);
}
Figure 4-7 IDC script PatchIsDebuggerPresent.idc to patch
IsDebuggerPresent flag in PEB.
Another way to detect that this technique is being used, is to check when
the PEB is being accessed. One way to do this is to check the second
operand for each instruction to see if it is accessing the PEB at FS:[30h] as
shown in the listing in Figure 4-8.
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// simple example to find a pattern dynamically
#include <idc.idc>
static main() {
auto code;
EnableTracing(TRACE_STEP, 1);
findPattern(GetEventEa(), "fs:30h");
for (code = GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_ANY | WFNE_CONT, -1); code >
0;
code = GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_ANY | WFNE_CONT, -1))
{
findPattern(GetEventEa(), "fs:30h");
}
EnableTracing(TRACE_STEP, 0);
}
// if pattern found in second operand, print a short message
static findPattern(addr, pattern)
{
auto oper1, oper2, mnem;
mnem = GetMnem(addr);
oper1 = GetOpnd(addr, 0);
oper2 = GetOpnd(addr, 1);
if (strstr(oper2, pattern) >= 0) {
Message("Found %s\n", pattern);
Message("%x %s %s, %s\n", addr, mnem, oper1, oper2);
}
return 0;
}
Figure 4-8 IDC script to find a pattern at run time.

4.4.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

Both the manual detection technique discussed above and the detection
scripts were very effective at detecting the use of the anti-analysis
technique. If the OllyAdvanced option to detect IsDebuggerPresent is
selected when the code in Figure 4-6 is run, OllyDbg will be detected
because the call to the function IsDebuggerPresent is never called. This
emphasizes the importance of understanding the limitations of the
functionality of tools and the likelihood of workarounds to have been
discovered and implemented to mitigate detection methods used by
analysts.

116

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

4.4.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

The PEB can be viewed in OllyDbg by pressing Ctrl+G (Goto Expression) in
the data window and entering FS:[30]. Highlight the offset at 0x02
(remembering to start at 0), press the space bar to pull up the editor, and
change the 0x01 to 0x00. This emphasizes a significant difference between

IDA Pro and OllyDbg. It is much easier to patch code with OllyDbg than
with IDA Pro and save the modified binary. OllyDbg is working with the
actual, original binary, whereas IDA Pro is working with an analyzed
version of the original binary that is stored in a database, but can still be
patched and run.

4.4.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The use of the mitigation technique was effective.

4.5.
4.5.1.

PEB NTGLOBALFLAGS() QUASI EXPERIMENT
Implementation of anti-analysis technique

The DWORD located at offset 0x68 in the PEB contains flags that define how
various APIs will be used by the loaded program, and certain flags are set if
the process is being run in a debugger. These flags are listed in Figure 4-9.

FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_TAIL_CHECK
FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_FREE_CHECK
FLG_HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS
Figure 4-9 NTGlobal Flags used

(0x10)
(0x20)
(0x40)
to detect if program is running

inside a debugger
The NtGlobalFlag will be set to 0x00 in a program that is not being
debugged. If the program is being debugged, the NtGlobalFlag will be set
to 0x70 which shows that the above flags are set. These flags can be set by
the call to the ntdll function LdrpInitializeExecutionOptions(). The
listing in Figure 4-10 demonstrates this technique.
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.686
.MODEL flat, stdcall
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE

;Case sensitive

include windows.inc
include kernel32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
include user32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.DATA
text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0
caption db 'NtGlobalFlags',0
text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0
.CODE
Start:
ASSUME FS:NOTHING
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[30h]
MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR [EAX+68h]
CMP EAX, 70h
TEST EAX,EAX
JNZ DebuggerDetected
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK
JMP Finish
DebuggerDetected:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK
Finish:
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
End Start
Figure 4-10 Listing of implementation of PEB!NTGlobalFlags
technique to detect presence of debugger.

4.5.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and

IDA Pro. OllyDbg was detected, unless the OllyAdvanced NtGlobal
flag option was enabled. Equally, IDA

Pro was detected until the

NtGlobalFlag (Patch global heap flag) option was selected.

4.5.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

To detect the use of this technique, the pattern searching script in Figure
4-8 can be used to notify the analyst about code access to the PEB. The
pattern searching script could be modified to cater for the various
permutations that are possible.
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4.5.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The pattern matching technique in Figure 4-8 effectively detected the use of
the technique using IDA Pro.

4.5.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

The listing in Figure 4-11 is partially extracted from an example by (Eagle,
2008b) and shows how the NtGlobalFlag can be successfully patched at
run time using the IDC scripting language in IDA Pro.

#include <idc.idc>
static main() {
auto globalFlags, func, end;
RunTo(BeginEA());
GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1);
globalFlags = Dword(EBX + 0x68) & ~0x70;
PatchDword(EBX + 0x68, globalFlags);
}
Figure 4-11 IDC Script to patch NtGlobalFlags at run time to avoid
detection of debugger.

4.5.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

Use of the script in Figure 4-11effectively mitigated the use of the technique.

4.6.

HEAP FLAGS QUASI EXPERIMENT

4.6.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

When the first heap of a program is created, its Flags will be set to 0x02 to
designate that the heap can grow and the ForceFlags field will be set to
0x00. However, when a process is being debugged, “these flags are usually
set to 0x50000062 (depending on the NTGlobalFlag) and 0x40000060
(which is Flags AND 0x6001007D)” (Yason, 2007, p.5). The following heap
flags in Figure 4-12 are also set when a heap is created on a debugged
process.
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HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED (0X20)
HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED (0X40)
Figure 4-12 Heap flags that are set when a process is being
debugged. These can be used to detect the presence of a debugger.
Falliere (2007, p.3) says that checking the ForceFlags field in a heap
header at offset 0x10 can be used to detect the presence of a debugger.
This technique is implemented in the listing in Figure 4-13.

.686
.MODEL flat, stdcall
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE

;Case sensitive

include windows.inc
include kernel32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
include user32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.DATA
text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0
caption db 'Heap Flags',0
text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0
.CODE
Start:
ASSUME FS:NOTHING
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[30h]
MOV EAX, [EAX+18h] ;process heap
MOV EAX, [EAX+10h] ; heap flags
TEST EAX,EAX
JNZ DebuggerDetected
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK
JMP Finish
DebuggerDetected:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK
Finish:
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
End Start
Figure 4-13 Listing of implementation of HeapFlags detection
technique.

4.6.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and

IDA Pro.
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4.6.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

To detect the use of this technique, the pattern searching script from Figure
4-8 can be used to detect when the PEB is being accessed. However, it
should be noted that it would be very easy to further obfuscate the operand
to access the PEB.

4.6.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The use of the detection technique proved to be effective.

4.6.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

Falliere (2007, p.3) suggests two ways to mitigate the use of this technique
as follows:
1. Create a non-debugged process, and attach the debugger once the
process has been created. An easy solution is to create the process
suspended, run until the entry-point is reached, patch it to an infinite loop,
resume the process, attach the debugger, and restore the original entrypoint.
2. Edit the registry key:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows

NT\CurrentVersion\Image

File

Execution Options
“Create a subkey (not value) names as your process name, and under this
subkey, a String value GlobalFlags set to nothing” (Falliere, 2007, p.3).
Yason (2007, p.5) says that a solution is to patch the PEB.NTGlobalFlag
and PEB.HeapProcess flag to the values as if the process is not being
debugged. Yason provides an OllyScript to patch the flags that is
reproduced as follows in the listing in Figure 4-14. The assembly language
feel is very evident in OllyScript syntax and serves as a very interesting
contrast to IDAPython and IDC script. A variety of OllyScripts can be
found on most reverse engineering web sites and can be used to see how
particular analysis techniques work and if desired, transform the algorithm
into another scripting language such as IDAPython to work with IDA Pro.
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var peb
var patch_addr
var process_heap
// retrieve PEB via a hardcoded TEB address (first thread:
// 0x7ffde000)
mov peb, [7ffde000+30]
//patch PEB.NtGlobalFlag
lea patch_addr, [peb+68]
mov [patch_addr], 0
//patch PEB.ProcessHeap.Flags/ForceFlags
mov process_heap, [peb+18]
lea patch_addr, [process_heap+0c]
mov [patch_addr], 2
lea patch_addr, [process_heap+10]
mov [patch_addr], 0
Figure 4-14 OllyScript to patch Heap Flags

4.6.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The technique was mitigated when the Heap Flag option of IDA Stealth
was checked. The script in Figure 4-14 effectively mitigated the technique
in IDA Pro. Setting the Heap Flags option in OllyAdvanced (v1.26) did
not help in mitigating this case, the debugger was still detected.

4.7.
4.7.1.

NTQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS() QUASI EXPERIMENT
Implementation of anti-analysis technique

The NtQueryInformationProcess call is used to retrieve information about
the running process. Its prototype is shown in Figure 4-15.

NTSTATUS WINAPI NtQueryInformationProcess(
__in
HANDLE ProcessHandle,
__in
PROCESSINFOCLASS ProcessInformationClass,
__out
PVOID ProcessInformation,
__in
ULONG ProcessInformationLength,
__out_opt PULONG ReturnLength
);
Figure 4-15 NtQueryInformationProcess call used to

retrieve

information about the running process
The PROCESSINFOCLASS enumeration can be set with a value of 7 to retrieve
the port number of the debugger for the process. The process is being
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debugged if the return value is non zero. An example implementation of this
technique by ap0x (2006) is shown in the listing in Figure 4-16.

.386
.model flat, stdcall
option casemap :none

; case sensitive

include \masm32\include\windows.inc
include \masm32\include\user32.inc
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
.data
DbgNotFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h
DbgFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h
DbgNotFoundText db "Debugger not found!",0h
DbgFoundText db "Debugger found!",0h
ntdll db "ntdll.dll",0h
zwqip db "NtQueryInformationProcess",0h
.data?
NtAddr dd ?
MinusOne dd ?
.code
start:
; MASM32 antiOlly example
; coded by ap0x
; Reversing Labs: http://ap0x.headcoders.net
;
This
example
can
detect
Olly
NtQueryInformationProcess API.
MOV [MinusOne],0FFFFFFFFh
PUSH offset ntdll ;ntdll.dll
CALL LoadLibrary
PUSH offset zwqip ;NtQueryInformationProcess
PUSH EAX
CALL GetProcAddress
MOV [NtAddr],EAX
MOV EAX,offset MinusOne
PUSH EAX
MOV EBX,ESP
PUSH 0
PUSH 4
PUSH EBX
PUSH 7
PUSH DWORD PTR[EAX]
CALL [NtAddr]
POP EAX
TEST EAX,EAX
JNE @DebuggerDetected
PUSH 40h
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundTitle
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundText
PUSH 0

by

using
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CALL MessageBox
JMP @exit
@DebuggerDetected:
PUSH 30h
PUSH offset DbgFoundTitle
PUSH offset DbgFoundText
PUSH 0
CALL MessageBox
@exit:
PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
end start
Figure
4-16
Implementation

of

NtQueryInformationProcess

technique to detect the presence of a debugger (ap0x, 2006)

4.7.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and

IDA Pro.

4.7.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The use of particular functions (where the use of the function is not
obfuscated) can be easily detected in IDC by the use of the function call
LocByName() which takes the name of the function to search for as a
parameter and returns the address of the function which serves to detect
the use of the function.

4.7.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The use of the technique was effectively detected using the function call
LocByName() in IDC.

4.7.5.
The

Implementation of mitigation technique
NtQueryInformationProcess

is

a

wrapper

around

the

ZwQueryInformationProcess system call. The debugger will be found until
the OllyAdvanced option ZwQueryInformationProcess is enabled. The
NtQueryInformationProcess signature is as follows in Figure 4-17.
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NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryInformationProcess (
HANDLE
ProcessHandle,
PROCESSINFOCLASS
ProcessInformationClass,
PVOID
ProcessInformation,
ULONG
ProcessInformationLength,
PULONG
ReturnLength
}
Figure 4-17 Signature of NtQueryInformationProcess

IDA

Stealth has an option to mitigate this technique using the

NTQueryInformationProcess option.
Once the address of the function has been found, the function can be
mitigated

by

setting

a

breakpoint

on

the

return

from

NtQueryInformationProcess. An algorithm presented by Eagle (2008a, p.
534) using IDA Pro is as follows:
•

Locate the address of NtQueryInformationProcess.

•

Create a function at the address.

•

Find the end address of the function.

•

Find the beginning of the return instruction by subtracting three from
the end address and set a breakpoint at this address.

•

Add a condition function on the breakpoint and set the breakpoint’s
attributes so that execution is prevented from stopping on the
breakpoint.

The listing in Figure 4-18 is extracted from an example by (Eagle, 2008b)
that implements the algorithm described above.
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#include <idc.idc>
//handle a return from NtQueryInformationProcess
#define ProcessDebugPort 7
static bpt_NtQueryInformationProcess() {
auto p_ret;
if (Dword(ESP + 8) == ProcessDebugPort) {
//test ProcessInformationClass
p_ret = Dword(ESP + 12);
if (p_ret) {
PatchDword(p_ret, 0); //fake no debugger present
}
}
}
static main() {
auto globalFlags, func, end;
RunTo(BeginEA());
GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1);
//

func = LocByName("ntdll_NtQueryInformationProcess");
func = LocByName("ntdll_ZwQueryInformationProcess");
MakeFunction(func, BADADDR);
end = GetFunctionAttr(func, FUNCATTR_END) - 3;
AddBpt(end);
SetBptAttr(end, BPT_BRK, 0); //don't stop
SetBptCnd(end, "bpt_NtQueryInformationProcess()");

}
Figure

4-18

Listing

of

NtQueryInformationProcess

avoidance

technique (Eagle, 2008b)
A

code

snippet

from

Yason

(2007,

p.7)

that

uses

NtQueryInformationProcess is reproduced in Figure 4-19:

; using ntdll!NtQueryInformationProcess (ProcessDebugPort)
lea eax,[.dwReturnLen]
push eax
; ReturnLength
push 4
; ProcessInformationLength
lea eax, [.dwDebugPort]
push eax
; ProcessInformation
push ProcessDebugPort ; ProcessInformationClass (7)
push 0xffffffff ; ProcessHandle
call [NtQueryInformationProcess]
cmp dword [.dwDebugPort], 0
jne .debugger_found
Figure 4-19 Code snippet using NtQueryInformationProcess (Yason,
2007, p.7)
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An example OllyScript presented by Yason (2007, p.7) is reproduced in
Figure

4-20.

It

shows

how

NtQueryInformationProcess()

a

breakpoint

returns

can

and

be

set

then

where
patches

ProcessInformation to 0 when the breakpoint is hit.

var

bp_NtQueryInformationProcess

// set a breakpoint handler
eob
bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess
// set a breakpoint where NtQueryInformationProcess returns
gpa
“NtQueryInformationProcess”, “ntdll.dll”
find
$RESULT, #c21400#
//retn 14
mov
bp_NTQueryInformationProcess, $RESULT
bphws
bp_NTQueryInformationProcess, “x”
run
bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess:
// ProcessInformationClass == ProcessDebugPort ?
cmp
[esp+8], 7
jne
bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess_continue
// patch ProcessInformation to 0
mov
patch_addr, [esp+c]
mov
[patch_addr], 0
// clear breakpoint
bphwc
bp_NtQueryInformationProcess
bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess_continue:
run
Figure 4-20 OllyScript to Patch ProcessInformation (Yason, 2007,
p.7)

4.7.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The mitigation techniques were observed to be very effective.

4.8.

KERNEL32 CHECKREMOTEDEBUGGERPRESENT() QUASI
EXPERIMENT

4.8.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

This call has two parameters, a process handle, and a pointer to a BOOLEAN
variable that will be set to TRUE if it is found that a debugger is attached to
the process. The signature of this call is as follows in Figure 4-21.
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BOOL CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent (
HANDLE
hProcess,
PBOOL
pbDebuggerPresent
)
Figure 4-21 Signature of CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
The

call

chain

for

this

function

is

via

the

ntdll

function

NtQueryInformationProcess which queries the DebugPort field of the
EPROCESS kernel structure. An example listing (ap0x, 2006) is provided in
Figure 4-22 that uses the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function call.

.386
.model flat, stdcall
option casemap :none

; case sensitive

include \masm32\include\windows.inc
include \masm32\include\user32.inc
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
.data
DbgNotFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h
DbgFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h
DbgNotFoundText db "Debugger not found!",0h
DbgFoundText db "Debugger found!",0h
krnl db "kernel32.dll",0h
chkrdbg db "CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent",0h
.data?
IsItPresent dd ?
.code
start:
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;

MASM32 antiRing3Debugger example
coded by ap0x
Reversing Labs: http://ap0x.headcoders.net
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent is function similar to
IsDebuggerPresent.
This function is available only in Windows NT and it
outputs TRUE or FALSE value if debugger is present
in selected process.

; Load the function via GetProcAddress
PUSH
CALL
PUSH
PUSH
CALL
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; IsItPresent variable will store the result
PUSH offset IsItPresent
PUSH -1
CALL EAX
MOV EAX,DWORD PTR[IsItPresent]
TEST EAX,EAX
JNE @DebuggerDetected
PUSH 40h
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundTitle
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundText
PUSH 0
CALL MessageBox
JMP @exit
@DebuggerDetected:
PUSH 30h
PUSH offset DbgFoundTitle
PUSH offset DbgFoundText
PUSH 0
CALL MessageBox
@exit:
PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
end start
Figure 4-22 Listing of CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent technique to
find presence of remote debugger (ap0x, 2006)

4.8.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and

IDA Pro.

4.8.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The use of this technique can be detected by locating calls to the
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function call as exemplified by the routine
presented in Figure 4-23.

4.8.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

Detection of the use of the technique proved to be effective.

4.8.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

A technique to detect and patch the use of this technique with the

Immunity Debugger is provided by BoB (2007) in the procedure listed in
Figure 4-23.

129

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

#-----------------------------------------------------------------------# CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent ..
# Note: This Api calls ZwQueryInformationProcess Api,
# so usually no need to patch both ..
def Patch_CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(imm):
deb = imm.getAddress( "kernel32.CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent"
)
# Just incase on Win2k .. ;)
if (deb <= 0):
imm.Log( "No CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent to patch .." )
return
imm.Log( "Patching CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent ..", address =
deb )
imm.writeMemory( deb, imm.Assemble( " \
Mov
EDI, EDI
\n \
Push EBP
\n \
Mov
EBP, ESP
\n \
Mov
EAX, [EBP + C]
\n \
Push 0
\n \
Pop
[EAX]
\n \
Xor
EAX, EAX
\n \
Pop
EBP
\n \
Ret
8
\
" ) )
Figure

4-23

Implementation

of

CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent

detection technique (BoB, 2007)
After detection, the procedure patches the program by assembling new
instructions to replace the original instructions.

The assembly language

commands and assembled instructions appear as follows in Figure 4-24.

MOV
EDI, EDI
PUSH EBP
MOV EBP, ESP
MOV EAX, [EBP + 0Ch]
PUSH 0
POP [EAX]
XOR EAX, EAX
POP EBP
RET
8
Figure
4-24
Resultant

8B FF
55
8B EC
8B 45 0C
6A 00
8F 00
33 C0
5D
C2 08 00
patched

program

after

running

CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent detection script.
Once the start address of the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function is
found in the Kernel32 DLL, memory can be over written with the new
instructions. This can be done manually through a debugger, or through a
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script. Figure 4-25 provides an equivalent example written in IDC script.
A variety of other anti anti debugging techniques in BoB’s script include:
•

IsDebuggerPresent

•

ZwQueryInformationProcess

•

CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent

•

PEB.IsDebugged

•

PEB.ProcessHeap.Flag

•

PEB.NtGlobalFlag

•

PEB.Ldr

•

GetTickCount

•

ZwQuerySystemInformation

•

FindWindowA

•

FindWindowW

•

FindWindowExA

•

FindWindowExW

•

EnumWindows

#include <idc.idc>
# detect and patch CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
static main() {
auto addr;
RunTo(BeginEA());
GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1);
addr = LocByName("kernel32_CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent");
if (addr != BADADDR){
Message("CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent at address %x\n", addr);
patchCheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(addr);
}
}

static patchCheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(addr) {
PatchDword(addr, 0x8B55FF8B);
PatchDword(addr + 4, 0x0C458BEC);
PatchDword(addr + 8, 0x008F006A);
PatchDword(addr + 12, 0xC25DC033);
PatchWord(addr + 16, 0x0008);
}
Figure 4-25 CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent detection and mitigation
IDC Script (Dynamic)
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4.8.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The implemented mitigation techniques proved to be very effective. The
debugger was detected when run inside OllyDbg, but was mitigated when
the OllyAdvanced ZwQuerySystemInformation option was enabled. IDA

Pro

was

detected

when

the

program

NTQueryInformation

process

CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)

checkbox

was

executed.

(which
must

be

selected

The

includes
in

IDA

Stealth to prevent its discovery by the anti-analysis technique.

4.9.
4.9.1.

UNHANDLED EXCEPTION FILTER QUASI EXPERIMENT
Implementation of anti-analysis technique

Windows has a chained Structured Exception Handler (SEH) mechanism to
pass exceptions to handlers instead of crashing the program if possible.
Malware can take advantage of SEH to gain control of the malware to detect
it is being debugged. The malware throws an exception deliberately, and if
its own SEH does not handle the exception, it can deduce that it is being
debugged. OllyDbg does have a setting to not handle exceptions and to
pass exceptions to the process being debugged. Exceptions are handled in
the following way for Windows XP SP2, Windows 2003 and Windows Vista
(Falliere, 2007, p.5):
•

Pass control to the per process Vectored Exception Handler if any.

•

Otherwise, pass control to the per thread SEH which is pointed to by
FS:[0] in the thread that generated the exception.

•

If not processed by the previous two steps, the final SEH in the chain
will call the kernel32 function UnhandledExceptionFilter which is
set by the system. This function will determine what to do next
dependent upon whether the program is being debugged or not. If
not being debugged, a user defined filter function will be called, that
is set by the kernel32 function SetUnhandledExceptionFilter. If it
is being debugged, the program is terminated.

Two types of exception handlers are (Gordon, n.d.) :
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•

Final exception handler.

•

Per thread exception handler.

The final exception handler is set up in the main thread by a call to the API
function SetUnhandledExceptionFilter which replaces the top level
exception handler that Win32 places at the top of each thread and process.
If an exception occurs after this call “in a process that is not being
debugged, and the exception makes it to the Win32 unhandled exception
filter, that filter will call the exception filter function specified by the
lpTopLevelExceptionFilter parameter”(+Pumpqara, n.d.). A modified
version of an example developed by +Pumqara is shown in Figure 4-26.
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.686
.model flat, stdcall
option casemap:none
include c:\masm32\INCLUDE\Windows.inc
include c:\masm32\INCLUDE\user32.inc
include c:\masm32\INCLUDE\kernel32.inc
includelib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
includelib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
.data
caption db "SetUnhandledExceptionFilter",0
text4 db "Return Point from Handler", 0
text1 db "In Handler",0
.code
ExceptionHandler proc
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK
; get the EXCEPTION_POINTERS structure from the stack
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [ESP+4] ;
; from the EXCEPTION_POINTERS structure, get the pointer
; to the CONTEXT structure
MOV EAX, [EAX+4] ; CONTEXT
ASSUME EAX:PTR CONTEXT
; change the regEip member of the CONTEXT to the safe address
MOV [EAX].regEip, OFFSET SafeAddress ; Change regEip
; Set EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION flag in EAX
XOR EAX,EAX
DEC EAX
RETN 4
; Normalize stack and return
ExceptionHandler endp
start:
; register the exception handler
INVOKE SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,offset ExceptionHandler
; force a divide by 0 exception
XOR EAX,EAX
DIV EAX
SafeAddress:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text4, addr caption, MB_OK
INVOKE ExitProcess,0
end start
Figure 4-26 Listing of implementation of
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter technique.

4.9.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

This technique was found to be very effective. If the program is run
normally, the exception handler will be called after the deliberate divide by
zero exception, and will return to the location of SafeAddress. If the
program is run in OllyDbg, the program will not enter the exception
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handler and will crash, unless the debug options are set to pass the
exceptions to the program. IDA Pro performs in a very similar manner and
can also be set to pass exceptions to the application. Many packers use this
technique to make the analysis process more difficult. This is because if the
program is being debugged, the top level exception handler is never called.
Only the per thread or per process handler is called.

4.9.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

Detection of this technique was accomplished by searching for a call to
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter function call.

4.9.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The detection technique proved to be effective.

4.9.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

The type of exception that is raised could be examined as well as the
handler and patched out if it assists the analysis.

4.9.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The mitigation technique proved to be effective.

4.10. NTSETINFORMATIONTHREAD() QUASI EXPERIMENT
4.10.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

A thread can be hidden from a debugger by using the ntdll function
NtSetInformationThread. This is usually used for setting the priority of a
thread, but can be used to prevent debugging events from being sent to the
debugger. It’s prototype is as follows in Figure 4-27.

NTSYSAPI NTSTATUS NTAPI NtSetInformationThread(
IN HANDLE ThreadHandle,
IN THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS ThreadInformationClass,
IN PVOID ThreadInformation,
IN ULONG ThreadInformationLength
);
Figure 4-27 NtSetInformationThread signature
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The ThreadInformationClass has to be set to 0x11 to hide the thread,
which essentially detaches the thread. The following listing, an extension of
an example by (Falliere, 2007, p.7) demonstrates this technique.

.386
.model flat,stdcall
option casemap:none
include c:\masm32\include\windows.inc
include c:\masm32\include\user32.inc
include c:\masm32\include\kernel32.inc
includelib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
includelib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.data
LibName db "ntdll.dll",0
FunctionName db "NtSetInformationThread",0
DllNotFound db "Cannot load library",0
AppName db "Load Library",0
FunctionNotFound db "Function not found",0
strAllOk db "Debugger Not Found", 0
.data?
hLib dd ?
FunctionAddr dd ?

; the handle of the library (DLL)
; the address of the function

.code
start:
invoke LoadLibrary,addr LibName
.if eax==NULL
invoke MessageBox,NULL,addr DllNotFound,addr AppName,MB_OK
.else
mov hLib,eax
invoke GetProcAddress,hLib,addr FunctionName
.if eax==NULL
invoke MessageBox,NULL,addr FunctionNotFound,addr AppName,MB_OK
.else
mov FunctionAddr,eax
push 0
push 0
push 11h
push -2
call [FunctionAddr]
invoke MessageBox, NULL, addr strAllOk, addr AppName, MB_OK
.endif
invoke FreeLibrary,hLib
.endif
invoke ExitProcess,NULL
end start
Figure 4-28 Listing of implementation of NtSetInformationThread
technique.
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4.10.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

When run outside a debugger, the MessageBox will display the message that
the debugger was not found. If stepped in OllyDbg, the thread will be
detached, and an error will be displayed that access is denied when trying
to exit from the debugger, effectively detecting the presence of the
debugger.

4.10.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The

of

use

this

technique

can

be

detected

by

locating

calls

to

NtSetInformationThread.

4.10.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The detection technique proved to be effective.

4.10.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

The OllyAdvanced option ZwSetInformationThread can be set to mitigate
this technique or when the IDA Stealth plugin NtSetInformationThread
option is selected.

4.10.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

IDA Pro was not detected when run without breakpoints, but detached the
thread when stepped through with the debugger. The debugger was not
detected when the IDA Stealth plugin NtSetInformationThread option
was selected. If the first breakpoint is set one instruction (or more) beyond
the call to the function, the breakpoint is reached ok, effectively mitigating
the technique.

4.11. KERNEL32 CLOSEHANDLE() AND NTCLOSE()QUASI
EXPERIMENT
4.11.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

The presence of a debugger can be detected by making use of the ZwClose
system call. CloseHandle indirectly makes use of this call. Calling ZwClose
with an invalid handle will generate a STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exception.
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Falliere (2007, p.7) says that “the only proper way to bypass the
CloseHandle anti-debug is to either modify the system call data from ring 0,
before it is called, or set up a kernel hook.” The listing in Figure 4-29, an
extension of an example provided by (Falliere, 2007, p.7) demonstrates this
technique.

.686
.MODEL flat, stdcall
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE

;Case sensitive

include windows.inc
include kernel32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
include user32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.DATA
text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0
caption db 'Heap Flags',0
text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0
.CODE
Start:
PUSH OFFSET Finish
PUSH 1234h
; invalid handle
CALL CloseHandle
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK
JMP Finish
DebuggerDetected:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK
Finish:
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
End Start
Figure 4-29 Listing of Kernel32 CloseHandle technique to detect
presence of debugger

4.11.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The program runs fine outside a debugger, but inside OllyDbg, the
STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exception was raised. IDA Pro behaved in a very
similar manner.

4.11.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The call to CloseHandle is easy enough to find for detection purposes. An
example script to locate functions and their cross references adapted and
modified from an example by Eagle (2008a, p.271) is shown in Figure 4-30.
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#include <idc.idc>
// locate functions and their cross references
// adapted from an example by Chris Eagle, p.271
// The IDA Pro Book
static findFunction(func) {
auto f, addr, xref, source;
f = LocByName(func);
if (f == BADADDR) {
Message("%s not located\n", func);
}
else {
for (addr = RfirstB(f); addr != BADADDR; addr = RnextB(f,
addr)) {
xref = XrefType();
if (xref == fl_CN || xref == fl_CF) {
source = GetFunctionName(addr);
Message("%s is called from 0x%x in %s\n", func, addr,
source);
}
}
}
}
static main() {
// add functions to find
findFunction("CloseHandle");
}
Figure 4-30 Listing of findFunction script adapted from Eagle
(2008a, p.271)

4.11.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The detection technique was found to be effective.

4.11.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

IDA Stealth

has an NtClose option that can be used to mitigate this

technique.

4.11.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The mitigation technique was found to be effective.
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4.12. USER-MODE TIMERS QUASI EXPERIMENT
4.12.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

Packers and debug detection routines take advantage of the fact that code
running in a debugger is going to take longer to execute than when not
running in a debugger. The routines measure the time elapsed and compare
it with a normal run time value. If it took longer to run than expected, then
it is probably running in a debugger. The RDTSC (Read Time Stamp Counter)
instruction can be used before and after a routine to determine how much
time elapsed.
The kernel32 DLL has a function called GetTickCount that returns with the
number

of

milliseconds

elapsed

since

the

system

was

started.

A

SharedUserData data structure is always located at address 0x7FFE0000
and contains the fields TickCountLow and TickCountMultiplier.
The following listing, in Figure 4-31, shows an full implementation of a
partial example presented by Yason (2007, p. 8). It shows how the RDTSC
instruction can be used to determine if the program could be being stepped
in a debugger.
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; this code uses the RDTSC instruction to get the time stamp
; before and after a section of timed code to determine if it
; is being debugged.
.686
.MODEL flat, stdcall
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE

;Case sensitive

Include windows.inc
Include kernel32.inc
IncludeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
Include user32.inc
IncludeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.DATA
text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0
caption db 'RDTSC',0
text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0
.CODE
Start:
; result of RDTSC returned in EDX:EAX
RDTSC
PUSH EAX
PUSH EDX
; just a delay to simulate some function
MOV ECX, 10
L1: NOP
LOOP L1
; get time stamp again
RDTSC
; work out the delta
POP EBX
CMP EDX, EBX
JA DebuggerDetected
POP EBX
SUB EAX, EBX
CMP EAX, 500h
JA DebuggerDetected
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK
JMP Finish
DebuggerDetected:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK
Finish:
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
End Start
Figure 4-31 Listing of implementation of RDTSC technique to detect
presence of a debugger.
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4.12.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

This technique proved to be effective at detecting the presence of a
debugger.

4.12.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

This use of this technique can be found by locating the instruction RDTSC.

4.12.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

Locating calls to the instruction RDTSC proved to be effective

4.12.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

A simple solution to this technique would be to identify where the timing
checks are being performed in the code, and then set a breakpoint before
the first time delta measurement and then perform a run instead of a step
until the breakpoint is hit (Yason, 2007, p.9). Alternatively the result
returned from a call to GetTickCount and modify the return value. Yason
says that OllyAdvanced installs a kernel mode driver that sets the Time
Stamp Disable bit (TSD) in the CR4 control register which will trigger a
General Protection (GP) exception if the RDTSC instruction is executed in a
privilege level other than 0. The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is setup so
that the GP exception is hooked and the execution of the RDTSC is filtered.
Yason emphasises that this driver may cause instability to the system.

4.12.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

OllyAdvanced has two anti RDTSC options, but the debugger was still
detected. The most effective mitigation strategy was to locate the calls to
the function and patch out appropriately.

4.13. KERNEL32 OUTPUTDEBUGSTRINGA() QUASI EXPERIMENT
4.13.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

Falliere (2007, p.7) reports that he encountered this technique whilst
examining files packed with ReCrypt v0.80. If OutputDebugStringA is
called with a valid ASCII string under the control of a debugger, the return
value will the address of the string passed as a parameter. When not run in
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a debugger, the return value should be 1. This technique is demonstrated in
the listing in Figure 4-32. Yason (2007, p.26) says that this technique is
specific to OllyDbg because it is vulnerable to a format string bug.

; this code will detect the presence of OllyDbg v1.1 and
; v2.0 alpha by exploiting a string format vulnerability
.686
.MODEL flat, stdcall
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE

;Case sensitive

include windows.inc
include kernel32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
include user32.inc
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib
.DATA
text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0
caption db 'OutputDebugStringA',0
text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0
textString db 'My Test String', 0
.CODE
Start:
XOR EAX,EAX
INVOKE OutputDebugString, addr textString
CMP EAX, 1
JNE DebuggerDetected
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK
JMP Finish
DebuggerDetected:
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK
Finish:
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
End Start
Figure 4-32 Listing of implementation of OutputDebugStringA to
detect presence of a debugger.

4.13.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

The technique worked in OllyDbg v1.10 and OllyDbg v2.00 (alpha2) and
it was found that the technique also worked in IDA Pro.

4.13.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

This technique can be detected by adding the following line to the main
function in the listing in Figure 4-30:
findFunction(“OutputDebugStringA”);
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A technique that works to detect and then patch the return result from
OutputDebugStringA is provided in Figure 4-33 which was extracted and
modified from an example by (Eagle, 2008b).

#include <idc.idc>
static main() {
auto addr, funcName, end;
funcName = "kernel32_OutputDebugStringA";
// run to entry point
RunTo(BeginEA());
// wait until process is suspended
GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1);
// locate address of function
addr = LocByName(funcName);
if (addr != BADADDR) {
Message("%s found at %x\n", funcName, addr);
MakeFunction(addr, BADADDR);
end = GetFunctionAttr(addr, FUNCATTR_END) - 3;
AddBpt(end);
SetBptAttr(end, BPT_BRK, 0); //don't stop
//fix the return value as expected in non-debugged
processes
SetBptCnd(end, "EAX = 1");
} else {
Message("%s not found\n", funcName);
}
}
Figure 4-33 Script to patch result of OutputDebugStringA function
call to hide presence of debugger.

4.13.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The use of the detection techniques was found to be effective.

4.13.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

This technique can be mitigated by enabling the OutputDebugString option
in IDA Stealth. Alternatively, the listing in Figure 4-33 can be employed.

4.13.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The mitigation techniques were found to be effective.

144

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

4.14. ROGUE INT3 QUASI EXPERIMENT
4.14.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

The idea of this technique is to insert INT3 opcodes into the binary to trick
the debugger into thinking it is one of the software breakpoints it has
inserted into the binary being debugged. Control will be given to an
exception handler when the INT3 is encountered in a program that is not
being debugged and the program continues executing. Debuggers typically
handle these debugger interrupts themselves. The exception handler of the
malware can set flags so that it can determine if it is running in a debugger
if the exception handler is not entered. Yason (2007, p.7) says that the
kernel32 DLL function DebugBreak() internally invokes an INT3 and this
can be used instead. An example presented by ap0x (2006) is presented in
Figure 4-34. It sets the value of EAX to 0xFFFFFFFF (via the CONTEXT
record) in the exception handler to flag the fact that the exception handler
has been entered. The purpose of the context record is to contain the state
of a thread. The context record that is passed to an exception handler
contains the current state of the thread that threw the exception (Yason,
2007, p.8). Yason (2007, p.7) points out that the kernel32 DLL function
DebugBreak() internally invokes INT3, and some packers use this call
instead of using INT3 directly.

.386
.model flat, stdcall
option casemap :none

; case sensitive

include \masm32\include\windows.inc
include \masm32\include\user32.inc
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
.data
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h
.code
start:
; MASM32 antiRing3Debugger example
; coded by ap0x
; Reversing Labs: http://ap0x.headcoders.net
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;
;
;
;
;
;

This code takes advantage of debugger not handling INT3
instructions correctly. If we set a SEH before INT3 executing
INT3 instruction will fire SEH. If debugger is present it
will just walk over INT3 and go straight forward.
If debugger is not present exception will occur and execution
will be handled by SEH.

; Set SEH
ASSUME FS:NOTHING
PUSH offset @Check
PUSH FS:[0]
MOV FS:[0],ESP
; Exception
INT 3h
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
CALL

30h
offset msgTitle
offset msgText2
0
MessageBox

PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
; SEH handling
@Check:
POP FS:[0]
ADD ESP,4
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
CALL

40h
offset msgTitle
offset msgText1
0
MessageBox

PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
end start
Figure 4-34 Listing of implementation of INT3 technique to detect
the presence of a debugger (ap0x, 2006)

4.14.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

This code successfully detects that it is running in OllyDbg.

4.14.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

This technique can be detected by searching the code for the INT3
instruction.
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4.14.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

Searching for the presence of INT3 instructions was found to be effective.

4.14.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

This technique can be mitigated in a couple of different ways. The first
solution was to allow the interrupts to be automatically passed to the
exception handler by setting the debugging options to pass INT3 breaks
and Single-step breaks to the program. Another method was to identify the
exception handler address (in OllyDbg, View

> SEH Chain) and then set

a breakpoint on the exception handler. Then the exception can be passed to
the exception handler by pressing Shift + F9, and the code of the exception
handler can be traced. Note that you have to step through (or set a
breakpoint) the code until the SEH is installed before you can see it in the
SEH window.

4.14.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The mitigation techniques were found to be effective. A software breakpoint
exception was raised in IDA Pro when the program was run and an option
to pass the exception to the program is offered via a dialog box. If the
exception is not passed to the program, the debugger was detected,
otherwise the debugger is not detected. Essentially, this technique can be
mitigated by setting an option to pass breakpoint exceptions to the program.

4.15. “ICE” BREAKPOINT QUASI EXPERIMENT
4.15.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

The Ice breakpoint is an undocumented Intel instruction that can be used
to detect programs that are being debugged. Its opcode is 0xF1. This
instruction generates a SINGLE_STEP exception when executed and the
debugger will not call the exception handler and execution will not continue
as expected. An example implementation is shown in the listing in Figure
4-35, which is a very simple modification to the example developed by ap0x
which was shown above in the listing of Figure 4-35.
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.386
.model flat, stdcall
option casemap :none

; case sensitive

include \masm32\include\windows.inc
include \masm32\include\user32.inc
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
.data
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h
.code
start:
; Set SEH
ASSUME FS:NOTHING
PUSH offset @Check
PUSH FS:[0]
MOV FS:[0],ESP
; Exception
db 0F1h
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
CALL

30h
offset msgTitle
offset msgText2
0
MessageBox

PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
; SEH handling
@Check:
POP FS:[0]
ADD ESP,4
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
PUSH
CALL

40h
offset msgTitle
offset msgText1
0
MessageBox

PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
end start
Figure 4-35 Listing of implementation of Ice Breakpoint technique
to detect the presence of a debugger.
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4.15.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

This technique was successful with OllyDbg and IDA Pro

4.15.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The use of this technique can be found by searching for the opcode F1h.

4.15.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The detection technique was found to be effective.

4.15.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

This technique can be overcome by setting the debugging options to pass
single-step breaks to the program.

4.15.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The mitigation technique was found to be effective.

4.16. INTERRUPT 2DH QUASI EXPERIMENT
4.16.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

Interrupt 2Dh will raise a breakpoint exception if the program is not being
debugged. Note how this is different to the other examples. If a debugger is
attached, there will not be an exception. This technique is demonstrated in
the listing shown in Figure 4-36.
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.386
.model flat, stdcall
option casemap :none

; case sensitive

include \masm32\include\windows.inc
include \masm32\include\user32.inc
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
.data
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h
.code
start:
; Set SEH
ASSUME FS:NOTHING
PUSH offset @Check
PUSH FS:[0]
MOV FS:[0],ESP
; Exception
INT 2DH
POP FS:[0] ; clear the SEH
ADD ESP, 4
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, offset msgText2, offset msgTitle, 30h
JMP Finish
; SEH handling
@Check:
POP FS:[0]
ADD ESP,4
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, offset msgText1, offset msgTitle, 40h
Finish:
PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
end start
Figure 4-36 Listing showing use of INT 2DH to raise an exception if
the program is not being debugged.

4.16.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

This was effective in both OllyDbg and IDA Pro.

4.16.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

This technique can be detected by search for Interrupt 2Dh.
150

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

4.16.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

The detection technique proved to be effective.

4.16.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

This technique can be overcome by setting the debugger options to pass all
exceptions to the program being debugged.

4.16.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

The mitigation technique proved to be effective.

4.17. POPF AND THE TRAP FLAG QUASI EXPERIMENT
4.17.1.

Implementation of anti-analysis technique

The trap flag in the Flags register is used to control the tracing of a program.
If the trap flag is set, an instruction that is being executed will raise a
SINGLE_STEP exception. Falliere (2007, p.10) says that this can be used to
thwart tracers. A working implementation using Falliere’s snippet of code is
given in the listing of Figure 4-37. This will have no effect on the flags
register of a program that is being traced. The debugger will process the
exception that is raised, and the associated exception handler will not be
executed.
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.386
.model flat, stdcall
option casemap :none

; case sensitive

include \masm32\include\windows.inc
include \masm32\include\user32.inc
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
.data
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h
.code
start:
; Set SEH
ASSUME FS:NOTHING
PUSH offset @Check
PUSH FS:[0]
MOV FS:[0],ESP
; Exception
PUSHF
MOV EAX, 100h
MOV [ESP], EAX
POPF
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, offset msgText2, offset msgTitle, 30h
JMP Finish
; SEH handling
@Check:
POP FS:[0]
ADD ESP,4
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, offset msgText1, offset msgTitle, 40h
Finish:
PUSH 0
CALL ExitProcess
end start
Figure 4-37 Listing of implementation POPF and the Trap Flag
technique to detect the presence of a debugger.

4.17.2.

Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation

OllyDbg and IDA Pro were detected if the exception was not passed to
the program.

4.17.3.

Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique

The use of this technique can be detected by examining exceptions.

4.17.4.

Effectiveness of detection of technique observation

This technique proved to be effective.
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4.17.5.

Implementation of mitigation technique

This was defeated by passing all raised exceptions to the program being
debugged.

4.17.6.

Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation

This technique proved to be effective.

4.18. SUMMARY OF VALIDATION OF TECHNIQUES RESULTS
The literature review revealed a large and wide variety of techniques
malware can incorporate to hinder analysis and avoid detection. A subset of
these techniques were implemented and validated in small, standalone
programs. All of the implemented techniques were observed to be effective
at detecting the presence of a debugger, namely IDA Pro and OllyDbg.
After ensuring that the anti-analysis technique was effective, small scripts
were developed or sourced to determine if the use of the technique could be
detected. All of the implemented detection techniques were observed to be
effective. Mitigation scripts were then developed or sourced to determine if
the use of the technique could be mitigated. All of the implemented
mitigation techniques or scripts were observed to be effective. A summary
of the results is provided in Table 4-1.
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Table 4-1 Validation of Techniques Results
Technique

Implemented
in Code

Debugger Detection

Technique
Mitigatable

IDA
Pro

OllyDbg
















IsDebuggerPresent
IsDebugged

Technique
Detectable

NtGlobalFlags











Heap Flags
NtQueryInformationProcess
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
UnhandledExceptionFilter
NtSetInformationThread
CloseHandle
User Mode Timers
OutputDebugString
INT 3
ICE Breakpoint
INT 2DH
POPF


































































These results provide a significant measure of validation for the antianalysis techniques discussed in the literature review (Falliere, 2007; Ferrie,
2008; Yason, 2007).
The ability to detect the use of anti-analysis techniques provides confidence
in being able to implement an application to detect malware, as suggested
by Wysopal (2009) who said that the use of such techniques could be a very
good indicator of the program under investigation to possibly have a
malicious

nature.

This

is

important,

because

the

literature

review

represented claims that existing malware detection paradigms are less than
effective and that a new approach is required.
The literature review showed that the coverage of anti-analysis techniques
in popular plugins was limited. These results show that mitigation scripts
can be very useful to extend the coverage of such plugins to aid in the
analysis of malicious software and to hide the presence of analysis tools.
Significant programming and operating system knowledge is required to
detect and mitigate the techniques malware can incorporate to avoid
analysis, as evidenced in the programs and scripts used to derive the
results in this chapter. The conduct of this research led to the identification
of a Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge by Valli and Brand (2008) that
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attempts to identify an appropriate spectrum of knowledge required to
analyse malicious software. A key component of the MABOK is the
treatment of anti-analysis techniques. The MABOK is discussed in greater
detail in section 6.7.9 of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED MALWARE
RESULTS

5.1.

OVERVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of examination of
network based malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors as
described in the Conceptual Framework, section 3.6 of this thesis. It
examines claims in the literature review that existing approaches to the
detection of malware is less than effective and supports research question
two, that is, “How can the use of these techniques be detected?”. In general,
the literature review discussed three techniques common to AV software to
detect malicious software as signature recognition, heuristics and file
integrity checking. To this end, the effectiveness of existing virus signature
detection is examined as well as an examination of the effectiveness of
heuristics.
An additional facet of this chapter is an examination into the use of run time
packers which are arguably, one of the most fundamentally used analysis
avoidance techniques. Methods that can be used to detect the use of run
time packers, include packer signature recognition and by measures of
entropy (randomness) in the code.
898 malware samples were collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors
between June 25 2007 and August 9 2008. All samples were collected by
the Nepenthes system which emulates known vulnerabilities that network
based malware takes advantage of, to install malware on the vulnerable
computer.

5.2.
5.2.1.

VIRUS SIGNATURES
Anubis

All 898 samples were submitted to Anubis and of these, 738 (82.2%) were
able to be analyzed and 160 (17.8%) were not able to be analyzed. Of the
738 specimens of malware that were able to be analyzed, 544 virus
signatures were able to be determined by the Ikarus virus scanner. This
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represents a detection rate by the Ikarus virus scanner of 73.7%. This is
the solitary virus scanner Anubis uses. The results of Ikarus are shown in
Table 5-1 and it is clearly dominated by the Allaple (Anonymous, n.d.-a)
worm. Variants exist of most types of malware and these variants were
grouped together where possible in the results in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1 Ikarus Virus Scanner results showing high incidence of
Allaple worm in the collected malware specimens.
Ikarus Signature
Allaple
Virut
PoeBot
Rbot
Agent
Nepoe
SdBot
Delf
WinFixer
VanBot
Hupigon
NSPM
Lovesan
ProcessHijack
IRCBot
oda
Lineage
AHKD
Adload
Zlob
Klone
Slaper
Sasser

5.2.2.

Count
422
30
17
16
10
8
7
6
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

%
77.57
5.51
3.13
2.94
1.84
1.47
1.29
1.10
0.74
0.74
0.55
0.55
0.37
0.37
0.37
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18

Virus Total

Virus Total is an online virus scanner site that accepts uploaded files
which are then processed by up to 36 virus scanner engines. Results for the
submission of a particular collected specimen to Virus Total are given in
Table 5-2 as an example. It shows that 33 of the 36 virus engines
recognized the signature of the malware. This particular specimen was
collected on October 17 2007 and the analysis was conducted on September
4 2008.
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Table 5-2 Virus Total results from a single submission showing
disparity in signatures by different vendors.
Anti Virus Scanner
AhnLab-V3
AntiVir
Authentium
Avast
AVG
BitDefender
CAT-QuickHeal
ClamAV
DrWeb
eSafe
eTrust-Vet
Ewido
F-Prot
F-Secure
Fortinet
GData
Ikarus
K7AntiVirus
Kaspersky
McAfee
Microsoft
NOD32v2
Norman
Panda
PCTools
Prevx1
Rising
Sophos
Sunbelt
Symantec
TheHacker
TrendMicro
VBA32
ViRobot
VirusBuster
Webwasher-Gateway

Result
Win32/Allaple.worm.B
WORM/Allaple.Gen
W32/RAHack.A.gen!Eldorado
Win32:Allaple
Worm/Allaple.B
Win32.Worm.Allaple.Gen
I-Worm.Allaple.gen
Worm.Allaple-311
Trojan.Starman
Suspicious File
Win32/Mallar
W32/RAHack.A.gen!Eldorado
Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.b
W32/ALLAPLE.E!worm
Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.b
Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.a
Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.a
Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.b
W32/RAHack
Worm:Win32/Allaple.A
a variant of Win32/Allaple.Gen
Allaple.gen
W32/Rahack.gen
Worm.Allaple.Gen
Worm.Win32.Allaple.a
W32/Allaple-F
Worm.Win32.Allaple.JF
W32.Rahack.W
WORM_ALLAPLE.IK
Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple
Worm.Win32.Allaple.Gen
Worm.Allaple.Gen
Worm.Allaple.Gen

The differing naming conventions used by each of the 36 Anti Virus
scanners is clearly evident.
162 specimens, collected between June 25 2007 and October 21, were
submitted to Virus Total. This had been a period of over a year for most
of the specimens since they had been collected. Only 17 of the 162 samples
(10.4%) were detected by all of the Anti Virus scanners. The results of this
test are plotted in Figure 5-1. It indicates that 100% detection by all Anti
Virus scanners is not achieved nearly a year after collection and suggests
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that the 73.7% virus detection rate by Ikarus may be considered within
the norm.
Figure 5-1 Virus Total detection rate plot showing less than ideal
detection results.
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5.3.

MALWARE FUNCTIONALITY

Anubis reports contain a summary of the functionality of the malware it
analyzes. Functionality reported by Anubis for the submitted samples
included various combinations of the following reports:
•

Performs Address Scan.

•

Auto Start Capabilities.

•

Creates Files in the Windows System Directory.

•

Changes Security Settings of Internet Explorer.

•

Joins IRC Network.

Address scans are performed by malware to locate other targets on the
network to attack. Auto start capabilities are generally changes made to the
registry to ensure that the malware is activated each time the computer is
restarted. Malware is generally packed when it is initially loaded onto a
vulnerable machine, and usually consists of multiple files which are then
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copied to various locations in the Windows System directory with the hidden
attribute set and given file names that very closely resemble legitimate file
names to provide additional camouflage. Security settings are changed in

Internet Explorer so that more malware can be downloaded from sites
without warnings. IRC networks are used by Bots to accept remote
commands from a BotNet. Table 5-3 lists the results of the high level
malicious activities the malware performed. Note that various combinations
of activities are possible.
Table 5-3 Submitted malware functionality results
Malware Function
Performs Address Scan
Auto start capabilities
Creates files in the Windows system directory
Changes security settings of Internet Explorer
Joins IRC network

Occurrence
Count
301
282
276
135
58

The Allaple (Anonymous, n.d.-a) worm was the most representative
specimen collected by the sensors. Four variants of this worm were
detected, including Allaple.A, Allaple.B, Allaple.D and Allaple.E.
The number of detections for each variant is presented in Table 5-4.
Table 5-4 Allaple variants detection results
Allaple Variant
Allaple.A
Allaple.B
Allaple.D
Allaple.E
Totals

Detections
340
63
1
18
422

Table 5-5 presents the functionality detected by Anubis of the variants.
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Table 5-5 Functionality of Allaple variants results
Malware Function
Performs Address Scan
Autostart Capabilities
Creates Files in the Windows System
Directory
Changes security settings of Internet
Explorer
Joins IRC network

Allaple.
A
164
119
112

Allaple.
B
29
22
21

Allaple.
D
1
0
0

Allaple.
E
13
3
4

9

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

In contrast, Table 5-6 shows the Allaple specimens where Anubis did not
record any activity at all, even though these particular specimens’ run time
was around 150 seconds as depicted in Figure 5-2.
Table 5-6 Allaple variants showing no activity recorded
Allaple Variant
Allaple.A
Allaple.B
Allaple.D
Allaple.E
Totals

No
Activity
62
13
0
2
77

Ikarus
Detections
340
63
1
18
422

%
18.24%
20.63%
0.00%
11.11%
18.25%
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Run Time Of Allaple Specimens Where No
Activity Recorded
300

Run Time (sec)

250
200
150
100
50
0
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76
Specimen

Figure 5-2 Run time Of Allaple specimens where no activity is
recorded could indicate deception.

5.4.

PACKER ANALYSIS

Anubis uses SigBuster as its packer signature detector during the time
this research has been conducted and it is not publicly available. The only
way to use SigBuster is to upload a malware specimen to Anubis and
have the file analyzed online. Of the 738 samples that were able to be
analyzed, the SigBuster packer detector recognized 543 signatures of
packers, as listed in Table 5-7.
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Table 5-7 SigBuster detected packer signature results
SigBuster Signature
Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer vna SN: 1647
eXpressor v1.4.5 SN:225
Signature_Safe v2. SN:49
PolyCrypt_PE v2005.06.01 SN:391PolyCrypt_PE v2.1.4b/2.1.5
SN:1150
Themida vna SN:732
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654
UPX All_Versions SN:1634
UPX All_Versions SN:1634EXE_Cryptor v2.2X SN:193
Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer vna SN: 1647UPX All_Versions SN:1634
FSG V1.3x SN:1637
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1671Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer vna SN:
1647
ASProtect v1.2x-1.3x SN:137
ASProtect v1.2x-1.3x SN:137ASProtect v2.1/2.2(exe) SN:1424
DotFix NiceProtect vna SN: 1655
EXE_Cryptor v2.2X SN:193
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654Unknown_packer vna SN: 1679
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654UPX All_Versions SN:1634
PKLITE32 v1.1 SN:1153
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1660
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654UPX All_Versions SN:1634EXE_Cryptor v2.2X
SN:193
Expressor v1.4 SN: 1672
Expressor v1.4 SN: 1672UPX All_Versions SN:1634
FSG V1.3x SN:1637EXE_Cryptor v2.2X SN:193
NsPack All_Versions SN:1635
PE_Compact v2.0x SN:1610FSG V1.3x SN:1637
PE_Compact v2.X SN:660FSG V1.3x SN:1637
PE_Pack v1.0 SN:1399
PE_Pack v1.0 SN:72
PE_Pack v1.0 SN:72
Unknown_metamorphic_packer vna SN: 1658
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1654
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1654UPX All_Versions SN:1634EXE_Cryptor
v2.2X SN:193
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1671Unknown_packer vna SN: 1679
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1676Signature_Safe v2. SN:49
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1679
UPX_xor_stub vna SN:1612
Xtreme_Protector v1.05 SN:78
Total

The

SigBuster

results

Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer

are

vna

SN:

dominated

by

Count
444
21
9
8

%
60.16
2.85
1.22
1.08

6
4
4
4
3
3
3

0.81
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.41
0.41
0.41

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1

0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.14

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14

1
1
1
1
1

0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
73.58

the

1647 signature with 444

occurrences, followed very distantly by variations of Expressor with 32
occurrences. In contrast, Mandiant Red Curtain (MRC) uses PEiD as its
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packer signature detector which is publicly available together with its
database of signatures. The PEiD database consists of over 400 signatures.

MRC only detected 43 known signatures, the results of which are displayed
in Table 5-8.
Table 5-8 PEiD signature results indicating disparity in signature
matching with those performed by SigBuster.
PEiD Signature
PECompact v2.x
CodeSafe v2.0
Anticrack Software Protector v1.09
(ACProtect)
Borland Delphi v6.0 - v7.0
Microsoft Visual Basic v5.0 / v6.0
UPX v0.89.6 - v1.02 / v1.05 - v1.22
ASProtect v1.23 RC1
UPX v1.03 - v1.04
PKLITE32 v1.1
PEtite v1.4
NeoLite vx.x
Symantec Visual Cafe v3.0
Microsoft Visual C++ v5.0/v6.0 (MFC)
Xtreme-Protector v1.05
UPX-Scrambler RC v1.x
Total

Count
11
9
4

%
1.49
1.22
0.54

3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.41
0.41
0.41
0.27
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
5.83

The significant contrast in results between Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 could be
attributed to SigBusters ability to detect the AllAple Polymorphic

Packer which is not in the PEiD database of signatures. It is also observed
that not a single signature matched between PEiD and SigBuster.
An alternative method for the detection of the use of a packer is through
measuring the entropy (randomness) of the program. MRC employs this
technique as one of the criteria it uses to develop a risk score to identify
malicious software. Packed code has a higher value of entropy than
unpacked code. MRC uses a value of 0.9 as a threshold to signal files of
interest. MRC was used to scan the directory of malware and returned 838
results. Of these, 829 returned a measurement of entropy of greater than,
or equal to 0.9. This represents 98.9% of the files. In comparison, when

MRC was used to scan the C:\Windows\System32 directory of an
164

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

uncompromised system, 19 files out of 671 executable files returned an
entropy of greater than, or equal to 0.9. This represents 2.83% of the files.
The entropy method appears to be very successful for the detection of
runtime packed files.
Figure 5-3 displays the entropy of the malware that was collected during
the period June 25 2007 to October 21 2007 and clearly shows the high
level of entropy of the malware.
Figure 5-3 Graph indicating high measures of entropy of malware
exceeding accepted threshold

Entropy of Malware over Collection Period
1.4
1.2

Entropy

1
0.8
Detection Threshold

0.6

Entropy

0.4
0.2

1
46
91
136
181
226
271
316
361
406
451
496
541
586
631
676
721
766
811

0

Malware June 25 2007 - October 21 2007

5.5.

SUMMARY OF COLLECTED MALWARE RESULTS

The results in this chapter support claims that signature based virus
detection is less than ideal. The Ikarus Virus Scanner used by Anubis only
detected 73.7% of malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors, even
though the malware had been in the wild for a period of up to a year. In
addition, the specimens were clearly malicious because they had arrived on
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the sensors by deliberately exploiting an emulated vulnerability and
installed software uninvited.
The

functionality

of

the

malware

determined

by

Anubis

clearly

demonstrated malicious intent. This does provide a good indicator of the
nature of the malware, however, running the software to determine its
nature gives control of the malware to employ deception techniques and
does provide an opportunity to the malware to do damage to the system.
Measures of entropy showed to be a very good method to determine if the
malware is packed. The results also showed that two different packer
signature determination tools provided very different results. This is
significant because identification of a packer signature assists in the
determination of the appropriate unpacking algorithm to employ to unpack
the malware to arrive at the OEP so that detailed analysis can commence.
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CHAPTER 6
6.1.

DISCUSSION

DISCUSSON OF VALIDATION OF ANTI-ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES RESULTS

Only a subset of the techniques discussed in the Literature Review of this
thesis were validated due to the extensive number of techniques uncovered
through a search of the literature and software reverse engineering sites.
The validation process included implementing individual techniques in
simple,

standalone

programs,

running

the

program

in

two

popular

debuggers (IDA Pro and OllyDbg) and then observing whether or not, the
debugger was able to be detected. The simple nature of the validating
program was designed to ensure that no other factor was present to
account for the behaviour of the program. This was followed by writing or
sourcing a detection and mitigation script or method and observing the
result. A summary of the results of the techniques that were validated is
presented in Table 6-1. The check symbol () designates that the technique
was successful, whilst the use of the cross symbol () would have been
used to designate failure of the technique.
All of the implemented techniques were successful in detecting the presence
of the two debuggers. The use of these anti-analysis techniques was
successfully detected and mitigated using scripts or via manual methods.
The techniques that were not implemented and discussed by other
researchers (Eagle, 2008b; Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008; Yason, 2007)
appear to be sound, and this researcher is confident that these techniques
would also be able to be detected and mitigated successfully.
Documentation for scripting languages to support the validation activity was
found to be sparse and mostly focused on function definitions. Learning how
to implement scripts to perform a particular function was attained by
examination of existing scripts from reverse engineering software web sites
such as Tuts4You (T. Rogers, 2008) and analyzing how they were
implemented. Scripting languages provide a rich set of functionality and are
essential for analysis of malware that employs anti-analysis techniques. The
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same scripting languages are also extremely useful for detection and
mitigation of anti-analysis techniques.
Table 6-1 Validation of techniques results showing validity of
technique and the ability to detect and mitigate the techniques.
Technique

Implemente
d
in Code

Debugger Detection

IDA
Pro

OllyDbg

Technique
Detectable

Technique
Mitigatable

IsDebuggerPresent
IsDebugged
















NtGlobalFlags











Heap Flags
NtQueryInformationProcess
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
UnhandledExceptionFilter
NtSetInformationThread
CloseHandle
User Mode Timers
OutputDebugString
INT 3
ICE Breakpoint
INT 2DH
POPF


































































6.2.

DISCUSSION OF COLLECTED MALWARE ANALYSIS
RESULTS

The Nepenthes sensors work by emulating known vulnerabilities and
allowing network based malware to install itself on the vulnerable computer.
It could be considered that any software that takes advange of such
vulnerabilities and installs itself on a computer over the internet, uninvited,
be categorised as malicious. The malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes
sensors was validated as malicious software by its behaviour, however the
detection rate by the Ikarus virus detector employed by Anubis was
approximately 73.7%. A detection rate of much lower than 100% may not
be an unusual result when compared with other virus detectors results as
performed when the malware was submitted to Virus Total, which
employs up to thirty six AV engines from various vendors .
A continuous subset of the malware collected between June 25 and October
21 2007 was submitted to VirusTotal on or around September 04 2008.
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Even though each malware specimen was submitted to 36 virus detectors,
approximately one year after collection and submission to online virus
collection agencies, only 93.7% of the virus engines agreed that the
specimens were malicious. This indicates that AV software may provide less
than ideal detection ability and supports the claims by other researchers
(Mila Dalla et al., 2008; Szewczyk & Brand, 2008; W. Yan et al., 2008; Z.
Yan & Inge, 2008; Zhou & Meador Inge, 2008).
The specimens were dominated by the Allaple worm at approximately
77.57% of the total number of specimens that could be analyzed.
Approximately 18% of these specimens recorded no activity when run
inside the sandbox Anubis provides, even though the average run time was
148 seconds. Although purely speculation at this point in time, this could
indicate specimens that have detected the presence of Anubis or other
analytical tools and used deception to not perform malicious activity to
avoid being detected and remains to be investigated. These samples should
be flagged for special consideration for determining if they were using anti
online analysis techniques that have been documented in this research.
98.9% of the specimens indicated very high levels of entropy which means
they were packed or protected. Packing and protecting is typically used by
malware to mitigate detection by Anti Virus software. The two packer
detectors did not agree on the names of any of the packer signatures they
detected. SigBuster provided a name for 73.58% of the specimens and

PEiD gave a name for 5.83% of the specimens. Knowledge of the name of
the packer greatly assists malware analysis because the appropriate
unpacking algorithm can be used to unpack the malware to arrive at the
OEP. Using packers that are not recognised by packer detectors assists the
malware from not being analyzed in detail and certainly implies that
automated unpacking based on recognition of a name could produce a lot of
false positives. Measurement of entropy appears to be a very successful
method of detecting packed and protected malware as supported by other
researchers (Ebringer & Sun, 2008; Lyda & Hamrock, 2007) .
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6.3.

RESEARCH QUESTION 1 - WHAT TECHNIQUES CAN
MALWARE USE TO AVOID BEING ANALYZED?

This research question is essentially exploratory in nature. It was answered
by
•

Uncovering techniques from a review of the literature.

•

Implementation of the techniques.

•

Validation of the techniques through quasi experimentation.

The literature review uncovered an extensive range of techniques, mostly
published by three key researchers (Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008; Yason,
2007) who each provide their own, differing taxonomies of techniques. Note
that these papers have only been published within the past year or two of
this research and this could be indicative of the problems encountered by
the increased spectrum of techniques malware can now employ to hinder
analysis. Their work is supplemented by other researchers (Anthracene,
2006; Gordon, n.d.; Rolles, 2007; Smidgeonsoft, 2005; Smith & Quist,
2006; xC, 2007) whose online articles focus on more individual techniques
and provide greater detail with respect to implementation and analysis. The
work of Rolles in particular, focuses on leading edge techniques such as
malware that uses its own virtual machines to avoid detailed analysis. Such
malware is difficult to analyse because the custom virtual machines have
their own instruction sets and these customised instruction sets have to be
determined before detailed analysis can commence. A proposed taxonomy
by the author of this research combines elements of the taxonomies of
Falliere, Ferrie and Yason appears in Table 6-2, in an attempt to provide a
more complete coverage of techniques. Note that each technique listed in
the taxonomy is the highest level stratum and could be further stratified.
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Table 6-2 Taxonomy of anti-analysis techniques
Technique

Description

Anti Emulation

A range of techniques exist to detect that the
malware is running inside popular VM’s such as
VMWare or Virtual PC.

Anti Online

A variety of techniques exist for malware to

Analysis

determine if it is running in a online analysis engine
such as Anubis or Norman Sandbox.

Anti Hardware

Techniques that target hardware such as the CPU
including the debug registers.

Anti Debugger

Target the way Debuggers work and take advantage
of these to take control of the flow of execution.

Anti Disassemblers

Target the way Disassemblers work and take
advantage of this to produce a false disassembly.

Anti Tools

Detect the presence of specific analysis tools and
enter a deceptive mode.

Anti Memory

Target the way memory is used when a process is
being debugged and take advantage of this as well
as the way processes can be dumped from memory
including stolen bytes.

Anti Process

Target the way processes are handled when being
debugged and take advantage of this including
structured exception handling.

Anti-analysis

Target the way analysis is conducted. Use junk
code,

code

camouflage,

check

sum

checks,

destruction of the Import Address Table and other
deceptive techniques to make analysis harder.
Packers and

Use run time packers and protectors to obfuscate

Protectors

code and data and make it hard to unpack to find
the original entry point. This includes packers that
use

their

own

virtual

machines

such

as

HyperUnpackme2.
Rootkits

Insert rootkits at Ring 0 to take control of the way
the operating system manages processes and use
deception to hide malicious processes.
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The existing literature only provided snippets of code and these snippets
had to be implemented in standalone programs for the purpose of validation.
Each technique that was validated was implemented in isolation to provide
as much control as possible over the environment and written in assembly
language. Assembly language was used because collected malware, such as
that collected by the ECU honeypot (Valli & Wooten, 2007) are binaries and
are in assembly language in their disassembled state. Validation was
conducted by employing quasi experiments where the effects on common
debuggers such as IDA Pro and Ollydbg were observed. All of the
techniques that were implemented were determined to be valid and
prevented analysis.
Malware is often packed or protected to hinder analysis by anti-virus
software or static analysis. One of the first steps the malware analyst
performs after detection of the virus signature is the detection of the packer
used to pack the malware. Determination of the name of the packer allows
the analyst to apply the appropriate algorithm to unpack the malware.
Hundreds of different packers exist and range from using simple techniques
through to very complex techniques that use Virtual Machines. Unpacking
can be conducted by automated scripts or with manual methods to arrive at
the OEP. Even simple packers can be customized by malware authors to
disrupt automated scripts and hence hinder analysis. Additionally, the
unpacking routines can contain the analysis avoidance techniques discussed
and validated in this thesis. A common technique is to cause a divide by
zero exception during the unpacking process to give control to the malware
so that it can determine if it is running inside a debugger. If it detects it is
running inside a debugger, the malware can take control and exit the
program.
Malware can use anti-forensic techniques at any time and use deception to
hide its real purpose. If it does not perform any malicious action while it is
being analyzed, it may be accepted on the system as being safe. Then once
free from analysis, it can perform its original, malicious objective.
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6.4.

RESEARCH QUESTION 2 – HOW CAN THE USE OF THESE
TECHNIQUES BE DETECTED?

This research question was also mostly exploratory in nature, particularly
with respect to how the technique can be detected. A number of the
techniques that were discussed in the literature review were validated in
small quasi-experiments where a single technique was implemented and its
behaviour

was

observed

and

empirically

recorded

from

conducting

controlled experiments. Once the technique was validated, scripts were
written or sourced particular to the two debuggers that were being used to
detect the use of the technique. There are a variety of plugins for the
popular debuggers whose purpose is to hide the debugger from malware
that uses these techniques, but these plugins only provide a very small
subset of anti-anti-forensic functionality and generally do not log the
detection event. This necessitated the development of scripts that not only
hide the debugger but also log the detection event. It was found that all of
the techniques that were implemented could be detected using scripts or by
manual methods. A very good source for discussing the development of
these detection scripts for IDA Pro are discussed by Eagle (2008b), but the
number and scope of the scripts is relatively small compared to the number
of techniques revealed from the literature review. A much higher number of
scripts are available from software reverse engineering sites such as the

Tuts4You web site maintained by Rogers (2008). However, the scripts at
such sites are written for debuggers such as OllyDbg and either have to be
rewritten into IDC or IDAPython scripts for IDA Pro, or the analyst must be
prepared to use multiple debugging tools and multiple scripting languages.
It is therefore highly advisable for malware analysts to develop or source
detection scripts and have a library of suitable scripts at their disposal. It is
also advisable for malware analysts to develop or have access to malware
analysts with scripting skills particular to popular debuggers.
It was noted that plugins for OllyDbg and IDA Pro such as Olly Advanced
and IDA Stealth focus mostly on hiding the debuggers. This researcher
recognizes three limitations of these plugins. The first is that the number of
techniques that are currently mitigated by the plugins is limited. This is
exemplified by the discrepancy in the large number of techniques uncovered
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in the literature review compared to the limited number of techniques
available in the plugins. The second is that the techniques focus on hiding
the debugger only. Other methods and approaches are required to cover
the other techniques that are available as specified in the taxonomy in Table
6-2 above. This means that extensive knowledge of techniques and tools
including acknowledgement of their limitations is required to mitigate the
anti forensic techniques that malware has at its disposal to employ. The
third limitation uncovered in this research is that the plugins do not provide
notification through logs that particular techniques were detected. This
limitation does not assist the collection of forensic evidence.
A review of the literature on malware analysis methodologies (Skoudis &
Zeltser, 2004; Zeltser, 2007) found that the most effective methodologies
take the presence of analysis avoidance techniques into account. Zelter’s
incremental, static and dynamic spiral approach for analyzing malware from
a high level of detail down to a low level of detail provided an effective
methodology to discover and mitigate analysis avoidance techniques as the
analysis progresses. Zelter’s methodology uses an iterative and recursive
technique to traverse through the phases of static analysis, molding the
environment for conitnued dynamic analysis. Zelter’s methodology begins
by performing a basic static analysis of the malware specimen such as
performing a virus scan, determining the type of file and the type of packer
used. This is followed by setting up a suitable environment to examine the
specimen in, such as Windows XP in a Virtual Machine. This is followed by
running the malware and observing its behaviour. The methodology
continues to spiral in from obtaining information from a low level of detail,
down to a highly detailed level. A graphical representation of Zelter’s
methodology is depicted in Figure 6-1. An extended model of Zelter’s spiral
analysis methodology is represented by Figure 6-2. The advantage of
extending Zelter’s spiral analysis methodology is that when anti forensic
techniques are encountered, they can be detected and mitigated before
proceeding with the analysis. This appears to be a far superior approach to
that discussed by (Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004) who neglects to include a
strategy for detecting and mitigating anti forensic techniques.
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Figure

6-1

Graphical

representation

of

Zelter's

analysis

methodology showing spiral nature through phases.

Preliminary Static Analysis

Detailed Dynamic Analysis

Tailor Static Analysis
Environment

Detect and Mitigate Dynamic
Analysis Avoidance
Technique

Detect and Mitigate Static
Analysis Avoidance
Technique

Tailor Dynamic Analysis
Environment

Detailed Static Analysis

Preliminary Dynamic Analysis

Figure 6-2 Extended analysis methodology to cater for anti-forensic
techniques.

Anti-analysis techniques are mitigated as they are

detected.
The analysis that was conducted in this research showed that the
measurement of the entropy of the malcode is very effective at detecting if
a packer has been used. The analysis of the collected malware via two
different, packer signature detectors also provided very different signature
results. Generally, once the packer signature has been determined, the
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appropriate algorithm can be applied to unpack the malware to arrive at the
OEP. However, if conflicting packer signatures are determined from two or
more packer signature detectors, both algorithms may have to be applied to
arrive at the OEP, and there is no guarantee that either one of them is
correct. This has implications with respect to wasting the time of the analyst
and certainly benefits the malware writer whose objective is to prevent or
hinder analysis of the malcode.

6.5.

RESEARCH QUESTION 3 – HOW CAN THE USE OF THESE
TECHNIQUES BE MITIGATED?

This research question was also mostly exploratory in nature and answered
through empirical results gained from controlled quasi-experiments. It was
found through quasi experimentation of the techniques that were selected
to be validated, that the techniques could be mitigated once they had been
detected. However, although popular debugging tools such as OllyDbg and
IDA Pro have plugins to help hide the debugger such as Olly Advanced
and IDA Stealth respectively, their coverage of techniques is relatively
limited given the much larger number of techniques that are available in
contrast to the number of techniques covered by the plugins. Additionally,
these plugins concentrate mostly in hiding the debugger leaving a
considerable lack of overall mitigation coverage for the remainder of the
techniques. This leaves considerable work to be done in providing mitigation
coverage for the remaining techniques in tools and scripts.

6.6.
6.6.1.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Methodology

Although the research questions were answered via the literature review,
validated through quasi-experimentation and detection of the use of
packers and protectors in collected malware, other research methods would
be of assistance, particularly to assist in triangulation to gain an improved
perspective of this phenomena. This could include a case study where
observations are made of how malware analysts in the field detect and
mitigate anti-forensic techniques.

It could include survey research

conducted via questionnaires and structured interviews of malware analysts
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in the field to find data to address a hypothesis such as “Is Malware
increasingly

using

anti

forensic

techniques”.

Conceivably,

given

the

complexity of malware, teams of malware analysts have specialties and
work together. A ethnography could be conducted to find meaning through
field observation of malware analysts and how they work together and
detect and mitigate anti-forensic techniques. Additionally, action research
could be conducted to interact with malware analysts in the field to assist in
improving the processes and methodologies associated with countering antiforensic techniques in malware.
Although detection and mitigation scripts were validated against the
implemented techniques, they were not used against the collected malware
because of the restraints of the research questions and limitations of time.
This remains as an activity to pursue.

6.7.

DISCUSSION OF CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This research claims to contribute to the body of knowledge associated with
the anti-analysis techniques malware can incorporate to hinder forensic
analysis. These claims are discussed in the following subsections.

6.7.1.

Confirmation that anti-analysis techniques are very effective

This research shows that a variety of techniques are available to authors of
malware to hinder the malware forensic analyst from fully discovering the
capabilities of the malware. Malware can use these techniques to detect if it
is being analyzed and can then use deception to hide its true intent (Brand,
2007; Eagle, 2008a; Falliere, 2007; Grugq, n.d.; Yason, 2007). This
research shows how these techniques work, how the use of these
techniques can be detected and how they can be mitigated. This line of
research that combines these three aspects has not been located in existing
research.

6.7.2.
This

Anti-analysis techniques can be detected and mitigated
research shows

that the

use

of scripting

for debuggers

and

disassemblers extends the functionality of the tools to facilitate the
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detection and mitigation of analysis avoidance techniques employed by
malware. This research recommends that the development of debugger and
disassembly scripting skills is a requisite to being able to detect and counter
analysis avoidance techniques of malware. This contribution exists at the
current front line of research in the detection of malware.

6.7.3.

Confirmation that virus signature detection is less than ideal

An examination of a sample of the malware specimens collected for the
purposes of this research shows that even though the majority of the
malware collected had been “in the wild” for up to, or exceeding one year,
the unanimous detection by a collection of thirty six AV detection engines
was

only

10.4%.

The

particular

AV

engine

used

by

the

Anubis

(International Secure Systems Lab et al., 2008) online virus analyzer only
recorded a 73.7% detection rate. This is a significant and potentially
alarming result. It indicates that even though it is accepted computer
security policy to run AV software, detection of all malware could be highly
unlikely. This is supports the findings of other researchers (Masood, 2004;
Mohandas, n.d.; Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Szewczyk & Brand, 2008).

6.7.4.

Malware extensively uses Packers and Protectors

Runtime packers are utilized by network based malware to compress
malware and to act as a counter measure to signature based AV software
via obfuscation (Sun et al., 2008). The packed malware has to be unpacked
to be able to perform a detailed static analysis because packed malware
obfuscates the malware code. Knowledge of the packer used, assists in the
process of unpacking because the appropriate unpacking methodology can
be employed. Software tools are available that attempt to determine the
name of the packer that was used to pack the malware. This research
shows that two popular packer detectors that were used by this researcher
did not agree on the names of any of the packers that were used. This is
significant because it indicates uncertainty could be associated with the
determined packer signatures and more in depth analysis is required to
validate the type of packing that was conducted. The line of this research
was extended to examine entropy (randomness) measurements of the
packed malware as a method of determining if the collected malware was
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packed or not. Entropy measurements are shown in this research to be a
very good indicator that malware has been packed.

6.7.5.

Support for a new paradigm for malware detection

AV software typically uses signature matching and recognition of heuristics
to detect malware. This approach generally requires the malware to have
been collected “from the wild”, analyzed and signatures downloaded to
client computers to approach any level of effectiveness. Significant damage
to computers could occur between the time of collection and signature
updates have been performed. In addition, it is very unlikely that AV
software will detect custom malware that has not been set loose on the
internet, but targeted against an individual or a corporation because it will
not have been analyzed and a signature will not have been obtained by an
AV company. AV software that uses this approach is seen to be fighting a
losing battle in the literature and from this research (Mila Dalla et al., 2008;
Zhou & Meador Inge, 2008). This research supports a proposal for a new
paradigm for malware detection. In particular, this research proposes that
detection of deception and anti-analysis techniques in software should flag
the software as potentially malicious and delegate for further in depth
analysis or removal.

6.7.6.

Identification of analysis tool deficiencies

A number of software tools are utilized by malware forensic analysts. Static
analysis and dynamic analysis are two methodologies that can be used to
analyse the malware (Aquilina et al., 2008). Software disassemblers and
debuggers such as IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2008) and OllyDBg (Yuschuk,
2008) can be used to perform a detailed analysis of the malware code and
provide an internal view of the malwares functionality (Valli & Brand, 2008).
This is referred to as static analysis. In contrast, dynamic analysis runs the
malware and observes the interaction of the running malware with the
computer from an external point of view. A number of plug-ins that extend
the functionality of IDA Pro and OllyDBg include IDA Stealth (Newger,
2008) and Olly Advanced (MaRKuS, 2006) respectively to work with
malicious code that employ anti-analysis techniques. The intention of such
plug-ins is to provide functionality to hide their associated tools from the
malware they are analyzing. The research in this thesis shows that the
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number of anti forensic techniques covered by such plug-ins is much less
than the number of techniques that are available to be implemented by
malware. In addition, this research shows that although the plug-ins
successfully hides the debugger or disassembler, the tools do not provide
any information to the analyst about having detected the use of analysis
avoidance techniques. This is significant because detection of the use of
anti-analysis techniques in software may be of assistance to a digital
forensic investigator to show that deception was used to hide malicious
intent.

6.7.7.

Determination of suitable malware analysis methodology

Essentially, types of malware analysis fall under two main categories,
dynamic analysis and static analysis. Dynamic analysis means the code is
run and its behaviour and interaction with the computer it is running on,
and the interaction with inter connected computers is observed. Static
analysis means that the code is not run, but the code itself is analyzed to
determine the functionality and capability of the code. Generally, dynamic
analysis is easier to perform than static analysis but malware can more
easily employ deception to hide its true intent without the analyst being
aware of it. In reality, both types of analysis can be subverted. This
research recommends that given the deceptive nature of malware, a
combination of dynamic and static analysis is best performed in a sequential
manner to mitigate analysis avoidance techniques. Fundamentally, this
means that an initial high level static analysis of the malware is first
performed. Using this information, a high level dynamic analysis is
conducted using the information from the first static analysis to setup a
suitable working environment.

Information gathered from this phase is

used as an input to conduct a more detailed static analysis, mitigating
analysis avoidance counter measures in the malware. This process of
dynamic analysis following static analysis is then followed, spiraling in from
a high level of perspective until a low level of perspective of the malware is
attained. This is very much along the lines recommended by Zeltser (2007),
but explicitly adds the search for anti forensic techniques and subsequent
mitigation as the analysis proceeds.
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6.7.8.

Development of a taxonomy of analysis avoidance techniques

This research amalgamates existing anti-analysis technique taxonomies into
a single taxonomy as shown in Table 6-2 (Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008;
Yason, 2007). This is envisaged as being potentially very useful for
classification purposes.

6.7.9.

Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge

This research has shown that malware does make extensive use of packers
and protectors to hinder analysis. This research has also shown that the
recursive and iterative approach outlined by Zeltser (2007) to analyse
malware is the most effective methodology to detect and mitigate antianalysis

techniques

as

they

are

uncovered

to

continue

analysis.

Combination of these two findings led to a proposed analysis process that
incorporates a learning taxonomy and is reproduced from the paper by Valli
and Brand (2008, p. 3) as Figure 6-3. Research remains to be done on
developing the learning taxonomy that incorporates anti-analysis techniques
into the malware analysis process. This research could possibly be
continued with surveys, case studies and ethnographies with AV software
company malware analysts and malware academic researchers. Nothing on
this particular research front has been able to be ascertained from known,
existing research. This line of research would also benefit from a study of
learning taxonomies such as Bloom’s learning taxonomy which divides
educational

objectives

into

three

domains,

affective,

cognitive

and

psychomotor (Anderson et al., 2001).
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Figure 6-3 Malware analysis process incorporating a learning
taxonomy that assists in the development of the MABOK.

The paper by Valli and Brand (2008) identified a Malware Analysis Body of
Knowledge (MABOK) that could “be used as a framework for competency
development and assessment for the field of malware analysis” (Valli &
Brand, 2008, p. 2). Essentially this is because malware analysis is
recognised to be difficult and a very broad knowledge domain is required to
undertake detailed, in-depth analysis of malware. A knowledge domain
identified by Valli and Brand (2008, p. 4) essentially from the research
conducted for this thesis, is reproduced as Figure 6-4. Essentially, the
diagram shows eight, high level categories of knowledge that are required
to undertake malware analysis. The next lower stratum identifies numerous
sub-domains of knowledge that could also be broken down into even more
sub-domains.
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Figure 6-4 Model of the learning domain of the Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK)

183

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

6.8.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The lines of enquiry examined in this research could be extended in a
number of avenues, as outlined in the following sub sections.

6.8.1.

Hypothesis

Future research could include addressing a hypothesis such as:
•

Network based malware is increasingly using anti forensic techniques.

This could be conducted by examining the network based malware collected
by the ECU Nepenthes honeypot using the analysis avoidance detection
and mitigation scripts presented in this thesis using a positivist, empirical,
quasi experimental research methodology as outlined in this thesis.

6.8.2.

Plugin Development

This research noted that plugins such as IDAStealth and OllyAdvanced
provide coverage for only a subset of analysis avoidance techniques
Additional research could be conducted on extending the coverage of
techniques of such plugins. A limitation of the existing plugins is that their
focus is on hiding the debugger and do not have the ability to detect and log
the use of anti-analysis techniques. The detection and logging of techniques
as they are discovered during forensic analysis of malware could assist in
the collection of evidence suitable for a court of law.

6.8.3.

Collation of Techniques

This research revealed an extensive range of analysis avoidance techniques
that

is

distributed

amongst

research

papers,

hacking

and

reverse

engineering sites. Detection and mitigation techniques are not represented
any where near the same extent in academic literature or on hacking and
reverse engineering sites. A very useful contribution to the field of malware
analysis research could be to collate analysis avoidance techniques together
with their corresponding detection and mitigation techniques into a central
library and to develop an encompassing taxonomy.
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6.8.4.

Improved Packer Signature Detection

Packer signature detection has been revealed in this research to be an area
that requires further and most likely, continual research. This also extends
to the area of unpacking packed malware as well. This is because malware
can use multiple packers not only from a sequential sense, for example,
pack the entire malware specimen with packer A and then pack the result
with packer B, but firstly pack sections of code with packer A and then pack
the result with packer B. This last scenario is another deception trick that is
generally only uncovered once manual analysis is conducted. It is possible
that an automated analysis process may miss the second (or third, or more)
level of packing. This remains an area of research that lacks published work.

6.8.5.

A New Paradigm for Malware Detection

This research has shown that AV software to be less than fully effective at
detecting malware. Research could continue into investigating a new
paradigm for malware detection, particularly by detecting the use of antianalysis techniques in scanned software and flagging it for more detailed
attention.

6.8.6.

A Model for Automating the Spiral Analysis Methodology

The spiral analysis methodology depicted in Figure 6-2 was proposed as a
suitable process to follow to detect and mitigate anti-forensic techniques
employed by malware in a very manual, labor intensive manner. This same
methodology is presented in Figure 6-5 in the form of a process diagram
that could be implemented in software to more automate the malware
analysis process where anti-forensic techniques need to be detected and
mitigated. It shows malware under investigation as the input to the process
that employs the spiral analysis methodology. A central control supervisor
processor is responsible for managing each step and phase of the analysis,
where recording, processing and reporting is managed or delegated to a sub
process. The supervisor function interacts with each phase by providing
control over the constituent steps in each phase. It also acts as the
recipient of data which is produced by each phase which is required to make
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decisions on how to tailor the subsequent phases. In addition to assisting
the forensic analyst, such a process could be a supplementary tool, or a
replacement, for traditional signature

and heuristic

based anti-virus

software. This is because detection of the use of deception techniques could
be a very good indicator of malicious intent as argued by this research.
Continuation of this line of research into automating the analysis process is
left to be researched.

Figure 6-5 Proposed process model to automate the spiral analysis
methodology which recursively and iteratively detects and mitigates
static and dynamic anti-analysis techniques
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CHAPTER 7
7.1.

CONCLUSION

ANALYSIS AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES OF MALWARE

AV software generally employs heuristics and signature matching to detect
the presence of malware. Determination of the signatures and heuristics of
malware is performed by analysts and sent out in updates to the signature
files anti-virus software depends on to detect its presence. It is not
uncommon for these updates to be conducted multiple times per day
because of the large number of new malicious threats that appear each day
on the internet. AV software has been shown in this research to be less than
fully effective and this supports the claims of other AV researchers. Malware
can employ a variety of techniques to avoid detection by anti-virus software
and hinder the analysis conducted by analysts. This is because malware is
becoming increasingly profit driven and more likely to incorporate stealth
and deception techniques to avoid detection.
Malware has an extensive range of anti-forensic techniques that it can
incorporate into its overall functionality to hinder analysis. This can include,
but is not limited to the following taxonomy of techniques:
•

Anti emulation

•

Anti online analysis

•

Anti hardware

•

Anti debugger

•

Anti disassembler

•

Anti tools

•

Anti memory

•

Anti process

•

Anti-analysis

•

Packers and Protectors

•

Rootkits

The overall aim of malware that incorporates these techniques is to defeat
the signature and heuristic based nature of anti-virus software and to
hinder the forensic analyst by making detailed analysis time consuming and
difficult. This research has validated a number of these techniques and all
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proved to be effective. This research has also shown that these techniques
can be detected and their use mitigated so that detailed forensic analysis
can be conducted. However, it remains a time consuming activity, based on
methodology and analysis that requires a very broad range of knowledge
and a significant skill set. Competence with scripting languages associated
with the popular debuggers is a requisite to being able to detect and
mitigate these techniques, particularly when new techniques arise. This is
because the coverage of the techniques in existing plugins and scripts is
limited. Plugins tend to concentrate on hiding the debugger, or mitigate
only a small number of the anti-analysis techniques that are available. This
is identified as a limitation analysts must be aware of. Existing analysis
scripts for some tools are more prevalent than for other tools. In either case,
the forensic analyst will need the ability to create or modify existing scripts
to conform to the requirements of the tools that the forensic analyst has
validated as forensically sound to employ.

7.2.

CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This research contributes to the body of knowledge directly related to the
anti-analysis techniques malware incorporates into its code, from a variety
of perspectives, as outlined in the following sub sections.

7.2.1.

Confirmation that anti-analysis techniques are very effective

This research shows that a variety of techniques are available to authors of
malware to hinder the malware forensic analyst from fully discovering the
capabilities of the malware.

7.2.2.
This

Anti-analysis techniques can be detected and mitigated
research shows

that the

use

of scripting

for debuggers

and

disassemblers extends the functionality of the tools to facilitate the
detection and mitigation of analysis avoidance techniques employed by
malware.

7.2.3.

Confirmation that virus signature detection is less than ideal

An examination of a sample of the malware specimens collected for the
purposes of this research shows that even though the majority of the
malware collected had been “in the wild” for up to, or exceeding one year,
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the unanimous detection by a collection of thirty six AV detection engines
was only 10.4%.

7.2.4.

Malware extensively uses Packers and Protectors

Runtime packers are utilized by network based malware to compress
malware and to act as a counter measure to signature based AV software
via obfuscation (Sun et al., 2008). Entropy measurements are shown in this
research to be a very good indicator that malware has been packed.

7.2.5.

Support for a new paradigm for malware detection

This research supports a proposal for a new paradigm for malware detection.
In particular, this research proposes that detection of deception and antianalysis techniques in software should flag the software as potentially
malicious and delegate for further in depth analysis or removal.

7.2.6.

Identification of a Malware Body of Knowledge

The knowledge required to analyse malware is extensive. A Malware
Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK) has been identified from the conduct
of this research, to include anti-forensics as a very significant component.

7.2.7.

Identification of analysis tool deficiencies

The research in this thesis shows that the number of anti forensic
techniques covered by such plug-ins is much less than the number of
techniques that are available to be implemented by malware. In addition,
this research shows that although the plug-ins successfully hides the
debugger or disassembler, the tools do not provide any information to the
analyst about having detected the use of analysis avoidance techniques.
This is significant because detection of the use of anti-analysis techniques in
software may be of assistance to a digital forensic investigator to show that
deception was used to hide malicious intent.

7.2.8.

Determination of a suitable malware analysis methodology

This research outlines a suitable methodology for analyzing malware that
incorporates anti-analysis techniques.

189

Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software

7.2.9.

Development of a taxonomy of analysis avoidance techniques

This research amalgamates existing anti-analysis technique taxonomies into
a single taxonomy.

7.3.

LINKING OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

Malware can use anti-forensic techniques and use deception to hide its real
purpose whilst being analyzed. If it does not perform any malicious action
while it is being analyzed, it may be accepted on the system as being safe,
or excluded from the evidence collection process. Then once free from
analysis, the malware can perform its original, malicious objective. Some
considerations must be made in order to closely analyze malware. Firstly,
totally relying on AV software to classify the malware could be a mistake
because signature based detection is far less than ideal. It is unlikely to
recognize customized malware that has not been analyzed before. This
leads to necessity of the digital forensic analyst to analyze the malware
manually. It must be noted that a significant number of anti-analysis
techniques exist covering the entire spectrum of the computational
mechanics of computers. These techniques are very effective at hindering
analysis. This can be compounded by additional factors. This includes
deficiencies in analysis tools that do not cover the number of anti-analysis
techniques that are available. It is made more difficult by the number of
packers and protectors that malware can use. This makes it hard because a
typical technique to unpack the malware is to use known algorithms to let
the malware unpack itself to reach the OEP. In doing so, control is given to
the malware and an opportunity exists for the malware to detect that is
being analyzed and to employ deception. An additional consideration is that
a very extensive knowledge of programming, debugging and operating
system internals is required that arguably exceeds the level attained even
by competent software engineers. On the positive side, the use of antianalysis techniques can be detected and mitigated, given significant
analysis skills have been attained. This can be assisted by using an
appropriate methodology where static and dynamic methods are combined
in such a way that the view of the malware transitions from a high level of
detail down to a low level of detail, mitigating the anti-analysis techniques
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as analysis progresses in a spiral analysis methodology. Although legitimate
software uses anti-analysis techniques to protect itself from reverse
engineers, malware is almost certain to use anti-analysis techniques. So
much so, the detection of the use of anti-analysis techniques may be a very
good indicator of the presence of malware.

7.4.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM RESEARCH APPROACH AND
CONDUCT

The selected research method to address the research questions was
positivist, empirical and quasi experimental. The research questions were
essentially exploratory in nature. Validation of the techniques, followed by
their detection and mitigation, was conducted in a series of controlled quasiexperiments. This effectively answered the research questions. Other
empirical methods such as action research, ethnography, survey and case
study could have been used, but would have required access to malware
researchers desirably working in AV software laboratories for an extended
period of time, and preferably, in situ. Such access is not possible for this
researcher at this time. A combination of these methods would not have
necessarily enhanced the validity of the results but would have undoubtedly
contributed to answering the research questions. Triangulation would have
been assisted by using additional tools to validate the results as would have
using multiple analysts to perform the quasi experiments.

7.5.

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

A number of significant implications have arisen from this research. A large
number of anti-analysis techniques were uncovered and found to be very
effective when implemented in small stand alone programs. These same
techniques could be detected and mitigated by the development of scripts
and plugins. Existing analysis tools serve primarily to hide the tools from
being counter detected by the malware and cover a small minority of the
available techniques malware can use to hinder analysis. These tools do not
provide functionality to log or record detection of analysis avoidance
techniques. Logging or recording of these techniques may be of great use to
the digital forensic investigator when analyzing malware whilst investigating
a case. Functionality can be added to existing tools by custom development
of scripts and plugins. Knowledge of analysis avoidance techniques and
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being able to script and develop plugins adds to a body of knowledge, the
MABOK, identified by this research. The MABOK covers the knowledge
domain required to analyse malware and will be useful for assessment and
skill development for analysts working with malware. In addition, this
research shows an appropriate methodology should be employed by the
forensic analyst to detect and mitigate these anti-analysis techniques as
analysis continues.
This research supports claims that AV software performs at a less than ideal
level and that a new paradigm is warranted. This research recommends that
any software that employs anti-analysis techniques be treated as suspicious.
This is because a characteristic employed by nearly all malware examined in
this research employed anti forensic techniques, primarily packers and
protectors.
Deficiencies in existing tools and plugins were found in the tools used for
this research with respect to handling anti forensic techniques. This
exemplifies the need for analysts to be able to conduct manual analysis and
to not rely on automated tools. In addition, this emphasizes the importance
of possessing the ability to be able to extend the functionality of the tools
on an as required basis.
This research can be continued on a number of fronts. Firstly, it could
continue the search for anti forensic techniques employed by the malware
that was collected for the purposes of this research. Such a line of enquiry
could use the existing detection and mitigation scripts as a foundation and
continue in the development and use against the collected malware. This
work could use a hypothesis such as “malware is increasingly using anti
forensic techniques” and show the use of the techniques over time for
collected malware.
Another line of enquiry would be to use the detection of anti forensic
techniques as a new paradigm for AV software. This would very much suit
the application of the true experiment research methodology.
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